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Abstract
Privacy is considered one of the fundamental human rights. Researchers have been investigating
privacy issues in various domains, such as our physical privacy, data privacy, privacy as a legal
right, and privacy designs. In the Human-Computer Interaction field, privacy researchers have been
focusing on understanding people’s privacy concerns when they interact with computing systems,
designing and building privacy-enhancing technologies to help people mitigate these concerns, and
investigating how people’s privacy perceptions and the privacy designs influence people’s behaviors.
Existing privacy research has been overwhelmingly focusing on the privacy needs of end-users,
i.e., people who use a system or a product, such as Internet users and smartphone users. However, as
our computing systems are becoming more and more complex, privacy issues within these systems
have started to impact not only the end-users but also other stakeholders, and privacy-enhancing
mechanisms designed for the end-users can also affect multiple stakeholders beyond the users.
In this dissertation, I examine how different stakeholders perceive privacy-related issues and
expect privacy designs to function across three application domains: online behavioral advertising,
drones, and smart homes. I choose these three domains because they represent different multi-
stakeholder environments with varying nature of complexity. In particular, these environments
present the opportunities to study technology-mediated interpersonal relationships, i.e., the relation-
ship between primary users (owners, end-users) and secondary users (bystanders), and to investigate
how these relationships influence people’s privacy perceptions and their desired ways of privacy
protection.
Through a combination of qualitative, quantitative, and design methods, including interviews,
surveys, participatory designs, and speculative designs, I present how multi-stakeholder considera-
tions change our understandings of privacy and influence privacy designs. I draw design implications
from the study results and guide future privacy designs to consider the needs of different stakehold-
ers, e.g., cooperative mechanisms that aim to enhance the communication between primary and
secondary users.
In addition, this methodological approach allows researchers to directly and proactively engage
with multiple stakeholders and explore their privacy perceptions and expected privacy designs.
This is different from what has been commonly used in privacy literature and as such, points to a
methodological contribution.
Finally, this dissertation shows that when applying the theory of Contextual Integrity in a
multi-stakeholder environment, there are hidden contextual factors that may alter the contextual
informational norms. I present three examples from the study results and argue that it is necessary to
carefully examine such factors in order to clearly identify the contextual norms. I propose a research
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Privacy research has been primarily centered around end-users, trying to understand users’ privacy
perceptions, concerns, needs, and expectations. As a result, privacy-enhancing mechanisms that
aim to mitigate people’s privacy concerns have also been designed around end-users. However,
as the existing socio-technical systems are becoming more and more complex, the privacy issues
associated with these systems have impacted people beyond the end-users. For example, in the
domain of the Internet of Things (IoT), when IoT devices collect data from their end-users, they
may also collect data of other people accidentally, such as a security camera capturing the images
of passersby and Amazon Echo recording the voice of people who are in the background.
More critically, privacy-enhancing mechanisms that are designed to address people’s privacy
concerns may potentially create an unintended impact on other stakeholders, making privacy designs
less desirable or usable. For example, the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P), a computer-
readable language for privacy policies, provided a tangible way for Internet users to manage
their privacy. However, it eventually became ill-fated due to several reasons, such as insufficient
enforcement by web organizations [60, 186], ad-hoc derivation of privacy policies [199], and
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discrepancies with their natural language counterparts [179]. In a sense, the lack of consideration
about how P3P may have impacted or have been impacted by other stakeholders (web organizations,
websites, etc.) contributes to its fate. Should these stakeholders be accounted for, P3P might have a
different outcome.
In this dissertation, building on the notion of multiple stakeholders, I investigate in the following
overarching research question, how does the multi-stakeholder perspective change our under-
standings of privacy and inform privacy designs? The goal is to understand in a socio-technical
system, 1) how the consideration of multiple stakeholders may change people’s privacy perceptions
and expectations, and 2) how privacy designs may influence or are influenced by different stake-
holders. To be more specific, in the scope of this dissertation, I do not focus on all stakeholders
in a socio-technical system. Instead, I primarily focus on the perspective of technology-mediated
interpersonal relationships (e.g., primary users and secondary users, owners and guests, etc).
To explore the above questions, I conducted a series of studies across three domains in which
multiple stakeholders were involved, including Online Behavior Advertising (OBA), drones, and
smart homes. I studied OBA because OBA focuses on individual users and relies on the data
collected from these users. At the same time, OBA is significantly constrained by the needs
and resources of multiple stakeholders (e.g., legal policies, tracking technology, etc.). I studied
drones because, as an emerging technology, drones represent a relatively simple multi-stakeholder
environment that primarily contains drone controllers and drone bystanders. Finally, I chose to study
smart homes because smart homes represent a complex social environment with many variables,
such as different social relationships, power dynamics, and potential confrontations.
I started the research by investigating average Internet users’ understandings of how OBA works
through an interview study. The results of the interview study informed the design and development
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of a web tracking blocker. To explore the impact of the blockers on different stakeholders who are
involved in the web tracking eco-system (e.g., legal stakeholder, economic stakeholder, technological
stakeholders, and societal stakeholder), I followed up with a speculative design exploration. The
speculation surfaced many potential issues beyond the usability and efficacy of a blocker, such as
the tension between protecting users’ privacy and tracking companies making profits. These issues
could potentially inform the design of a web tracking blocker in the current time.
In the drone domain, building upon my prior research on understanding the privacy perceptions
of drone bystanders (i.e., people who can be captured by the drone footage), I conducted an
interview study to investigate the privacy perceptions of drone controllers. The results suggested
the mismatched perceptions between controllers and bystanders. For example, when bystanders
were concerned about their photos being taken by the drones, controllers thought the concerns were
exaggerated since the drone cameras could not capture their images. Based on these perceptions, I
proposed several privacy-enhancing mechanisms for drones. I ran a survey study to examine how
controllers and bystanders perceive these mechanisms and whether they would like to use them.
The results suggest that mechanisms that considered the needs of both bystanders and controllers
received more recognition from both groups, such as the controller-bystander app and the automatic
face blurring.
In the smart home domain, I started with discovering smart home users’ privacy perceptions
and their desired ways to protect their own privacy through a co-design study. I then conducted
similar research with smart home bystanders (i.e., people who are not the users nor the owners of
smart home devices but are subject to the data collection of these devices, such as guests, visitors,
passersby, etc.), and tried to understand their privacy perceptions, needs, and desired ways to address
their concerns. The results suggest that bystanders, whose privacy needs are often ignored, also have
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privacy needs in smart homes. Through comparing the results with the two types of stakeholders in
smart homes, I also discovered that cooperative mechanisms (i.e., mechanisms that bridge the needs
of users and bystanders) are promising to fulfill the privacy needs of both stakeholders.
In the end, I synthesized the results from all three domains and summarized the design impli-
cations for privacy designs in general, considering the needs of multiple stakeholders. Besides, I
also argued how the results of this dissertation complement the theory of Contextual Integrity and
called out a research agenda to facilitate the discovery of contextual informational norms in the
multi-stakeholder environment.
1.1 Document Organization
This dissertation starts by reviewing the literature on various conceptualizations of privacy, the
theoretical foundation of this dissertation, and privacy research from the multi-stakeholder perspec-
tive. The literature review leads to the primary research question, how does the multi-stakeholder
perspective change our understandings of privacy and inform privacy designs?
To answer this question, I present three case studies: online behavioral advertising, drone, and
smart homes. In each case study, I first present the privacy issues and designs from the end user’s
perspective. Then, I present the exploration of other stakeholders’ perspectives. In each case, I
discuss the design implications drawing from this case regarding how considering the needs of
multi-stakeholder informs privacy designs.
In the discussion, I synthesize the results from all three cases and analyze the commonalities, then
draw design implications to reflect the lesson learned across all three domains. I then discuss how
this dissertation contributes to the theory of Contextual Integrity. At last, I present a research agenda
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to facilitate the application of the theory of Contextual Integrity in multi-stakeholder environments.
This dissertation contains text from several previous papers [231, 233, 232, 229, 230]. Additional
text written for this dissertation will be used for future publication.
1.2 Overview
This dissertation investigates the privacy perceptions and expectations of two different stakehold-
ers (e.g., technology users, bystanders, and external stakeholders) in three domains (i.e., online
behavioral advertising, drones, and smart homes), as well as their desired controls to manage their
privacy. The dissertation includes three projects, which were conducted from April 2017 through
August 2019. The first project on online behavioral advertising includes an interview study with 21
participants, followed by a speculative design exploration. The second project on drones includes
an interview study with 12 drone controllers, a second interview study with 16 participants, and
a survey with 169 drone controllers and 717 drone bystanders. The third project on smart homes
includes a co-design study with 25 smart home users and another co-design study with 18 smart
home bystanders. The series of studies yield the following contributions.
1.3 Major Contributions
This dissertation makes four main contributions.
First, by examining three technological domains, this dissertation explores the privacy issues in
each domain from the multi-stakeholder perspective with a primary focus on technology-mediated
interpersonal relationships (e.g., drone controllers and bystanders). We find that conflicting interests
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and social confrontations may change people’s privacy perceptions, which further change how
privacy mechanisms are designed.
Second, through the Contextual Integrity (CI) theory lens, this dissertation shows that in an
environment that involves multiple stakeholders, there are some hidden factors that may influence
the contextual informational norms (e.g., social relationships). As a result, this dissertation advocates
that future research is needed to apply the CI theory to multi-stakeholder contexts.
Third, methodologically, this dissertation, unlike other methods in the literature that involve
multiple stakeholders indirectly (e.g., Privacy Impact Assessment), uses a combination of qualitative,
quantitative and design methods to directly engage different stakeholders in the research and allow
researchers to dive deeply in the privacy perceptions of different stakeholders.
Fourth, this dissertation lays out design implications for practitioners and provides a research




In this section, I first review the literature related to various conceptualizations of privacy. Then,
I draw the definition of privacy from the Theory of Contextual Integrity and the definition of
stakeholders from the Stakeholder Theory to form the theoretical foundation of this dissertation.
Finally, I review the literature related to the multi-stakeholder perspective of privacy research, which
motivates the overarching research question for the remaining dissertation.
2.1 What is Privacy?
Solove defined privacy in the taxonomy, that privacy “is in disarray [and n]obody can articulate
what it means” [193]. Although researchers from different science fields have attempted to define
privacy numerous times, it is widely recognized that privacy is hard to define [192]. As such,
in reviewing the literature on privacy conceptualizations, I will not provide a concrete definition
of privacy. Instead, I will focus on several different conceptualizations of privacy from a social
and legal perspective, and summarize how researchers from different realms define privacy. This
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approach is largely inspired by Smith et al.’s work about information privacy research [192].
Privacy as a human right.
In Harvard Law Reviews (1890), Warren and Brandeis’ defined general privacy as “the right
to be left alone” [212]. They considered privacy as a fundamental human right. This definition
has been found to influence many court cases that were related to general privacy [192]. In my
opinion, this is a very initial attempt to define general privacy and is a very valuable benchmark.
However, this definition does not consider the role of information privacy versus physical privacy,
and I perceive this definition as more leaning towards physical privacy.
Privacy as a commodity.
Bennett (1995) and Cohen (2001) defined general privacy from an economic perspective. They
both believed that privacy is on the contrary side of the information market economy [28, 53]. To
them, rather than a fundamental human right, privacy is the economic principles of cost-benefits and
trade-off [28, 53]. The idea of this definition is the fact that consumers shift their minds of privacy
from a human right to a commodity. They can sell their information or cooperate the gathering
of their data in exchange for some benefits, or perceived benefits [45, 65, 8]. This definition was
leaning towards information privacy rather than physical privacy.
Privacy as a state.
Westin (1967) introduced the concept of “privacy as a state” [215]. He defined privacy from
four psychological states: anonymity, solitude, reserve, and intimacy [215]. It is worth noting that
Westin’s conceptualization of privacy is largely in the “individual” level rather than the “collective”
or “group” level, as Margulis later commented, “ (Westin) models the organization on an individual
who acts rather than on a collective” [145]. Weinstein (1971) defined privacy as a state of “being
apart from others” [214]. In this definition, it is important to understand that unlike other states such
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as alienation, loneliness, ostracism, and isolation which are generally initiated by the larger society,
privacy is normally pursued by individual [214].
Privacy as a control.
Altman (1975) introduced the concept of privacy as a control. Altman defined privacy as “an
interpersonal boundary-control process which paces and regulates the interaction with others”,
and “the selective control of access to the self or one’s group” [13]. Based on this definition,
Margulis [145] further defined, “Privacy, as a whole or in part, represents the control of transactions
between a person(s) and other(s), the ultimate aim of which is to enhance autonomy and/or to
minimize vulnerability”. Such a definition has been used in mainstream research in the privacy field
and becomes the origin of many other definitions of privacy in other fields, such as information
system and marketing [62]. For example, in the information system field, Culnan defined privacy as
“the ability of individuals to control the terms under which their personal information is acquired
and use. ”[62]
Privacy as a situational concept.
Laufer and Wolfe (1977) conceptualized general privacy as a situational concept which tied to
concrete situations [130]. These situations generally have three dimensions: self-ego, environmen-
tal, and interpersonal. Information systems, economics, and marketing scholars narrowed these
definitions of general privacy so that they addressed information-based issues. The state of limited
access was translated to the state of limited access to information. Furthermore, in the theory of
Contextual Integrity, Nissenbaum introduced two information norms that serve as the benchmark of
privacy: the appropriateness of the information to be revealed in a certain context’ and the flow or
distribution of information from one party to another [165, 164]. She further noted that privacy is




Privacy is not a singular concept but resembles a family taxonomy with different categories
of privacy-related problems and the relations among these problems. These problems include
information collection, processing, dissemination, and invasions. It is more philosophical than prac-
tical [193]. For instance, how to operationalize different categories of privacy-related problems in
this taxonomy is an open question [193]. Also, it may fall into a recursive situation to conceptualize
privacy with privacy-related problems.
Aside from the above conceptualizations of privacy, Nissenhaum defined privacy as a contextual
integrity. Next, I will focus on the theory of Contextual Integrity, from which I draw the definition
of privacy for the remaining of this dissertation.
2.2 Theory of Contextual Integrity
Since privacy research is very interdisciplinary, many theories from other fields (e.g., psychology,
education, etc.) have contributed to the evolvement of privacy theories. In this dissertation, I choose
the theory of Contextual Integrity (CI) as the theoretical foundation, primarily because CI is not
conditioned to a specific time, location, or a specific situation [164]. Instead, it can be applied
to different contexts “sweepingly defined as spheres of life such as education, politics, and the
marketplace or as finely drawn as the conventional routine of visiting the dentist. . . ” [164]. As a
multi-stakeholder perspective can potentially introduce new angel of the privacy issues in various
contexts, the CI theory provides a solid foundation to examine the emerging privacy issues. A
more in-depth discussion of the CI theory will be presented in the discussion section. Here I briefly
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review the theory formation and its application.
Nissenbaum proposed the theory of Contextual Integrity (CI) in 2004. The CI theory introduced
the appropriate information to be collected under a certain context, and the appropriate information
flow or distribution as the benchmark of privacy integrity [164]. As such, privacy is considered
as breached if either one of the two norms is violated, and maintained if both of the norms are
honored [164]. Another main idea in the CI theory is such norms are always associated with a
specific context, thus are not universally applicable [164, 165]. In the further development of the CI
theory, Nissenbaum adapted it to the online environment [165].
The development of this theory was originally motivated by the ambiguity of public surveillance
practices, which consist of various ways of monitoring individuals, such as public records online,
consumer profiling and data mining, and RFID usage [164]. It was previously assumed that people
have little privacy expectations in public spaces and that aggregations of information are not intrusive
if individual pieces of the information were not intrusive [54]. Nissenbaum argues that public
records online violate the norm of information flow because certain locally kept records of an
individual had been moved to the web and this placement had altered the information accessibility
from local to global [165, 164]. RFID usage can also violate customers’ privacy because RFID can
make customers’ information available to retailers, manufacturers, and other entities. As such, it
transfers the discretion of using the information from the customers to the information gatherers.
Therefore, it is also a violation of the information flow [164].
Several projects have leveraged the theory of contextual integrity in unpacking privacy violations
in different contexts [127, 33, 239, 169, 205, 191, 23, 202]. Similarly, the theory of contextual
integrity can guide our inquiry towards what information might be appropriate or inappropriate to
collect by various technologies, and how the information should be distributed or shared among
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different stakeholders. Discovering these norms can help us design privacy mechanisms to address
potential privacy issues in various contexts.
2.3 Stakeholder Theory
Situated in the organizational context, Freeman proposed the Stakeholder Theory of organizational
management and business ethics [88]. In the original work that detailed the Stakeholder Theory
framework, Freeman first defined a “stakeholder” as “any group or individual who can affect or is
affected by the achievement of an organization’s objectives” [88]. The theory then stresses the rela-
tionship between a business and its various stakeholders, such as customer, suppliers, investors, and
others who may assist or hinder the achievement of the organization objectives [88], and addresses
the business morals and values explicitly as a central feature in organization management [88].
For example, when making decisions in the organization context, sometimes managers have to
ignore some existing relationships and obligations among different stakeholders in the organization,
because they need to consider other stronger relationships and obligations [102]. The key here is
that this entire process should be exposed and examined, and the conversation among different
stakeholders should be facilitated [118]. In a sense, it calls for the needs to explicitly consider
different stakeholders in the decision-making process of an organization. Besides, it also implies
that the interests of these stakeholders are eventually joint to create values for each stakeholder [89].
As such, the Stakeholder Theory is fundamentally a theory about how to manage a business
effectively and how the business works at its best [89]. Since the origin of the Stakeholder
Theory in 1984, it has become a key theoretical foundation when studying business ethics and
management [21, 113, 184, 51, 155, 90, 189, 181] and has challenged the traditional view that
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business should treat the shareholders’ wealth as the primary goal [89].
Inspired by the Stakeholder Theory, privacy researchers, when trying to understand the privacy
issues or designing for protection, it is critical to consider not only the direct users but also other
stakeholders who might impact or be influenced by the direct users. Research should also look into
the interconnected relationship among all the stakeholders to understand privacy more thoroughly.
Privacy designs, on the other hand, should also create values for all stakeholders rather than only for
direct users. Drawing from the Stakeholder Theory [88], in the context of this dissertation, I define
a “stakeholder” as “an individual or entity who can facilitate or hinder the use of technology”.
Under this definition, many existing technologies have multiple stakeholders. For example, in
the context of a smart home, homeowners are the primary stakeholders since they are the users
of the smart home devices. In addition, there are many other stakeholders as well, such as the
guests who are visiting the home, the passersby and the neighbors who may be recorded by the
outdoor security cameras in the house, and so on. More broadly speaking, policymakers, device
manufacturers, and advertising companies are all stakeholders of the smart home since they can
impact or can be impacted by the use of smart home devices.
However, the existing privacy research has been overwhelmingly focusing on the privacy of
the primary users and rarely touched on the privacy of and the potential implications on other
stakeholders. In the next section, I will review the literature, though limited, on multi-stakeholder
privacy research, from which I will draw the main research question for this dissertation.
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2.4 Multi-Stakeholder Privacy Research
Privacy research has been primarily focusing on the privacy of the end-users, aiming to understand
their privacy perceptions and concerns. Privacy designs and mechanisms are also built to address
the needs of end-users. However, socio-technical systems may have influenced many stakeholders
other than the end-users.
To this end, only a few prior research has explicitly discussed and addressed the multi-stakeholder
aspect of privacy issues. For example, in wireless communication, the owner/primary users of
cognitive radio require detailed usage information from the secondary users to calculate how much
they should be paid [176]. However, the detailed information provided by the secondary users
may invade the privacy of the secondary users. In this context, Zamkov et al. developed a privacy-
preserving mechanism that allows the privacy users to only know how much they should be paid
without having all information from the secondary users [176]. Similarly, as a key component
in the cognitive radio networks, cooperative spectrum sensing also poses great privacy risks to
the secondary users since the sensing requires precious location information from the secondary
users [100]. To address this issue, Hamdaoui et al. developed a privacy-preserving framework based
on cryptography to protect the privacy of secondary users [100].
Besides, some other research has also loosely touched on the privacy of different stakeholders in
various contexts. For example, from the view of bystanders, Denning et al. find that people expected
to be asked for permission before they are recorded by Virtual Reality devices [66]. Lifelogging
devices, such as SenseCam [105], have the risks to capture bystanders’ faces and behaviors and
put their privacy at risk [108]. In the context of a smart home, Lau et al. found that secondary
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users’ privacy might be breached if their voices were accidentally recorded by the voice assis-
tant [129]. Stone and Stone-Remero discussed the privacy from the multi-stakeholder perspective
in organization employment contexts and expressed the concerns on conflicts between companies’
needs to enhance their authority and power through collecting employee’s data and individual
employee’s needs for privacy [198]. On the legal front, the US National Telecommunication and
Information Administration (NTIA) published the multi-stakeholder process for the Internet of
Things Security [4], the unmanned aircraft systems [3], and cybersecurity vulnerabilities [2]. Such
a process aims to provide opportunities to discuss and come to a consensus across all stakeholders,
and negotiate potential solutions when there is difficulty to achieve consensus [5].
However, one core issue in a multi-stakeholder environment is the potential conflict of interests
among different stakeholders. Such conflict of interests could potentially change how different
stakeholders perceived privacy, how privacy-enhancing mechanisms are designed, and whether the
privacy designs will be adopted. In this dissertation, I aim to unpack how the multi-stakeholder
perspective informs privacy designs by examining three cases, each of which involves at least two
different stakeholders. The goal is to understand the privacy perceptions of different stakeholders,
their desired way of privacy protection, how they are impacted by other stakeholders in the eco-
system, and then draw design implications to guide future privacy designs.
2.5 Research Question
Drawing from the above literature as well as the theory of Contextual Integrity and the Stakeholder
Theory, I aim to investigate the privacy perceptions and designs from a multi-stakeholder perspective.
As such, in this dissertation, the overarching research question is:
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How does the multi-stakeholder perspective change the understandings of privacy and
inform privacy designs?
To explore this research question, I turn to three different domains, i.e., online behavioral
advertising, drones, and smart homes, to understand how considering multiple stakeholders in these
specific domains changes people’s privacy perceptions and designs. In each case, I start with the
immediate stakeholder, i.e., the end-users, then expand the scope to other stakeholders.
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Part II
Case 1: Online Behavior Advertising (OBA)
18
Chapter 3
Online Privacy: Users’ Understandings of
OBA
Online Behavioral Advertising (OBA) is pervasive on the Internet. While there is a line of empirical
research that studies Internet users’ attitudes and privacy preferences of OBA, little is known about
their actual understandings of how OBA works. This is an important question to answer because
people often draw on their understanding to make decisions. Through a qualitative study conducted
in an iterative manner, we identify four “folk models” held by our participants about how OBA
works and show how these models are either incomplete or inaccurate in representing common
OBA practices. We discuss how privacy tools can be designed to consider these folk models. In
addition, most of our participants felt that the information being tracked is more important than who
the web trackers are. This suggests the potential for an information-based blocking scheme rather
than a tracker-based blocking scheme used by most existing ad-blocking tools.
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3.1 Introduction
Online Behavioral Advertising (OBA), or targeted advertising, is prevalent on today’s Internet [196].
OBA is “the practice of tracking an individual’s online activities in order to deliver advertising
tailored to the individual’s interests” [55]. A common practice of OBA is that first-party sites (i.e.,
sites that a user visits voluntarily) rely on third-party entities (e.g., ad networks) to track a user’s
browsing activities across websites and to serve ads targeted at the user [146]. OBA can benefit both
advertising companies (e.g., increasing click-through rates and prices of ads [27]) and Internet users
(e.g., providing ads that better match their potential interests [147, 205]). However, since OBA
involves online tracking and profiling of users, it has raised significant privacy issues [204, 147, 205].
Prior studies have found various user attitudes and perceptions of OBA (e.g., [204, 147, 205,
133, 177]). For instance, Ur et al. note that people find OBA “creepy and scary” because of its
online tracking practices, but sometimes people also find OBA “smart and useful” [205]. As such,
individual users seem to have varying acceptance of OBA depending on the context [48, 211, 150].
However, most of these studies either (1) did not study people’s understandings of how OBA works
(e.g., [204, 132]) or (2) investigated people’s perceptions of OBA after the researchers explained
OBA (e.g., [133, 177, 48, 211, 150]), therefore it is not clear to what extent ordinary Internet users
actually understand how OBA works nor what their understandings are.
Drawing from the literature on mental models, we examine people’s understandings of how
OBA works. Psychologist Kenneth Craik pioneered the concept of mental models, describing “the
mind constructs ‘small-scale models’ of reality that it uses to anticipate events, to reason, and to
underlie explanation” [57]. Since then, the notion of mental models has been further developed. For
instance, Phil Johnson-Laird, an influential scholar of mental models defines them as “psychological
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representations of real, hypothetical, or imaginary situations” [116]. Mental models have also been
studied extensively to understand how people comprehend various things such as language and
music [96]. In addition, “mental models affect people’s reasoning” [116] and people draw from
their mental models to make various decisions [116, 117]. For instance, people’s mental models of
how thermostats work influence the ways in which they control these devices [217].
The mental model approach has also been applied in the domain of privacy and security
(e.g., [9, 20, 44, 213, 35, 138, 158, 75]), but has not been systematically used in the context of OBA.
Rick Wash conducted an interview study to examine people’s mental models of home computer
security [213]. He notes, “to understand the rationale for people’s behavior, it’s important to
understand the decision model that people use” [213]. Drawing from prior literature (e.g., [185, 10]),
he uses the term folk models to denote mental models that can be incorrect representations of reality
but are used by people in practice [213].
Our work was in part inspired by Wash’s study [213]. We aim to uncover people’s folk models
of OBA, regardless of whether these models accurately represent the reality of OBA. We note that
mental models can encompass more than a picture of how things work [96], but here we use folk
models to denote people’s understanding of how OBA works. There is little work that touches on
this question, and our study aims to fill the gap. We believe that understanding people’s folk models
of OBA is important because these models can influence people’s behavior or decisions regarding
OBA, for instance, how they control or limit OBA. Furthermore, privacy tools for OBA can be more
effective when they incorporate people’s folk models, for example, by helping people recognize
privacy risks (e.g., third-party tracking) and adopt countermeasures (e.g., blocking third-party
trackers).
We inductively developed four folk models of OBA held by our participants through a qualitative
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study conducted in an iterative manner. In addition to a pilot study with eight people, we conducted
two rounds of semi-structured interviews with another 21 Internet users from different U.S. states
and cities. These models differ in terms of the following: who tracks Internet users’ information;
where the tracked information is stored; and how targeted ads are selected or served.
Similar to Wash’s study [213], our qualitative research does not support claims that can be
generalized to all Internet users, but it instead aims to uncover folk models that people have about
OBA and that can inform future privacy-enhancing designs for OBA. In the sense of theoretical
sampling [142], the discovered folk models are held by real people but the study says little about
how common or statistically representative these models are in the general population.
To guide future privacy tools for OBA, we also asked participants’ opinions about what tools
or features they desire in order to help them protect their privacy in the context of OBA. While
most OBA tools focus on trackers, most of our interviewees felt that the information being tracked
is more important than trackers (i.e., who is tracking the information). This result suggests the
potential for an information-based blocking scheme rather than a tracker-based blocking scheme
used by most existing ad-blocking tools such as Ghostery.
This chapter makes two main contributions. First, we uncover different folk models of OBA
that ordinary Internet users have. These models have implications for privacy designs and public
policies of OBA. Second, we identify people’s desired features of privacy-enhancing tools for OBA.
These features should be explored by future privacy tools.
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3.2 Related Work
Our work was mainly inspired by prior research on people’s attitudes and perceptions of online
tracking and OBA, as well as people’s mental models of privacy and security.
3.2.1 People’s Attitudes and Perceptions of OBA
There is a line of empirical research that examines people’s attitudes towards OBA mostly via
surveys. Several surveys have shown people’s objection of online tracking and OBA. For instance,
Turow et al. polled 1000 Internet users in the U.S. and found that 87% of them did not want
advertisers to track them online [204]. Similarly, McDonald and Cranor found that 64% of their
survey respondents considered targeted ads to be “invasive” [147]. Another survey found that one
major reason why the respondents disliked OBA was because of online tracking and subsequent
analyses of the tracked data [175].
However, Ur et al.’s interview study has painted a more nuanced picture. They found that many
of their interviewees considered OBA “creepy and scary” because of its online tracking practices,
but sometimes people also found targeted ads “smart and useful” [205]. This study also suggested
people’s acceptance of OBA may vary depending on the context.
A number of subsequent survey studies focused on people’s context-based preferences of
OBA [48, 211, 150]. Leon et al. found that the data retention period and scope of data use
significantly affected their respondents’ willingness to share data for OBA [133]. Chanchary and
Chiasso found that people’s OBA preferences differ by the first-party sites they visit [48]. Melicher
et al. combined their participants’ browsing histories and interview data in identifying additional
situational factors such as the types of information being tracked and the frequency of visiting
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first-party sites that can affect people’s attitudes towards online tracking [150]. Wang et al. surveyed
both American and Chinese Internet users and found that both user groups had different OBA
preferences based on the type of first-party sites, despite the fact that the former had more privacy
concerns over OBA than the latter [211].
While these prior studies offer invaluable insights into people’s perceptions of OBA, most
of these studies (e.g., [133, 177, 48, 211, 150]) provided a detailed explanation of OBA before
examining people’s preferences of it. In contrast, four prior studies asked people’s perceptions
of OBA before explaining OBA [204, 147, 205, 132] and two of them did not ask about people’s
understandings of how OBA works [204, 132]. The other two studies touched on this question but
did not yield mental models that represent people’s understandings of OBA [147, 205]. Ur et al.’s
study focused on people’s attitudes towards OBA rather than their understandings of OBA [205].
The remaining study investigated people’s beliefs about OBA [147] but differed significantly from
our study.
More specifically, McDonald and Cranor provided their survey respondents four diagrams
depicting different configurations of first- and third-party cookies in OBA and asked the respondents
to select the configuration which was not possible [147]. Unlike their approach, we sought to
discover people’s folk models of OBA without providing any a priori models or pictures to constrain
or influence their thinking. We have discovered folk models (e.g., browser-based models) that differ
from the models they provided in their study. We will present our folk models in the results section.
In addition, few studies have touched on people’s understanding of online tracking and OBA.
Rader conducted an online experiment and found that most participants were aware that sites like
Google or Facebook can collect information about their users’ activities on them (e.g., what pages
they visit or what links they click) [177]. This is a case of first-party tracking. Ur et al. asked their
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interviewees the ways in which ads are tailored to them. The two most common methods mentioned
were based on users’ browsing histories and web searches [205]. Another survey study found that
people have various understandings of the type of data (e.g., personal information or location) web
trackers can track online [48]. Some of these perceptions were incorrect, e.g., people thought online
tracking was malware and online tracking directly involved local browsing history [150]. Our work
differs from these studies in that we focus on people’s folk models of OBA rather than exploring
them in passing.
Overall, the extant literature does not provide a clear picture of the folk models people have
about how OBA works. Our study aims to fill this gap.
3.2.2 People’s Mental Models of Privacy and Security
The mental model approach has been employed by a number of researchers to investigate people’s
understandings of the Internet [200, 119]. Thatcher and Grey’s work utilized drawing as a means of
understanding people’s mental models [200]. Their work revealed several typical understandings
of how the Internet works, such as considering the Internet as a central database, or as a modular
structure network [200]. Our study adopted a similar drawing task to solicit people’s understandings
of OBA.
Kang et al. observed that people’s mental models of how the Internet works can be very different,
and these models were partially influenced by people’s technical knowledge [119]. The researchers
suggested that users with more technical knowledge tend to have a more sophisticated mental model,
but the level of technical knowledge barely affects users’ security and privacy practices [119].
Researchers have also used the mental model approach to investigate users’ perceptions related
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to their privacy and security. Camp proposed five possible mental models that can be used to explain
people’s understandings of computer risks, including models of physical safety, medical infections,
criminal behavior, warfare activities, and market failures [44]. Asgharpour et al. conducted a
card sorting study and found that computer security experts and non-experts have different mental
models of computer security [20]. For instance, experts associated passwords with a criminal
model whereas non-experts thought of a physical safety model [20]. Wash’s work on people’s
mental models of threats towards their home computers suggested eight folk models, including
four virus-centered models and four hacker-centered models [213]. Bravo-Lillo et al. used a
mental model approach to understand computer users’ psychological processes and reactions toward
computer warnings [35]. They were able to identify different perceptions of novice and advanced
users and to obtain insights in improving computer warnings [35]. Most recently, Naiakshina et al.
studied people’s mental models of the security of mobile messaging tools and found that people
overestimated the capabilities of attackers [158].
The above studies shed light on people’s mental models of the Internet as well as privacy and
security risks. However, people’s mental models of OBA still remain unclear. Our study aims to
address this gap by inductively analyzing people’s understandings of how OBA works.
Our primary research question is what folk models people employ in practice about OBA, for
instance, regarding the information flow in OBA. This was in part inspired by Helen Nissenbaum’s
theory of contextual integrity which presents a framework to determine privacy violations based
on the norms and appropriateness of information flow in a particular context [164]. A secondary
research question is what privacy-enhancing features or tools people desire for OBA. Answers to
both questions will inform future privacy designs for OBA.
26
3.3 Method
We designed and conducted a qualitative study in an iterative manner to understand people’s folk
models of OBA. This study was approved by the IRB. We started with a pilot study to test the
interview script and explore people’s understandings of OBA. We then conducted a first-round of
interviews to develop initial folk models, followed by a second-round of interviews to further verify
the models.
3.3.1 Pilot Study
Drawing from prior research examining people’s attitudes and perceptions of OBA [204, 147,
205, 133, 177, 48, 211, 150], we developed a list of interview questions that investigate people’s
understandings, attitudes, and experiences of OBA. To assess the quality of these questions, we pilot
tested this interview protocol with eight family members and friends during January and February,
2016. The pilot results suggest that they understood the questions albeit most of them did not
understand how OBA works. For instance, most of them did not know that third-party entities (e.g.,
ad networks) are likely involved in OBA. These pilot study participants’ understandings of OBA
were covered by the four folk models developed in the subsequent two rounds of interviews. For
instance, many of them held the connected-first-party model.
The pilot results also suggest that they varied in their opinions of OBA after we explained OBA
and that they differed in their interests in learning more about OBA and/or using tools to control
OBA. In order to further identify people’s understanding of OBA (i.e., mental models) and their
preferences of OBA, we added a drawing task and a card sorting task.
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3.3.2 First-Round Interviews
We revised the interview protocol based on the feedback from the pilot study. Next, we describe the
updated protocol.
Questions about Internet usage
We began our interviews with questions about interviewees’ demographics such as age, gender,
and occupation. We then asked about their background in using computers and the Internet, e.g.,
“What do you usually do when you browse the web? What devices do you use to browse the web?”
We also asked about their usage of web browsers, e.g., “Do you know that you can change your
browser settings? Do you know what a browser extension/add-on is? Do you save any of your
account information in your browser? What kind of information do you save?”
We then asked them to sort 18 cards, each containing an information item (e.g., name or
home address), based on their comfortableness with saving the data into their browser. This card
sorting task was designed to assess their perceived sensitivity of different information. Most
interviewees put the information items into two or three clusters based on their perceived sensitivity,
for instance, social security numbers as highly sensitive and religion as mildly or moderately
sensitive. Since these card sorting results mostly corroborate the findings reported in the prior
literature (e.g., [133, 122, 211]), we removed this task from the second-round of interviews.
Mental models of OBA
Next, we asked about interviewees’ attitudes toward and interactions with online ads, e.g., “Do you
notice that there are ads on websites? Do you generally click on ads?”
Similar to the use of hypothetical scenarios in Wash’s mental model study [213], we presented a
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hypothetical ad scenario in which a user first looks for shoes on Amazon.com and a few hours later
he or she visits Facebook and sees other shoe ads there. This scenario was designed to represent
common OBA practices that interviewees can easily understand since Amazon and Facebook are
popular sites that people visit. We then asked them to draw what they think happened in this
scenario on a piece of paper and to explain their drawing. This drawing with think-aloud task
explored interviewees’ own understandings of how OBA works before we offered our definition
and explanation of OBA. These drawings visualized the interviewees’ folk models of OBA (i.e.,
their own theories of how OBA works).
We followed up with additional questions about their knowledge and understanding of OBA
and web trackers, e.g., “Have your heard of targeted ads? Do you know how targeted ads work?
Have you ever heard of web trackers? What do you think web trackers are, who they are and what
they do?”
After the interviewees answered the above questions about OBA, we offered the same expla-
nation of web trackers to each interviewee. Specifically, we explained that the sites they visit
voluntarily are first-party entities, and that web trackers are typically third-party entities which track
user information and can provide ads targeted to the user based on the collected user data (e.g.,
browsing activities, page visits). We then answered any questions that interviewees had about web
trackers. We also asked them “What do you think trackers are collecting when they are tracking
you? What’s more important to you, the trackers or the data is being tracked?”
Privacy-enhancing tools for OBA
Finally, to help inform future privacy design for OBA, we asked interviewees questions about their
desired features in helping them deal with web trackers, e.g., “If there was a magic tool that can do
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anything, what types of features would you like this tool to have pertaining to web trackers?”
We asked these questions after explaining OBA with the rationale that if interviewees did not
have a correct understanding of OBA, they may miss features that they would have wanted. For
instance, similar to what we found in the pilot study, many participants in this round of interviews
were not aware that web trackers are often third-party entities. These participants requested the
privacy tools to provide more information about OBA, including the third-party trackers involved.
If we asked these tool-related questions before explaining OBA, these participants would not know
the existence of third-party trackers and thus are unlikely to ask for corresponding tool support.
However, asking these tool-related questions before explaining OBA might discover that people
having different folk models desire different privacy features. Therefore, we asked these tool
questions both before and after explaining OBA in the second-round interviews.
3.3.3 Second-Round Interviews
We analyzed the first-round interviews and developed four folk models that our participants had
about how OBA works. Similar to the iterative methodology used in Wash’s mental model
study [213], we conducted a second-round of interviews with new participants to check the validity
of these models by seeking “negative” examples [168] that are not covered by these models.
There were two major updates of the interview protocol in this round. First, we removed the card
sorting task. Second, we asked the questions related to privacy tools both before and after explaining
OBA. The updated study thus included the following sequence of components: questions about
Internet usage, questions about mental models (with the same hypothetical scenario), questions
about privacy tools, our explanation of OBA, and the questions about privacy tools (second time).
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3.3.4 Participant Recruitment
We recruited prospective participants from Syracuse University campus, shopping malls, public
libraries, and online communities (e.g., Craigslist). We also used snowball sampling, i.e., asking
participants to refer our study to their contacts [30]. We deliberately selected participants in order
to create a diversified sample in which participants have various demographic characteristics and
occupational backgrounds.
From March to May 2016, we recruited and conducted our 1st-round of interviews with 14
participants from the Syracuse area. These interviews were face-to-face. From July to August 2016,
we recruited and conducted our second-round of interviews with seven additional participants from
Pennsylvania, Seattle, and Los Angeles. These interviews were conducted online using services
such as Skype. Participants showed and explained their drawings in the interviews and sent their
drawings to the researchers afterwards. Each interview took about one to two hours and was
compensated $10.
It is worth noting that our sample is not statistically representative of the general Internet user
population, but it is diverse in terms of participants’ age, geographic locations and occupations.
Similar to Wash’s study [213], we do not believe our sample is particularly special. There are
probably other people similar to our participants in the general population. In addition, we did not
observe any significantly new findings, particularly regarding people’s understandings of how OBA
works, from our second-round of interviews. This suggests theoretical saturation [99] and thus we
did not conduct any additional interviews.
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Table 3.1: Participants used three factors in reasoning about OBA and constructing their folk models.







Browser-pull Browser Browser Browser pulls
ads
1st-party-pull Browser Browser 1st-party sites
pulls ads










We audio recorded all interviews upon participants’ permission, and transcribed the recordings. We
then conducted a thematic analysis [32], a common approach for analyzing qualitative data.
First, we read through all the interview transcriptions multiple times to immerse ourselves in the
data. Second, two co-authors coded one interview together at the sentence level to develop a code
book.
Then, the two coders coded the same subset of interviews independently using the code book.
When they encountered concepts not covered by the existing code book, they added new codes
accordingly. Once finished, the two coders compared, discussed and converged the codes into an
updated code book of 210 unique codes, such as, “Internet experience,” “attitudes toward OBA,”
and “PETs features.” We wrote the codes on post-it notes and created an affinity diagram to group
these codes into nine themes: background, misconception, advertisement, specific information
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concerns, privacy-enhancing technologies, mental models, privacy and security practices, privacy
expectations, and web trackers.
Finally, we read the associated interview quotes to ensure the coherence within each theme.
Based on our review, we adjusted the inappropriately grouped codes and the affinity diagram
accordingly.
3.4 Results
In this section, we report the results from the 21 interviews, focusing on our participants’ folk
models of how OBA works and their preferences of privacy tools for OBA.
3.4.1 Participants
The ages of the 21 participants ranged from 19 to 67, with an average of 34. Six participants were
female and 15 were male. They were from a wide range of locations, including large and small
cities in the states of New York, Pennsylvania, California and Washington. Our participants also
had various occupations such as university staff, college students, software engineers, business
professionals, retired workers, a mechanical engineer and a waitress.
All of our interviewees use computers and the Internet on a daily basis. Two of them use the
Internet less than 2 hours a day, the rest of them use the Internet more than 7 hours a day. The
primary purposes of using the Internet include checking emails, using social media, doing research
for their jobs, contacting friends and families, and reading news. In addition, 19 of our interviewees
had heard about targeted ads. Some of them voluntarily talked about their experiences of targeted
ads. Four interviewees said that they have heard of web trackers, but only one understood what a
web tracker is.
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3.4.2 Folk Models of OBA
We provided our interviewees a detailed scenario to understand their thoughts about how OBA works
and how information flows. The interview results suggested that our participants’ understandings
of how OBA works mainly differed by three factors: who tracks users’ information; where the
information is stored; and how ads are selected or served. Based on these three factors, we identified
four major folk models. Table 3.1 summarizes the factors that our participants used to reason about
OBA and construct their folk models. Table 9.1 summarizes participants’ folk models as well as
their attitudes toward web trackers and OBA.
Table 3.2: Participants’ folk models and attitudes of trackers and OBA.
ID Folk model Accept trackers Accept OBA
P1 3rd-party Yes Yes
P2 Connected 1st-party No Yes
P3 3rd-party Yes Yes
P4 3rd-party No No
P5 Browser-pull No Yes
P6 Connected 1st-party No No
P7 Connected 1st-party No No
P8 3rd-party No No
P9 Browser-pull No No
P10 1st-party-pull Yes Yes
P11 Browser-pull Yes Yes
P12 1st-party-pull Yes Yes
P13 Browser-pull Yes Yes
P14 Connected 1st-party No No
P15 Browser-pull No No
P16 1st-party-pull Yes Yes
P17 3rd-party Yes Yes
P18 Connected 1st-party No Yes
P19 3rd-party Yes Yes
P20 3rd-party Yes Yes
P21 1st-party-pull Yes Yes
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Figure 3.1: Browser-pull model: an example from P9.
When a user searches for a pair of shoes on Amazon, the web browser will save the search
information. The web browser has contracted with Amazon. When the user visits Facebook, the
browser will pull the saved information and display ads for Amazon on the user’s Facebook page.
3.4.3 Browser-Pull Model
Five interviewees held this model. They believed that all tracking is done by the browser, which
would pull from advertisers relevant ads that target user data/profiles stored locally by the browser.
In this model, the web browser plays the primary role in OBA. For instance, P5 thought that the
web browser monitors and detects his browsing patterns and pulls ads based on those patterns. He
also believed that all tracked information is saved in his local computer.
“The system is set up to notice your patterns and to pull information that seems relevant to
you...I’m just thinking [the information] is [transmitted to] my computer.” (P5)
P9 had a similar view as illustrated in his drawing (see Figure 3.1) in which the browser tracks
his online activities and has contracted with Amazon to ship their ads.
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“I’m searching on Amazon and looking for shoes, web browser tracks my activity, and, you
know, I’m just thinking that Amazon and ads are contracted with web browser, and browser just
ships ads. There’s when I’m on Facebook, the ads just pops up.” (P9)
P15 also held this model but felt that he can control the browser’s tracking through the browser
settings.
“I think it is all based on your Internet options what you allow. I think it is the browser that
allows this...No matter whatever browser I’m on...I can go to the Internet options and mess around
the way it looks into my information.” (P15)
The essence of this model is that the browser is the key – the browser tracks users’ activities,
saves their information on the local computer, and selects and displays the relevant ads. Because
the browser is on users’ computers, some participants holding this model (e.g., P15) also had the
perceived agency to limit or control OBA through the browser settings.
3.4.4 First-Party-Pull Model
Four interviewees held the first-party-pull model. Similar to the browser-pull model, participants of
this model also believed that all tracking is done by the browser. However, unlike the browser-pull
model, people of this model thought that first-party sites (e.g., Amazon or Facebook) rather than the
browser pull relevant ads based on the user’s data/profile stored in the browser. In this model, both
the web browser and first-party websites play active roles in OBA.
For instance, P10 explained the use of cookies and the retrieval of targeted ads by the first-party
sites, as shown in his drawing (see Figure 3.2). In this example, when he searches for kayaks on
Amazon, the browser will save the search information in a browser cookie. Then, the browser
will find other sites that also sell kayaks. When he visits Facebook later, Facebook will pull these
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Figure 3.2: First-party-pull model: an example from P10.
When a user searches for a kayak on Amazon, the browser will save the search information in
a browser cookie. The browser will find other sites that also sell kayaks. Later, the user visits
Facebook, which will pull these sites from the browser and display them on the user’s Facebook
page.
sites that sell kayaks from the browser and display them on his Facebook page. Note again, the
first-party site (Facebook) pulls the relevant ads. In addition, P10 believed that first-party websites
can only access the cookies from the last website that the user visited. P12 shared a similar
model but described his theory in a more technically sophisticated way, highlighting the use of the
HTML meta tag on first-party sites (e.g., eBay or Facebook). He believed that these websites are
designed in a way (with similar meta tag structures) so that they can directly access all of the user’s
browsing/searching history and cookies in order to select targeted ads.
“So this is the eBay webpage, and in your meta-tag you’re gonna have embedded information
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Figure 3.3: First-party-pull model: an example from P16.
He searches shoes on Amazon, then the browser stores the action in the cache; later, he visits
Facebook, which then goes to its advertising server, and bids ads with the cached user information
using a bidding algorithm. Facebook then displays the ads on his Facebook page.
that not only pulls up the information from your cookie and consent your account to automatically
login...but it also contains advertising tracking data...And then if you log into, for instance, Facebook,
if they have a similar meta-tag structure they can access the search data from this tracking cookie,
so that this controls the same search criteria.” (P12)
P16 is a web developer with technical knowledge of the Internet. His drawing (see Figure 3.3)
illustrated that the browser stores the user’s Amazon activities in its local cache; then Facebook pulls
that user’s information from the cache, bids ads with that user’s information, and finally displays the
targeted ads on the user’s Facebook page. He was our only participant who mentioned ad bidding,
which suggests that he had more knowledge about the online ad ecosystem than other participants.
However, he was not aware of third-party tracking in OBA. After he described his mental model,
we explained OBA to him and asked about his feelings of OBA again. He was surprised to learn
that often third-party entities (e.g., ad networks) track users’ online activities for OBA purposes but
his concerns about his information and privacy remained the same.
“I never thought it is third party. It matters to me since I’m not sure how they can use my
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information legally and the purposes. But I think I feel the same, because before I know this, I’m
still worried about my information and privacy.” (P16)
P16’s example is rather telling because we would normally assume that technically savvy users
would know how OBA works. But, that was not the case. This is somewhat surprising because
even web developers like him who seemed to have knowledge about ad bidding (a rather advanced
understanding of online ad systems) did not know about common online tracking done by third-party
entities.
Other less technically savvy participants also held this model albeit with less details. For
instance, P21 thought that the browser records his activities on Amazon and then Facebook pulls
his information from the browser. However, unlike P10 and P16, he did not know the technical
specifics of how Facebook can actually access his information stored by the browser.
“Chrome gets all my transaction from Amazon, and for some reason, Facebook can access this
information.” (P21)
While these participants provided different levels of technical details in their explanations,
the underlying theory is the same. In this model, the browser still plays an important role in
tracking users’ browsing activities and storing this information locally. But, the first-party sites
(e.g., Facebook) rather than the browser select relevant ads based on the user profile stored in the
browser. This means, unlike the browser-pull model, the browser cannot single-handedly deliver the
targeted ads. Instead, first-party sites select ads that they think are relevant to users.
3.4.5 Connected-First-Party Model
Five interviewees believed that first-party websites (e.g., Amazon and Facebook) are directly
connected and collaborate with each other. In this model, users’ data is tracked and stored by each
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first-party site that they visit. Different first-party websites are connected, exchanging the user data
that each of them tracks and saves. As such, first-party websites form a kind of a collaborative
network and play the main role for delivering targeted ads.
For instance, P18 believed that first-party sites have shared resources between them so they can
share their user information stored in their databases.
“It definitely goes into the database on Amazon, and then it will probably, I guess there is some
kind of shared resource between them, so it will basically go into the database on Facebook, then
shows on my page.” (P18)
P7 shared the idea and also explicitly mentioned a partnership between Amazon and Facebook,
which makes the information sharing possible.
“Amazon and Facebook have some type of partnership and so Amazon gives them certain
information and are able to locate certain people for specific products and advertise certain
Figure 3.4: Connected-first-party model: an example from P6.
When she searches shoes on Amazon, Amazon saves the search information. Amazon sells the data
to Facebook (indicated by a dollar sign at the bottom left of the Facebook box). Facebook then gets
more money from “other shoe” companies (two dollar signs) to show the shoe ads on her Facebook.
The CEOs of Amazon and Facebook under the sun would not share her data if it is not for money.
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products to certain people for whatever they’re looking for.”
P6 went further and suggested that Amazon sells her data to Facebook, as shown in her drawing
(see Figure 3.4).
“Amazon has decided to work in conjunction with Facebook, this is my personal belief and
transferred all of my data about my shoe experience and gave it to Facebook, to say ’Hey, she likes
shoes.’ And now Facebook is going to get bulk dollars from other shoe companies because now I
know about other places beside or other shoe types beside the one I just bought...I think amazon
sells that to Facebook.” (P6)
P6 emphasized the economic or business model in her understanding. Her drawing shows that
Facebook gives money to Amazon (with one dollar sign) for her data that Amazon shares and
Facebook receives more money from other shoe companies (with two dollar signs) to serve their
ads on her Facebook page. As such, P6 believed that money drives the connection between Amazon
and Facebook. She disapproved an alternative explanation in a witted fashion and articulated money
as the driving force behind this connection.
“I don’t see why Amazon would do this because I don’t see like the CEO of Amazon and the CEO
of Facebook hanging out under the sun as best friends smiling...so there’s got to be a reason...the
biggest lubricant I ever come across is money, or at least some kind of gain of some sorts.” (P6)
The key of this model is that first-party sites are directly connected and they share user data
with each other in order to select targeted ads. According to this model, the connected first-party




Seven interviewees held this model. In this model, people believed that first-party sites track and
collect user data then contribute the data to a third-party entity, and then the third-party entity
leverages the user data it has (presumably from different first-party sites) to select relevant ads for
users. As such, various first-party websites and third-party entities are involved in OBA, according
to this model.
Some participants believed that there are third-party entities involved but they knew almost
nothing else about these third-party entities, for instance, who they are or whom they belong to. For
example, P4 drew a big bubble that she called an “Internet space” that stores and provides user data
to different sites such as Facebook (see Figure 3.5). But, she cannot tell what this Internet space is
or who controls it.
Figure 3.5: Third-party model: an example from P4.
When a user searches shoes on Amazon, Amazon collects the user’s data and then transmits the
data to an Internet space. This Internet space sends ads to Facebook, which will display the shoe
ads on the user’s Facebook.
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“I don’t know, it must be like some Internet thing, Internet space I don’t know, and somehow it
just goes to like Facebook and whatever else there is out there.” (P4)
P19 drew a more detailed graph, illustrating the existence of some database that all companies
such as Amazon and Google share (see Figure 3.6). But, he knew nothing else about this database.
“I don’t really know. I guess there should be some sort of database in the middle, then not only
Amazon and Facebook, but also other companies, have access to it, keep injecting new information
to it. It’s more of a shared space, or common space for all companies who are involved in this
ecosystem.”
P19 also questioned how Amazon and Facebook match the same user. He hypothesized the
use of cookies, which include a user’s IP address. He also doubted first-party sites (Amazon
and Facebook in our scenario) are directly connected. This is an important difference from the
connected-first-party model in which first-party sites are directly connected.
P17 also believed there is a central database and it is likley dominated by Google.
“There must be some central database or data center...I think it’s like Google. Google has
something like this, like many big companies have this kind of data center. But it is dominated by
Google. In the example you mentioned, there is no Google involved, so I guess it is third party.”
(P17)
In this case, he suggested that large companies like Google represent the third-party entities.
This understanding was fairly accurate since Google indeed represents a major web tracker and
serves targeted ads across the Internet [196].
Like P6 who had a connected-first-party model, P1 also focused her understanding on the
economic aspects. However, P1 believed that those third-party entities rather than the connected
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first-party sites make the ads ecosystem work.
“These guys [third parties] have an agreement with Amazon, they are like, ’Oh, I’m just going
to take information from this guy’. Facebook gets money by displaying the ads sent by these guys
[third parties]...this branch [third parties] allows that to happen. So in a way it is a neutral third
party.” (P1)
In her view, the third-party entities connect Amazon and Facebook, collect and store users’ data,
Figure 3.6: Third-party model: an example from P19.
All companies share a common database. When a user searches shoes on Amazon, Amazon sends
that information to the shared database. Other companies such as eBay and Google also contribute
user information to this database. When the user visits Facebook, the site obtains user data from
this database to select relevant ads.
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and then send targeted ads to Facebook.
Regardless of whether these participants knew who the third-party entities are or represent, they
shared the key understanding that these third-party entities rather than the first-party sites that users
visit voluntarily make the OBA work. Both user tracking and selection of targeted ads are done by
these third-party entities. According to this model, first-party sites are not connected directly but
are bridged through third-party entities.
3.4.7 Misconceptions and Speculations of OBA
During our interviews, we also observed participants’ recurring misconceptions and speculations
about OBA. We use the word “misconceptions” to denote our participants’ inaccurate understandings
of web trackers and what trackers collect, mainly from a technical standpoint. Typical misconcep-
tions our participants had include: trackers are hackers, and trackers are viruses. Wash’s home
computer security study has uncovered several hacker-based and virus-based mental models [213],
however, his participants did not report considering web trackers as hackers or viruses. Furthermore,
we use the word “speculations” to represent our participants’ views that are technically possible
but their applications for OBA are not clear. Common speculations our participants made include:
trackers access local files on a user’s computers, and trackers resides locally on users’ computers.
Misconception: trackers are hackers
Some interviewees identified trackers as hackers, people with malicious intentions. For instance,
before getting our explanation of OBA, P2 believed that web trackers can hack into his online
accounts.
“They say it’s a secure site and you got to login, but of course I login with the same password
that I always use...I’m sure that those web trackers can hack in there too.” (P2)
45
P2 seemed to confuse web trackers with hackers that aim to break into people’s accounts and
steal their personal data.
Misconception: trackers are viruses
Considering trackers as computer viruses was another common misconception among our partic-
ipants. For instance, P4 expressed her belief that her anti-virus software will protect her from
trackers.
“Thank God for Norton because sometimes it comes up oh so and so just attacked you or
something, so I don’t even pay attention because I figure that will save me.” (P4)
These participants seemed to misconstrue web trackers as computer viruses designed to attack
their computers.
Speculation: trackers access local files
Some participants thought that trackers can access files stored on their local computers. For instance,
when asked whether he would be interested in a tool that can block trackers, P5 expressed his lack
of interest because there is very little on his computer that he worries about. He mentioned, “Even
things that are around my desktop, besides my resume and cover letters and that’s about it.” His
explanation reflected his overestimation of the capabilities of trackers in which they can access
(arbitrary) files stored locally on his computer. P5 also believed that trackers can log his typing,
saying “everything you type in can technically be downloaded.” While tracking users’ typing is
technically possible, we are not aware of any reports of this kind of tracker behavior in practice.
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Speculation: trackers reside locally on user computers
Some participants indicated that trackers can not only be something in the browser but also reside
locally on their computers. For instance, P5 said “I think it’s in the web browser. I also think there’s
something on your computer.” But he could not elaborate what he meant by “something” on his
computer.
3.4.8 Privacy-Enhancing Tools for OBA
To inform future design of privacy tools for OBA, we asked our interviewees questions about tools
or features that can help protect their privacy in the context of OBA.
Trackers vs. the information being tracked
Existing ad blockers such as Ghostery are structured by trackers. When a user visits a website, the
ad blocker shows a list of trackers on the site that the user can selectively block. However, these
tools do not show what type of information each tracker tracks. In addition, prior research has
shown that ordinary Internet users do not recognize the names of most trackers (e.g., BlueKay) with
few exceptions being household names such as Google [132]. Furthermore, our card sorting results
support the prior literature (e.g., [133, 122, 211]) that people perceive different levels of sensitivity
for different information items (e.g., home address is perceived more sensitive than educational
level). Given these observations, we wondered whether the information being tracked is more
recognizable and thus more useful to users than the trackers. Therefore, we asked our participants
“what is more important to you, the tracker or the information being tracked?”
All but one interviewee answered that the information being tracked is more important. For
instance, P1 cared more about the information being tracked because this information can be used
to make assumptions about her.
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“I would say what is being tracked. I guess they use the information to build out their profile, I
guess it is a little strange using the information they collect to make assumptions about me, what
type of person or Internet user.” (P1)
P7 provided a different justification, arguing that the tracked information can be used to identify
individuals.
“I mean the biggest thing is the information. I mean trackers are replaceable, but information is
not because that’s a specific set of info per person.” (P7)
P8 was the only participant that did not perceive the information being tracked to be more
important than the trackers because he wanted to know both.
“What information is being collected for sure, but I also want know who is collecting it. I want
to say both, because, you know, I would want to know who that person, or the entity is, how they are
gonna use that information.” (P8)
Desired privacy features for OBA
When asked about their expectations of a magic tool that can help protect their privacy regarding
OBA, our participants suggested many features.
Block tracking. A commonly desired feature is to block tracking. For instance, P17 would like
to automatically block trackers based on his preferences. P16 desired a feature that allows him to
select the type(s) of information that he wants the trackers to track or not to track.
Interestingly, when we asked participants’ experiences with online ads, some participants
reported using ad blockers to block ads but they did not relate these ad blockers to web trackers.
This might be because they are called ad blockers rather than tracker blockers.
Transparency. Several interviewees were also interested in knowing more about trackers and
48
their behaviors.
“It is a scary technology, but maybe if I have a better understanding of how it connects with
companies or something like that. Maybe I can see like the scope of web trackers? Like how many
people it affects, how many places my information is going.” (P1)
P1 hoped to know detailed information about the scope and effect of tracking. In addition, P19
was interested in knowing what data is being tracked by whom and for what purposes.
In our second-round interviews, we asked this privacy tool-related question both before and after
we explained OBA. P18 held a connected-first-party model and requested additional privacy tool
support after our OBA explanation, which made him realize the existence of third-party trackers.
He then suggested the tool to provide detailed information about third-party trackers and their
behaviors.
Effortless to use. In addition to concrete features, many interviewees emphasized the tool should
be effortless to use. P10, for instance, expressed that he would only use such a tool if it only needs a
one-time setup for all websites.
“This is per website or do I do it one time and it does it for every website? That was my first
thing cause I don’t want to have to do it per website.” (P10)
This is understandable because privacy protection is often not people’s primary or direct task.
Therefore, they would not want to divert from their main task to spend too much time in using a




Drawing from the literature on mental models and particularly Rick Wash’s work on folk models of
home computer security [213], we examined Internet users’ understandings of how OBA works
through a qualitative study including a pilot study and two rounds of semi-structured interviews.
We discovered four folk models of how OBA works. The browser-pull model assumes that all
tracking is done by the browser, which would pull from advertisers relevant ads that tailor to the
user data/profile the browser stores locally. In this case, the browser is the “middleman” between the
first-party site and advertisers. The first-party-pull model presumes that all tracking is still done by
the browser, but first-party sites pull relevant ads based on the user data/profile stored in the browser
(e.g., cookies). In this case, first-party sites decide which ads to show. The connected-first-party
model posits that different first-party sites directly share and even sell user data that they collect
with each other and that one first-party site can use another first-party site’s user data to pull relevant
ads directly from advertisers. In this model, first-party sites directly interact with each other and
with the advertisers. Lastly, the third-party model assumes that first-party sites first track and collect
user data then contribute the data to a third-party entity, then this third-party entity uses the user
data it has (presumably from different first-party sites) to select relevant ads. This model is closer to
common OBA practices than other models but it is still not detailed enough, e.g., some participants
hardly knew anything about the third-party entities.
As discussed in the related work section, our work is one of the first studies that investigate
people’s mental models of OBA. The body of literature on mental models of privacy and security
rarely touches on the topic of online tracking or OBA, for instance, Wash’s study focuses on home
computer security [213]. The extant research on people’s privacy perceptions of OBA also does not
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focus on people’s understanding and mental models of OBA. The notable exception is the work
of McDonald and Cranor in which they provided their survey respondents four diagrams of OBA,
focusing on who have access to users’ cookies [147]. They then asked their respondents which
diagram is unlikely to happen [147]. In comparison, our folk models emerged from our interviews
rather than pre-defined by us. Our folk models differ from their cookie-centered models [147]
because ours are based on three factors: who tracks user information, where the tracked information
is stored, and how the targeted ads are selected or served.
3.5.1 Why Folk Models of OBA Matter
The folk models uncovered by our study are novel, but why do they matter? There are several
reasons why they matter.
User education
All four folk models are either inaccurate or incomplete. Similar to Camp’s suggestions that risk
communication should be designed based on non-expert mental models [44], we believe that it
would be useful to customize user education of OBA based on the folk models.
In our second round of interviews, some of our interviewees changed their attitudes towards
OBA because of our explanation of OBA. For instance, some participants of the connected-first-
party model were surprised to learn that their information can be tracked or even sold by third-party
entities. Therefore, their attitudes towards OBA were changed from neutral to negative. Knowing a
user’s current folk model can tailor the education to reduce the knowledge asymmetry between the
user and the OBA practitioners.
Previous studies have suggested that technically savvy users have more accurate or sophisticated
mental models than their less technically savvy counterparts (e.g., [119]). However, we did not
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observe a clear relationship between technical knowledge and folk models. Somewhat surprisingly,
our arguably most technically savvy participants P16 and P18, two web developers, held the 1st-
party-pull model and the connected-first-party model, respectively. Both of them were not aware of
third-party trackers. This is important because even technically savvy users can have inaccurate
models and need user education to gain a more accurate picture of OBA.
Attitudes towards OBA
Capturing people’s folk models can help understand people’s attitudes towards OBA. We observed
some associations between the two.
Interviewees of the browser-pull model had different attitudes toward tracking and OBA. These
participants believed that the browser tracks and stores their data. Interviewees who were aware of
different browser settings (e.g., clear browser history and cookies) tended to be positive about OBA
because of their perceived ability to control tracking by setting the browser options. In contrast,
those who did not know about browser settings tended to be more critical of OBA.
Interviewees of the first-party-pull model generally accept OBA because they only expected
first-party sites to access their information in order to select relevant ads. They had little concern
because they generally trusted the sites that they visit voluntarily. However, they were unaware of
the existence and impact of third-party tracking.
For interviewees holding the connected-first-party model, they were generally not against online
tracking because they thought their data is only shared between first-party sites that they trust.
However, they did not appreciate the idea of first-party sites selling their information between each
other. They understood that this is one of the main business models of the Internet, but they still
disliked it.
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Participants of the third-party model all included third-party entities in their explanations.
However, their descriptions of third-party entities varied significantly, ranging from a clear idea of a
specific organization to a vague notion of an “Internet space.” Their attitudes toward OBA also
varied. We did not observe any significant patterns in this group.
User behavior
The literature of mental models suggest that these models can influence people’s reasoning and
decision making (e.g., [116, 117]). We also encountered some examples of certain folk models
affecting people’s behavior in our study. For example, some participants of the browser-pull model
rely on browser settings to control online tracking because they believed that web tracking and OBA
are carried out by the browser. Another example is that P18 of the connected-first-party model
requested a transparency feature that provides detailed information about third-party trackers only
after we explained OBA. This suggests that people of different folk models may need different
privacy features (particularly educational features) that tailor to their (lack of) understanding of
OBA.
3.5.2 Implications for Design and Policy
Our results have a number of implications for privacy designs and public policies of OBA.
First, as mentioned before, future privacy tools for OBA could highlight different information to
cater to people with different folk models. For example, for people having the connected-first-party
model, the tools can emphasize that third-party entities can be tracking and sharing their online
activities. In addition, governmental policies or industry best practices could require or encourage
privacy policies of web tracker companies to include simple but visual representations of how they
work in the OBA ecosystem, similar to the way that our interviewees drew their folk models.
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Wash argued that technologies should be designed to work with people’s mental models even
if these models are incorrect because it is more difficult to educate users about the correct mental
model [213]. We agree with this viewpoint to some extent. For instance, while the browser-pull
model does not capture the common OBA practice, researchers have proposed privacy-preserving,
client-based OBA systems, resembling the browser-pull model [31]. However, we still believe
there are benefits to educate people about OBA practices that are common on the Internet. For
instance, people holding the browser-pull model might think they can control or stop OBA by just
setting their browser options. Therefore, that folk model could discourage them from adopting more
effective privacy tools such as ad blockers that can block trackers.
Second, popular tools such as Ghostery and AdBlock are capable of blocking third-party trackers.
These tools list the trackers on a site and allow people to block them selectively. However, most
of our interviewees felt that the information being tracked is more important than the trackers
themselves. This is a significant finding because it suggests that a completely different blocking
scheme, one based on the type of information being tracked, might be perceived more useful by
Internet users than the status quo, a tracker-based blocking scheme. In other words, the tools can be
structured by the information being tracked rather than by a list of trackers. In addition, these tools
can allow users to block tracking of certain types of information. Alternatively, future tools can
support both schemes.
Emerging technologies, such as OpenWPM [81], Sunlight [131] and ReCon [180] are promising
in identifying or inferring what information is being tracked by a tracker and the purpose of tracking
to some extent. They pave the way for information-based blocking tools. On the policy front, we
advocate that web trackers and ad networks should clearly explain what information they collect
and why they collect the information in their privacy policies and preferably in a machine-readable
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format. This could enable future privacy tools to automatically analyze and compare the behaviors
of different trackers and the OBA practices of different sites.
3.5.3 Limitations and Future Research
We outline our study limitations and directions for future research. First, we did not have a
particularly large sample. But our study was conducted in an iterative manner including a pilot
study with eight people and two rounds of interviews with a total of 21 participants. The results
from the pilot study and the actual interview study were consistent. In fact, we did not learn any
significantly new things from our second-round interviews, suggesting theoretical saturation. Our
sample is also diversified in that our participants came from various age groups and geographical
areas, representing different occupations. Therefore, we are confident our results are valid.
Second, our qualitative study aims to examine people’s folk models of OBA in depth rather than
assess how statistically representative these models are in the generic population. In future work,
we plan to conduct a large-scale survey to further examine how common these models are.
Third, when we asked our interviewees to draw their mental models of OBA and web track-
ing, we only used one hypothetical scenario. This may prevent us from discovering additional
models. Future work can include multiple scenarios and ideally ones that people have experienced
themselves.
Fourth, we asked participants to do the card sorting task before the drawing task in our first-round
interviews. The card sorting task asked about participants’ comfortableness with saving their data
into their browser. This might prime people to think more about browsers. However, we believe
the priming is minimum because we removed the card sorting task in our second-round interviews
and there were participants having the browser-pull model and the first-party-pull model. In both
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models, the browser is responsible for tracking users.
Finally, our interviews are self-reported data and thus do not include participants’ actual
behavioral data. To further examine the impact of these folk models on people’s behavior, future
work can consider collecting and analyzing user behavior data, for instance, through experiments
and/or log analyses.
3.5.4 Conclusion
Online Behavior Advertising is pervasive on the Internet. We interviewed 21 people from the US
to investigate their understandings of how OBA works. We identified four folk models held by
our interviewees. These models are either inaccurate or incomplete in representing common OBA
practices. User education tailoring to people’s folk models of OBA is likely to be more effective. In
addition, most of our interviewees felt that the information being tracked is more important than the
trackers. Future privacy tools should consider these folk models and user preferences of OBA.
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Chapter 4
Online Privacy: Implications Beyond Users’
Privacy
Tools to limit web tracking often operate in either a tracker-based model or an information-based
model. Prior research has been focused on the effectiveness and usability of these tools on the
individual users’ level. How these tools impact the larger space beyond individual users over longer
time periods remains understudied. In this chapter, we use speculative design scenarios to surface
questions about how the adoption of web tracking blockers impacts not only users, but also a
broader set of societal, economic, legal, and technical stakeholders. Our speculative explorations,
building on a Wizard-of-Oz study, surface many potential issues beyond the usability and efficacy
of blockers, e.g., the tension between protecting users’ privacy and tracking companies’ need to
make profits. Our exploration also broadens the understanding of privacy beyond individual users
and argues that future tools to limit online tracking should consider the needs from a broader set of
stakeholders.
4.1 Introduction
Online tracking is a pervasive practice on the Internet. One common use of online tracking is online
behavioral advertising (OBA), which most Americans felt was an invasion of their privacy [204, 147].
People’s attitudes towards OBA are also contextual based on the type of information being shared
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with OBA [133] and online activities people undertake [211].
To help users limit online tracking, researchers and practitioners have proposed and implemented
many blockers. These blockers can be divided roughly into two types, i.e., the tracker-based blocker
and the information-based blocker. A tracker in the tracker-based model consists of a piece of
software (usually javascript) that tracks a user’s information. Most existing tools and blockers use
the tracker-based model, in that they list the trackers that are present on a website and allow users
to block the list of trackers collectively or selectively (e.g., Ghostery [98], Privacy Badger [25],
and Disconnect.me [67]). However, the usability of this model has been challenged by a few prior
studies (e.g., users only recognize trackers from household names, such as Google [132]). The
information in the information-based model refers to the types of data that are collected by trackers
(e.g., location or IP address). Research has shown that most users are more concerned about what
information is collected rather than who is tracking that information [231]. As such, researchers
have proposed and implemented tools based on this model in mobile systems (e.g., users can choose
to block their location data or contacts from being tracked by installed applications) and on the web
(e.g., P3P [59]).
This research expands prior work that focuses on the usability issues of these tools. We aim to
investigate multiple facets of blocking tools in two ways. First, we explore the multi-dimensional
web tracking blocker design space by examining existing practices and literature, and a Wizard-
of-Oz study. Second, grounded in the design space and inspired by speculative design research
approaches [74], we explore the implications for adoption [140] for blockers through a set of
speculative scenarios in order to understand the technical, economic, political, and legal contexts
that could affect or be affected by the widespread use of blockers. We deliberately choose this
approach over a traditional user study because while the traditional user study allows to understand
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user reactions to the blockers, the speculative scenarios allow us to take a step back and situate end
user privacy as one value among a more complex landscape of additional stakeholders and other
social values. This approach aims to surface broader issues and impact that are beyond what would
normally emerge from traditional user studies of privacy enhancing technologies.
This chapter makes two contributions. First, through a speculative exploration complemented by
a Wizard-of-Oz study, we explore the potential technical, economic, political, and legal spaces that
situate or impact the wide adoption of blockers and understand the implications beyond individual
users. Second, we discuss how our approach using a Wizard-of-Oz study and a speculative
exploration broadens our understanding of usable privacy research and argue for adopting similar
methodology in studying privacy in other domains.
4.2 Technical Background
In this section, we provide some background knowledge related to online tracking and details of the
two blocking models.
Broadly speaking, online tracking can be categorized into first-party tracking and third-party
tracking. First-party tracking is conducted by the websites that users visit and directly interact
with [11]. For instance, if Amazon tracks what a user does on its own website, this is considered
first-party tracking. Third-party tracking refers to the practice where third parties (e.g., advertising
companies) embed their tracking technologies (e.g., cookies) across the first-party websites (e.g.,
CNN) to track individuals’ activities on these websites [182]. This is third-party tracking because
users are tracked by someone different than who they are directly interacting with.
In this chapter, we adopt the definition of online tracking from Melicher et al.’s work, “online
trackers partner with websites to track visitors’ activities” [150], and focus on third-party tracking.
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We will use tracking/trackers to denote third-party tracking/trackers unless specified otherwise.
The tracker-based blocking model is the mechanism that has been adopted by the majority of
the available products on the market, e.g., Ghostery [98]. In a tracker-based blocker, a list of trackers
on a particular website is displayed in real-time as the users browse through the website. Users can
block online tracking by blocking trackers collectively or selectively. As mentioned before, existing
blockers have adopted this model and some of these tools have suffered from several usability and
effectiveness issues, such as the unfamiliar names of the trackers [132].
The information-based blocking model is a blocking mechanism that enumerates what types
of information are potentially tracked on the website, and allow the users to block the types of
information collectively or selectively. Prior research has proposed several mechanisms based on the
information-based model, such as P3P [59]. In the real world, the information-based blocking model
has been partially implemented in the smartphone eco-system (i.e., users are asked to share their
location and Bluetooth usage with some apps) and on the web (i.e., when users visit some websites,
they are asked whether to allow or block the tracking of their locations with the websites [121]). It
is worth noting that tools that operate in the information-based blocking model primarily target the
first-party tracking.
4.3 Related Work
4.3.1 Socio-technical Countermeasures for Web Tracking
Numerous countermeasures have been proposed to combat online tracking. These countermeasures
include Do-Not-Track (DNT), an HTTP head field that once enabled signifies that the user wants to
be opt-out of being tracked [146]; the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P), a machine-readable
privacy disclosure that could be retrieved automatically by web browsers to make users aware of
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website privacy practices [58]; the proxy server, an intermediary between users and the destination
server to preserve users’ information [186]; alternative services that do not track users or provide
extra security measures, such as the search engine DuckDuckGo [71], the Tor web browser [39],
and the Brave web browser [38]. It is worth noting that both DNT and P3P are not just technical
projects but also web standards and organizational projects carried out by the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C). They later became ill-fated, particularly P3P, due to several reasons, such as
insufficient enforcement by web organizations [60, 186], ad-hoc derivation of privacy policies [199],
and discrepancies with their natural language counterparts [179].
Another type of countermeasures includes several web tracking blocking tools. For example,
Ghostery [98] and Disconnect.me [67] can detect and block various types of trackers such as online
behavioral advertising (OBA), social media, and site analyzers, and are classifying and blacklisting
trackers by examining their service domains [203]. Privacy Badger [25] leverages a slightly different
mechanism that requires less “custom configuration to block non-consensual trackers.” It judges
and prevents a third-party by detecting its behavior across different sites, hence it could be regarded
as “behavior-based” instead of “blacklist based” [203]. There are also more severe blockers which
inhibit all third-parties, such as Request Policy [172], or ad-oriented blockers such as Adblock
Plus [171]. Recently, some web browsers embedded features to limit web tracking as well, such as
the Intelligent Tracking Protection in Safari to prevent cross-site tracking [226] and the Tracking
Protection in Firefox to block web trackers [6].
These blockers have been well studied in prior research regarding their effectiveness and
usability. For example, Traverso et al. compared seven of the most popular blockers and found
none of them could deliver their promised protection [203], even though Ghostery outperformed the
other blockers [203, 153]. Roesner et al. also found that third-party cookie blocking is ineffective
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and plugins would remove potentially useful features for users (e.g., social media buttons) [182].
Wills and Uzunoglu also found that the effectiveness of the current blockers varied. For example,
Disconnect.me could only provide moderate protection and Ghostery, Adblock Plus, and Adguard
have to be manually configured to enable better protection because their default protection would be
minimal [218]. Leon et al. tested nine online ads blocking tools and identified a number of serious
usability flaws: the interfaces were hard to understand, the opt-out options were hard to set up, and
the settings were complex to configure [132].
One noticeable trend in the above research is that they all consider individuals’ privacy as the
primary goal when designing and implementing the blockers. However, very limited research has
expanded the scope to understand the impact of these blockers beyond individual users. This is an
important topic mostly because the online tracking system represents a complex socio-technical
environment. In this system, web tracking blockers impact and are also influenced by many other
stakeholders. For example, partly in response to blocking, some websites and third parties are trying
to track people through new ways that are less easily detectable [77]. In some other cases, websites
may limit the user’s experience or access to content if they detect blockers being used. These cases
demonstrate the impact of adopting the blockers and potential push back from other stakeholders
other than the end-users.
Our goal in this chapter is to explore the implications of adopting various online tracking
blockers on and beyond individual users. Such implications can potentially illuminate the designs
of future blocking technologies.
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4.3.2 Speculative Design for Privacy Research
Proposed by Dunne and Raby, speculative design uses design to create artifacts that exist in the
future or an alternate present, and brings those artifacts to the present, demanding responses from
the present [74]. Speculative design uses design artifacts and the process of design to imagine
alternate socio-technical configurations of the world as a way to interrogate questions about values
and politics through design [219]. Rather than focus on solving an immediate problem, it uses
design to ask questions and open up or explore a design space [74, 73, 22]. By creating an imagined
world surrounding a speculative artifact, it also allows the investigation of how technologies are
entangled with social, legal, and economic forces.
As privacy researchers, we have seen prior research in the design community beginning to
explore issues related to privacy using speculative design practices. For example, Lindley et al.
used design fiction to articulate how an Internet of Things door lock could communicate with voice
user interfaces (e.g., Amazon Echo) and surfaced potential data collection and sharing issues under
the umbrella of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [141]. Using design packets,
Pierce et al.’s work imagined creative alternatives to the existing forms of privacy policies and
discovered a number of new insights for future privacy policies from a design lens, such as the
need for active user engagement [170]. Inspired by the science fiction novel The Circle, Wong et al.
crafted a set of design fictions to explore privacy and surveillance issues in emerging sensing and
tracking technologies [222, 221].
However, while technical privacy research has adopted user-centered design techniques, specu-
lative design approaches are rare in the privacy research community [220]. Speculative design can
be useful to help probe issues related to privacy that exist beyond interactions between a human
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(a) Information-based model (b) Information-based model with
sensitivity (c) Tracker-based model
Figure 4.1: Our three interactive prototypes.
(a) An information-based model; (b) an information-based model with information sensitivity; (c) a
tracker-based model, which mimics the Ghostery interfaces [98]. Participants can toggle the button
to allow or block the collection of specific information / tracker.
and system at the interface level. At a broader level, speculative design can also help us explore
the problem space of “privacy” itself, allowing us to see privacy as situated in a specific context or
situation. When looking at privacy in online tracking contexts, speculative design also begins to
view privacy as a social construct, interrogating privacy for who, from whom is privacy is protecting,
and who is responsible for providing privacy? How might the implications of the answers these
questions differ for different stakeholders in the online environment? These are in line with recent
conceptualizations of privacy as situated in different social contexts and different subject positions
[157, 164]. Moreover, speculative design allows us to investigate where privacy might come into
conflict or tension with other values held by end-users or other stakeholders. This follows calls by
Lindley et al. for HCI researchers to consider “implications for adoption” to explore and discuss
technologies beyond their prototype stage using design practices such as speculative design or
design fiction [140].
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4.4 Iterative Processes of Speculation
In this section, we describe the process of how we came up with our scenario-based speculations.
The decision to use scenarios was made for several reasons. Usable privacy research has a
tradition of using user-centered design techniques, so creating scenarios that resemble traditional
user scenarios may help this work to be more accessible to other privacy researchers. Our work is
also inspired by Nathan et. al’s value scenarios, which similarly repurposed traditional scenario-
based design with a critical and speculative design perspective, in order to envision long term
systemic effects of new technologies [160, 159]. Our detailed steps are presented below.
4.4.1 Step 1 - Explore The Tracking Blocker Design Space
To explore the tracking blocker design space, we first looked at existing blockers and literature
to understand common design elements in their designs. We reviewed popular blockers (e.g.,
Ghostery [98], Disconnect.me [67], AdBlock Plus [171]), blocking features embedded in various
browsers (e.g., Safari [226], Brave [38], Firefox [6]), and prior research on the effectiveness and
usability of these tools (e.g., [203, 182, 218, 132]). We then summarized five dimensions that
have been used in designing blockers. These dimensions include Information Dimension (i.e.,
what information is presented to the users), Mode Dimension (i.e., information-based or tracker-
based blocking), Automation Dimension (i.e., whether the blocker can run automatically without
human intervention), Preferences Dimension (i.e., whether users are allowed to set their blocking
preferences), and Categories Dimension (i.e., whether the information is categorized for better
readability).
These dimensions were identified based on our observations and reviews of the existing blockers
and research, particularly in terms of how these blocker designs could differ significantly (e.g., levels
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of human involvement rather than graphical details of the UIs). For instance, Ghostery provides a
list of trackers to the users [98] whereas AdBlock Plus runs in the background without providing
users much information [171]. This observation led us to create the Information Dimension. As
another example, Ghostery runs in a tracker-based model [98] whereas Google Chrome allows
users to block certain information from being tracked, e.g., location [121]. Thus, we created the
Mode Dimension to capture this difference in design. The Automation Dimension was drawn
from the observation that Adblock Plus automatically identify and block trackers [171], whereas
Disconnect.me relies on a tracker list to identify trackers [67].
To ensure what these dimensions covered align with end-users’ expectations of an ideal blocker,
we designed three interactive prototypes in the form of browser plugins (as shown in Figure 4.1)
using different combinations of the above five dimensions. We then used them as probes in a Wizard
of Oz study with 15 participants to explore whether we have missed any other dimensions. We
recruited our participants through Craigslist, flyers, and word of mouth from a medium-size city
in the east coast of US. Their ages ranged from 20 to 40 (Mean=28, Median=29, STD=6.2). Nine
were male and six were female. They represented a wide range of occupations (e.g., a librarian, a
social worker, an accountant, etc.) and different levels of experiences with the Internet and web
tracking blockers.
In the Wizard of Oz study, we asked our participants to complete a set of tasks with the
three interfaces (e.g., setting their preferences, and blocking necessary information based on their
preferences) in the lab. We observed them when they were working on their tasks, then conducted an
exit interview to understand whether they encountered any challenges, how they hoped to improve
the design and any other feedback. Given that this study is not the focus on this chapter, we only
discuss what we have learned from the process.
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Through the Wizard of Oz study, we did not identify any new dimension in the blocker de-
sign space. However, our participants’ feedback helped us to form a deeper and more thorough
understanding of what factors should be included in these dimensions, which further guided our
subsequent speculative exploration. We revised the description of each dimension and present
them below. For each dimension, we also include examples to illustrate where we identified that
dimension from.
Information Dimension refers to the amount of information provided to users. The blocker
can provide more information to end-users (about the data each tracker collects, sensitivity, why
the data is collected, and who the trackers are), or it might provide less information to end-users
(operating more in the background).
Mode Dimension refers to which mode the blocker is based on. The mode of blocking can be
based on the type of data being collected (i.e., the information-based model), or who the trackers
are (i.e., the tracker-based model), or a hybrid approach of both aforementioned models (i.e., the
hybrid model).
Automation Dimension refers to whether the blocker is automatic or dependent on human
intervention. If it is the former, then it can automatically figure out who the trackers are and what
data and information the trackers are collecting. However, if the blocker is dependent, it requires
the cooperation of people and organizations who create these online trackers to disclose what data
they are collecting.
Preferences Dimension refers to whether the blocker needs to collect users’ preferences. The
blocker can allow more user-guided input or be more paternalistic and make decisions without user
input.
Categories Dimension refers to the extent to which the information presented to end-users
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about what gets blocked is categorized.
4.4.2 Step 2 - Initial Interface Designs
Practically, creating interfaces helped us explore multiple design opportunities and possibilities
inspired by the above five dimensions. As a way to explore implications for adoption, we followed
Wong and Merrill’s work [219] by starting with a purposely mundane design – a series of web
tracking settings pages. This mundane form, however, was helpful in getting us to think about how
these technologies may get adopted as part of people’s everyday practices. As privacy researchers,
we also thought that the form of a privacy settings page might make the scenarios more familiar
to others in the usable privacy and privacy-enhancing technology communities, as these types of
settings pages are common in their work.
We created three scenarios, varying the factors given for each dimension, as summarized in
Table 1. Our goal was to produce a diverse set of blocker scenarios to explore different potential
effects, rather than to exhaustively explore every possible combination.
We started by going through the dimension list. To reflect the Information Dimension, we first
designed the first blocker (S1) in which the blocker is running in the background once it is installed
and requires limited interactions with the users, thus has no tangible interface. We then designed
the second (S2) and third (S3) blockers to have a user interface.
To reflect the Mode Dimension, given that the tracker-based model has been already widely
adopted in real-world, we focused on the information-based model and the hybrid model. We
designed S1 and S2 to be the information-based model, and S3 to be the hybrid model.
To reflect the Automation Dimension, we designed S1 to be fully automated since it would run
in the background. S2 is also fully automated, and S3 is more dependent on other companies to
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reveal their data collection practices.
To reflect the Preferences Dimension and Categories Dimension, we created two permutations.
We only required S2 to categorize all the information and S3 to collect users’ preferences. As S1
did not have an interface, these two categories were not applicable.
4.4.3 Step 3 - Crafting Scenarios Around the Interfaces
It is worth noting that, while we created and shared a set of speculative interfaces to represent what
the blockers might look like in each scenario, we found that thinking about the text of a scenario is
helpful in allowing us to sketch out the speculative world that exists beyond the blocker interface–for
instance, documenting the organizations and institutions who develop and maintain the blockers, or
describing laws that promote the use of blockers.
Before crafting the broader scenarios surrounding the interfaces, we began to ask ourselves and
discuss what would be necessary to implement these blockers, what effects and consequences might
that have, and how would the effects and consequences influence people’s behaviors. Because we
were in part interested in the ways individuals’ behaviors and other aspects of the world might
interact and be affected by the adoption of blockers, we looked to Lessig’s framework which
includes four regulating forces [134], i.e., law, technical design, economic markets, and social
norms that are all ways to affect, or “regulate”, human behavior. We used this framework as a
basis for thinking about aspects in our scenarios that went beyond an interaction by a human and
a computer. We took a dynamic view using Lessig’s forces; i.e., people’s experience of the mass
adoption and use of blockers could affect and be affected by the law, technical design choices,
markets, and social norms.
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Based on this framework, our speculative exploration focused on how legal changes or tech-
nological changes would influence other aspects of the scenarios which eventually may influence
people’s behaviors. One drawback of using Lessig’s model, however, was that the model did not
account for individual differences which could impact people’s behavior as well, i.e., people in
different subject positions or people with different skills and resources may be affected differently
by the same technologies or by the same laws. As such, based on what we found from the Wizard
of Oz study, we added an additional force, users’ digital literacy, in order to capture individual
differences in people’s understandings of online tracking which might affect their behavior.
When conducting design research, beyond the outcome of creating design artifacts, moments of
critical reflection during the process of design can provide insight into a phenomenon being studies
[178, 190]. As such, attuned to these forces (technology, law, economic markets, social norms,
and users’ digital literacy), we reflected on different ways that blockers might be implemented and
deployed, leading us to reflect on three additional design dimensions for the scenarios, including:
Format Dimension refers to the format of the blocker. For instance, is the blocker a third-party
browser plugin or an installed browser feature?
Implementation Dimension refers to who is responsible for implementing, updating, and
maintaining the blocker?
Interests Dimension refers to in whose interests is the blocker created for? For instance, is the
blocker created in the interest of end-users, advertisers, or the developers?
So far, we have iteratively speculated three interfaces and the scenarios around them. Table 4.1
summarizes how these three speculative scenarios differ from each other.
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Table 4.1: Different factors in the three speculative scenarios
Dimensions S1 S2 S3
Information Background UI UI
Mode Info Info Hybrid
Automation Auto Auto Dependent
Preferences NA N Y
Categories NA Y N
Format Plugin Feature Settings
Implementation Non-profit Browser Tracker
Interests Users Company Advertiser
4.4.4 Step 4 - Critically Examine the Speculations
When we finished creating the scenarios and interfaces in this fictional world, we then used the
five dimensions (four dimensions from Lessig’s model [134] plus the users’ digital literacy we
observed from our prior Wizard of Oz study) to critically examine the scenarios. The goal was to
understand what the consequences and implications of adoption might be—particularly if there
might be possible consequences that we might not have initially expected. To guide us through the
process, we asked ourselves the following questions:
• Technical design: Are there any design changes that can lead to the successful or unsuccess-
ful implementation of the blocker?
• Law: What will happen if there is a lack of law enforcement or policy regulation to limit the
power of industry?
• Social norm: What is the intention of the blocker and what are the expectations of the public?
• Economic markets: Is there a balance between the needs of users and industry stakeholders?
• User literacy: Will the end-users have the knowledge and the ability to use the blocker
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(a) The icon of ProtectionPlus in
S1. The red icon to the right
indicates the plugin has been
installed and is currently in use.
(b) Main interface. (c) Notification on reddit.com.
Figure 4.2: The icon of ProtectionPlus in Scenario 1 (a), and the two interfaces of Limestone in
Scenario 2 (b,c).
It is worth noting that, in this chapter, we do not claim the exhaustive or complete representations
of scenarios, interfaces, or questions. Traditionally, research in the usable privacy community
focuses on designing interfaces, developing functional prototypes, and evaluating them through
users studies or field studies to understand the potential user experiences issues or effectiveness
in helping users mitigating privacy and security concerns. Our goal in this research is to broaden
our understanding of blockers beyond the level of the user interface, to instead surface potential
technological, legal, social, and economic impacts that implementing a blocker widely may cause
from privacy researchers’ perspective. Thus, our scenarios and interfaces, as well as the questions
we ask, represent only a subset of all possibilities as a way to begin to surface these questions.
Future research can take other routes and understand new issues from other perspectives. Next, we
present the three speculative scenarios and interfaces.
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4.5 Speculative Scenarios
Each speculative scenario contains three elements: (1) a background introducing the technical or
legal environment, (2) a detailed description of the scenario, and (3) an interface design of the
blocker. Below are the details.
4.5.1 Scenario 1: Invisible Blocker
Background. Computer science researchers at EFDN University develop an algorithm that can
accurately infer what types of information are being tracked when a user is browsing websites on
a mobile or computer device. The work comes to the attention of privacy researchers working
in partnership with NoTracking.org, a non-profit organization that is dedicated to limiting web
tracking for online users and promoting a more private, equitable web. Together, they develop a
user-oriented blocker that has automatic agency in detecting what types of data are being tracked
when a user is browsing the web, then blocks sending certain types of data to the tracker. They have
also collaborated with the researchers to understand what types of information are sensitive to users
in different contexts.
Description. NoTracking.org builds a new web tracking blocker, ProtectionPlus, to help
their users limit online tracking. It is a browser plugin available on all the mainstream web
browsers. Compared to other existing blockers (e.g., Ghostery [98]) that require users to set up the
blocking rules, ProtectionPlus minimizes users’ effort by running in the background. No settings
or configuration are required; once the users install the blocker, they do not need to worry about
it anymore. When users visit a website, ProtectionPlus will show a red icon next to the browser
search bar, indicating that it is working (Figure 4.2a). Then it will be able to automatically detect
the types of information being collected on that website and block the types of information that
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(a) Information and Tracker view. (b) Notification View.
Figure 4.3: The main interfaces of StopInfo in Scenario 3.
are sensitive to general users based on the organization’s research. When users want to learn more
about the information that is blocked, ProtectionPlus will provide more details, such as who collect
and why are they collecting the information, on their website.
4.5.2 Scenario 2: Balanced Web Browser
Background. Computer science researchers at EFDN University develop an algorithm that can
accurately infer what types of information are being tracked when a user is browsing websites on
a mobile or computer device. The work comes to the attention of Limestone, a mainstream web
browser company that aims to develop the next-generation web browser to give users more controls
of their data. It helps the company to build a positive public image of the company and attract
more users. Together, they develop a new feature in the Limestone browser which enables users to
perform fine-grained control of their data.
Description. This new feature (Figure 4.2b) allows the users to block the tracking of certain
types of information based on their preferences. Once a user blocks on a certain type of information,
the browser will pop out a notification telling the user the potential consequence of blocking this
74
type of information. For example, in Figure 4.2c, when the user tries to block the “IP address” from
being tracked, the notification reads, “Blocking trackers from tracking your IP Address will disable
the comment function on reddit.com”. The user will then make the blocking decision based on the
notification. At the same time, the browser company also needs to work with different third-party
tracking companies and advertisers to make a profit, thus they do not expect that the users block
everything through this new feature. In fact, the notification tries to nudge users to sometimes not
block information from being tracked.
4.5.3 Scenario 3: Greedy Web Tracker
Background. Following the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
individual states in the United States begin passing data privacy and protection laws, starting with
the California Consumer Privacy Act. In order to standardize a dozen different state rules into
a single set of laws, the U.S. government faces enough pressure by technology companies and
consumer advocates to pass the national Data Accountability and Trust Act (DATA), 15 U.S.C
§§9012-9021. Several subsections are of particular importance for online tracking. §9014 c.1.E
affirms individuals’ right to have “meaningful choices” in how data about them are collected
and used. §9015 a.2 mandates that data collectors and data processors provide machine-readable
privacy notices (in addition to existing text-based notices) that disclose what types of information
are collected. Liability rules established in §9020 state that a website can be liable if they use a
third-party tracker that is not compliant. This leads to a growing marketplace of tracking companies
that are DATA-compliant, providing machine-readable data policies and providing options for users
to block certain types of data uses.
Description. KnowYou is a web tracking company that collects users’ data when they interact
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with the website. The primary goal of the company is to maximize its profit by collecting as much
information as possible, then monetize it by analyzing it or directly selling it to other advertising
companies. They collect users’ data by embedding their web tracker in the mainstream news
websites, social media websites as well as shopping websites. Based on the DATA law, all web
tracking companies should provide the users the options where users can specify their preferences
of what types of information they allow to be collected. KnowYou, therefore, develops StopInfo, a
tool to collect users’ preferences for information collected through web tracking. They embed the
tool in their privacy policy and provide an information view and a tracker view (Figure 4.3a) where
users can specify their preferences. In the information view, users can block all types of information
collectively or certain types of information selectively. When users click on block all, an interface
(Figure 4.3b) will show up to notify users of the consequences of blocking all types of information.
For the best interest of the company, the fewer users use this feature, the better it will be.
4.6 Reflections of Our Speculative Scenarios
As mentioned before, the speculative scenarios were designed not only to reflect the design dimen-
sions that we have identified from the literature and current practices but also concerns and risks that
were not particularly present in the user studies, such as the blocker being designed in the interest
of different stakeholders and the consequences it might bring, and the tension between the users and
the web trackers. Some of these concerns and risks were ones that we have seen from prior research
on web tracking and blocking, other concerns and risks surfaced as we began to think about ways
in which multiple types of stakeholders (including different types of users, secondary users, and
corporate stakeholders) might adopt and respond to the use of blockers while we were creating the
scenarios.
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Situating ourselves in the fictional world with the three scenarios we created and thinking about
the five questions we posed in the prior section, we unpack the potential issues for the adoption
and implementation of a blocker in different scenarios and discuss the implications from legal,
technological, social, economic, and users’ perspectives. It is worth noting that these issues and
implications are not mutually exclusive. Like in the present world, they often intertwine with each
other and thus create a complicated situation. For clarity, we discuss each perspective independently.
4.6.1 Commentary: Technological Reflections
In our speculative scenarios, technological changes across different settings may change how people
use these blockers. For example, since in Scenario 3, all information presented in the interfaces are
not categorized. As such, users may face a lot of usability issues, such as suffering from clotted
information. Eventually, the tool may end up not being used as much due to usability problems.
In Scenario 2, the Limestone browser aims to balance the needs of both users and the tracking
and advertising companies. By showing the users the consequences of blocking certain types
of information, it helps users make better and more informed decisions without interfering with
their experiences. The tracking and advertising companies can also collect user information in
a non-intrusive way. However, considering the imbalanced power dynamics between the online
tracking industry and end-users, Limestone also leaves potential opportunities for tracking and
advertising companies or even the websites themselves to work around the goals of the blockers.
One possible way is to tie the core functions of the website with the major types of information
collection so that if the users block any information collection, they will essentially not able to use
the website. In an earlier example (as shown in Figure 4.2c), if the web trackers embed the tracking
of the IP address in the comment function on an online discussion site, then blocking the IP address
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tracking will essentially make the site not usable. This practice will force users to allow information
collection in order to keep the website usable even when they hope for the opposite. This can lead
to a situation where websites design their systems to work in such a way that forces users to have
little choice in blocking, i.e., users have to allow all tracking to access a site’s functions which is
adversarial to the intent of the blockers.
4.6.2 Commentary: Legal Reflections
In the scenarios, we also speculate the potential consequences on users’ behavior caused by legal
changes. For example, in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, we did not make any changes to the legal
environment. Scenario 3 considers how legal and regulatory changes may shift economic incentives
for how companies track, collect and use data, which could change the environment in which trackers
operate. However, if changes happen in the law that requires trackers to reveal the information
collection details, we might also see potential pushback from the tracking and advertising industry
or workarounds to alternative routes given that such changes in the law will hurt that industry’s
current business model. One potential way to work around the law is that users may be asked to
temporarily disable their blockers or disable the blocking function on their browser while they
visit some sites, otherwise they will not be able to visit the sites, as this is currently happening
with browser extensions that block advertisements (e.g., AdBlocker Plus [171]). Thus the plugin
remains not effective, as it will be possible for the tracking and advertising industry to follow laws
of disclosing their practices, while still making it difficult for users to opt-out or make choices about
tracking. Furthermore, the DATA law’s focus on individual choice and consent may not work in
cases where data are about multiple people, such as on shared devices. On a more hopeful side, the
ability to levy fines against companies for violations may create more incentives to respect users’
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privacy or follow their expectations of data collection.
4.6.3 Commentary: Social Reflections
We observed potential social issues that can arise from each scenario, especially when considering
whose interest the blocker is designed for and what is the intention of the blocker. For example,
in Scenario 1, given that a non-profit organization such as NoTracking.org aims to protect the
users’ privacy, users may have more trust towards ProtectionPlus. However, since developing
and maintaining a technological product requires a significant amount of resources (e.g., funding,
technicians, developers to update it, etc.). If NoTracking.org does not have the resources to continue
supporting ProtectionPlus and starts to look for resources outside of the organization (e.g., through
fundraising), users’ trust in an independent non-profit organization may decrease. Or, without
resources to maintain ProtectionPlus, the blocker may not get updated, reducing its feasibility as a
sustainable long term solution.
In another example, in Scenario 2, Limestone, the browser creating and implementing the
blocker, aims to serve the interests of both end-users and the advertising companies. Limestone
aims to provide users some level of control over their own data, which can help build a positive
image of the company among consumers, and at the same time, aim to provide the advertising
companies enough data for their benefits. The motivation for providing advertising companies data
could be heightened if Limestone also runs their own tracking or advertising network, as some
current browser providers do (e.g., Chrome and web trackers from Google). However, users may
have misconceptions that Limestone’s goal is to protect them wholeheartedly. This mismatch may
defeat users’ expectations. If Limestone’s role in tracking is revealed to users in a surprising or
“creepy” way, it can lead to a strong push back from the users against the company.
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4.6.4 Commentary: Economic Reflections
In Scenario 1, even though ProtectionPlus seems to be a very helpful tool for users by automatically
blocking trackers, it can potentially damage the web tracking and online advertising industry if
adopted at scale. ProtectionPlus may automatically block many types of information that tracking
companies need in order to provide advertising services. In a world where people’s information is
used as a commodity and advertisements are delivered to the users in exchange for free Internet
services, without considering the needs of web tracking companies, a tool like ProtectionPlus may
hurt the Internet economy and may eventually lose its value. Alternatively, we also considered that
online tracking and advertising companies may try to develop workarounds to make blockers less
useful to end-users. This can lead to a type of blocking “arms race”, where blockers try to find new
ways to function, and tracking and advertising companies find new workarounds.
4.6.5 Commentary: Users’ Digital Literacy
When we started to think about how users’ digital literacy impact their ability to use the blockers
in these scenarios, we discovered several interesting insights which were also related to the four
dimensions discussed already. In Scenario 1, one potential issue related to the adoption of the
blockers can be that users may not even know the existence of ProtectionPlus since as a non-profit
organization, NoTracking.org does not have as many resources as the other companies in the
industry to promote their product. Thus, users who are generally not tech savvy potentially will
not even know about the blocker because they do not know to search for and download it. In fact,
we already observed such issues from our Wizard of Oz studies since very few of our participants
have heard of any web tracking blocking tools. Similar issues also hold in Scenario 2 and Scenario
3: users who have low digital literacy may experience issues in finding the feature, understanding
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the interfaces, and in how to use the tool to protect themselves. Even if installed as a feature of the
browser in Scenario 2, users may not take advantage of it, depending on how the Limestone browser
implements it (e.g., Limestone may decide to turn off the blocker by default or make its settings
page difficult to find). Users with low digital literacy can be put in risky positions considering the
imbalanced power dynamics in the web tracking ecosystems where other stakeholders already have
significantly more power than users do.
4.6.6 Implications and Questions for Blocking Technologies Adoption
From the above reflections, we synthesize a set of implications and questions for privacy researchers
who are creating blockers to consider. These considerations operate at a level above individual
interactions with an interface, focusing on how blockers might interact with other aspects of the
world over a longer period of time.
• Consider additional direct and indirect stakeholders beyond users (similar to Value Sensi-
tive Design [91]). For instance, what is the role of browsers, developers, regulators, and
policymakers, etc?
• Whose privacy is at stake, and what threats is the blocker trying to protect them from (e.g.,
government surveillance, behavioral advertising tracking, bad web actors, etc.)?
• Should privacy be treated as the only goal? What other values beyond privacy might be at
stake? How to understand and achieve the balance between privacy and other goals?
• What legal environment(s) will the blockers be working in? Does that have implications for
what the blocker needs to disclose to users, or how the blocker itself is able to work?
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• Who is responsible for offering and maintaining the blocker over time? Deployment options
such as having the blocker be embedded in a browser or operating system versus a third-party
download, or being maintained by a for-profit versus non-profit company might suggest
different types of motives for creating the blockers and may affect user trust in different ways.
Moreover, prior literature on information tracking, in general, arises the discussion around
the potential consequences that web tracking and blocking technologies could have more broadly
beyond the web tracking industry. For example, a recent study has shown that developers perceived
the web tracking embedded in the advertising network as the only viable way to monetize their
apps [154]. However, most app developers also acknowledge that they mostly choose to use the
advertising networks’ default settings to collect users’ data [154]. As the tracking online and
through smartphone share the same advertising networks, the changes we argue for in the tracking
and blocking mechanisms can impact how the ads network operates and collect users’ data. The
ads network will further influence how developers collect users’ information in smartphone app
tracking and create a significant impact on their lives. More broadly and in the long run, the impact
may also affect tracking through the Internet of Things (IoT) as well, given the recent growth in the
IoT adoption, as well as many forthcoming new technologies.
Thus, our speculate exploration essentially provides a lens to understand the adoption of blocking




4.7.1 Reflecting Our Speculative Exploration Process
As privacy researchers, we realize the limitations of the existing methodological toolbox for privacy-
enhancing technologies (PETS) research. Traditionally, PETS related research pipeline includes an
empirical study to understand people’s privacy concerns, system prototyping to address people’s
concerns, and user studies to validate the system (e.g., [210, 126, 233]). This approach limits the
privacy concerns and risks to what the users have suggested in the study rather than what could have
happened in the long run when the actual systems are deployed in different real-world settings.
This chapter presented a case study of a potential new privacy research paradigm. We started
our exploration by investigating the web tracking blocker design space through literature, current
practices, and a Wizard of Oz study. Grounded in the dimensions we identified, we designed
different variations of blockers and their interfaces, then created three speculative scenarios where
these variations were used in practice. This sequence of explorations not only gave precedence to
what users value (e.g., privacy, autonomy) but also surfaced other potential issues and obstacles
when implementing web tracking blockers.
Creating a set of speculative scenarios and interfaces helped us build on and move beyond
immediate questions about usability and user expectations of the web blocking system. By thinking
about “implications for adoption” of a web blocking technology in different socio-technical settings,
we began to consider how the blockers might interact with multiple types of stakeholders in various
contexts, as well as how they might relate to different technical and legal infrastructures, and
how the blockers might be maintained and used over longer periods of time. These reflections
suggested social, technical, and legal implications for researchers who are working on blocking
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tools to consider, which were not obvious from the results of the traditional user studies alone.
As the responsibility for addressing privacy spans social, technical, and legal domains, expanding
researchers’ considerations to include these domains helped us work towards a fuller and richer set
of ways to try to protect privacy. This case study suggested that PETS research would benefit from
considering implications for adoption through speculative design-inspired methods.
4.7.2 Speculative Design of PETS
We recognize that the speculative design methodology has rarely been used within the privacy and
security community. To the best of our knowledge, our study as well as Briggs and Thomas’ study on
future identity technologies [36] are some of the few uses of speculative design approaches in privacy
and security research. In contrast, lots of prior work in the design research community has touched
on privacy and security issues related to technology development (e.g., [222, 170, 141, 139]).
Based on our own experiences, we believe that speculative design is a valuable addition to
privacy/security researchers’ methodological arsenal, and can help put privacy/security research
in conversation with design researchers similarly grappling with issues in the domains of privacy
and security through different methods. The mainstream research paradigm in privacy and security
usually involves researchers building functional prototypes and then running user studies to evaluate
the prototypes. The focus is often on the technical feasibility and user experiences. In contrast,
speculative design purposefully ignores the technical feasibility in exploring the futuristic and
technically challenging ideas. It allows people to critique the status quo, imagine and experience an
alternative future(s) where they are free from the current market and technology limitations, and
raise questions for future technology development. It also helps to surface other potential issues
and consequence that are not obvious through traditional user studies. Creating alternative futures
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also allows people to pursue the values they espouse—or alternatively, to explore values in possible
futures that we might want to avoid. This is particularly valuable in the context of online tracking or
the Internet more broadly because stakeholders’ relationships are power-laden, where usually the
industry has more power over ordinary users. This power imbalance shapes current online tracking
practices. Future speculative design work might explore what privacy looks like when power is
distributed differently among users and technology companies.
We advocate that on the one hand, researchers interested in the privacy and security aspects of
the technology in the design community can proactively work with researchers in the privacy and
security area to better facilitate and deepen the related aspects in their design work. On the other
hand, the privacy and security community should broaden their methods and consider adopting
speculative design methods in exploring future privacy-enhancing technologies. In particular,
these approaches can encourage researchers to think outside the box by not limiting themselves
to the industry or market demands or current practices and to raise empirical research questions
for future research. Furthermore, it broadens the scope of the investigation, helping researchers
think of further downstream effects related to the ways in which the technologies interact with
other aspects of society beyond the technologies’ users. It can also help researchers to think more
critically about contemporary technologies and shed lights on who is truly benefiting from these
technologies. For example, this method can be applied to explore PETS for future automation
technologies (e.g., privacy mechanisms for self-driving cars), smart toys (e.g., empowering children
and parents to better control their privacy against ubiquitous data collection), social media (e.g.,




Online tracking is prevalent and many tracking blockers have been developed to help people manage
online tracking. We used a speculative design approach, complemented by an Wizard of Oz study,
to understanding the implications of adopting web tracking blockers. Through three speculative
scenarios and several interfaces, our exploration surfaces many potential issues that may come
with the adoption of web tracking blockers, and further sheds light on the technical, legal, social,
economic, and user-related implications for future web tracking blocking tools. Our research
presents a case study of a new paradigm for future research in the privacy and security community.
Our approach also helps to discover deeper privacy issues hidden in the user studies and illuminate
future empirical research questions to ask. We advocate a deeper collaboration between the design






Drone Privacy: Bystanders’ Perspectives
As an emerging technology, drones represent a simple multi-stakeholder environment. On the
one hand, drone controllers fly the drones and take pictures or record videos with it; on the other
hand, drone bystanders (i.e., those who are not the controllers, such as people who are walking
on the street) can potentially be caught by the camera on a drone. To examine people’s privacy
perceptions of drones, we started with an interview study to investigate the privacy perceptions of
drone bystanders [228]. In this section, I summary our study design, data analysis, as well as main
findings. For full results, please refer to Appendix A.
5.1 Study Design
Each study session started with a drone demonstration. When the participants came to our lab for
the study, we first showed them a drone (DJI Phantom 2 Vision+) statically and explained in detail
how to control a drone to fly and take photos. If the weather permitted, we would demonstrate
the drone motion by operating it in front of the participants. We then answered any questions the
participants might have related to the drone and its capabilities.
We started the interview with the participants immediately after the demonstration. The interview
protocol is structured as follows. We began by asking the participants some general questions
related to their perceptions of drones, such as “have you ever heard of drones? How do you feel
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about drones? Do you see any benefits of drones?” We also asked our participants to compare a
drone with two other tracking/recording technologies, smartphones with cameras, and closed-circuit
television (CCTV). We then presented five scenarios to the participants, including a drone is being
used in recording a promotion event in a shopping mall, delivering goods, recording a friend’s party,
reporting a parade, and searching criminals. We asked our participants to explain their perceptions
of drones in each scenario. Finally, we asked our participants to describe what kinds of notifications
and controls they would like to have and how the drones should be regulated.
5.2 Data Analysis
We conducted interviews with 16 participants (eight male, eight female, 18 - 62 years old, average
29 years old). All interviews were recorded then transcribed. We conducted a thematic analysis [32].
The other co-author and I first immersed ourselves in the data by reading through the transcripts
several times. We then coded the transcripts, discussed the codes, and merged our codebook to form
a final codebook with 132 unique codes. The codes were then grouped into nine themes, including
drone features, drone usage, attitudes towards drones, cultural differences, private vs. public space,
privacy concerns, safety concerns, and drone control. The details of the process and the sample
codes are documented in the published paper [228] in Appendix A.
5.3 Results Summary
Our participants suggested several perceived benefits of drones, such as the ability to fly and to
take high-definition photos and videos in inaccessible or even dangerous environments. They also
mentioned many potential application domains, such as aerial photography, package delivery, and
emergency responses in the high-traffic area. At the same time, our participants also discussed
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their safety, security, and privacy concerns of drones. The safety concerns were mainly about the
possibility of hitting by a drone or drones interfering with each other. The security concerns mainly
centered around drone trespassing on some sensitive or even forbidden areas (e.g., military facilities)
due to its mobility. As of the privacy concerns, Table 5.1 summarized the key findings related to our
participants’ privacy concerns. The full results and examples of quotes can be found in Appendix A.
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Ownership, sensitivity of the place, and
nature of activity are three factors to deter-
mine whether a place is private or public.
Peeking and stalking Drones may peek through the window, or
follow and record an individual’s activi-
ties.
Recording and sharing Drones may take and share photos and






Most participants perceive a shopping mall
as a public space, thus have less concerns.
But drone usage should be limited.
Recording a friend’s
party
It is not clear whether a friend’s house is
private or public, thus participants have
mixed attitudes.
Delivering goods Generally acceptable
Reporting a parade Generally acceptable because it is a public
space
Searching for criminal Generally acceptable, but some partici-








The major difference is the distance of
recording, and whether the bystanders can
access the owners or controllers
Drones and CCTV The flexibility, visibility, intended pur-
poses, and the trust in the controllers influ-











Each drone should have an unique ID
Regulations Regulation should limit the physical di-
mension of the drone and the area that
drones can fly in
Key Discussion Points Duality of drones Privacy concerns are not only about the
drones but also about the drone controllers
and the perceived relationship with the
controllers.
Table 5.1: Summary of the privacy perceptions of drone bystanders
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Chapter 6
Drone Privacy: Controllers’ Perspectives
Prior research has discovered various privacy concerns that bystanders have about drones. However,
little is known about drone controllers’ privacy perceptions and practices of drones. Understanding
controllers’ perspective is important because it will inform whether controllers’ current practices
protect or infringe on bystanders’ privacy and what mechanisms could be designed to better address
the potential privacy issues of drones. In this chapter, we report results from interviews of 12
drone controllers in the US. Our interviewees treated safety as their top priority but considered
privacy issues of drones exaggerated. Our results also highlight many significant differences in how
controllers and bystanders think about drone privacy, for instance, how they determine public vs.
private spaces and whether notice and consent of bystanders are needed.
6.1 Introduction
Drones are lightweight unmanned aircraft controlled by operators or onboard computers. Drones
can enable numerous innovative applications but have also raised significant privacy concerns due
to their maneuverability and capabilities of taking photos/videos and sensing the environment. For
instance, in our prior work, we interviewed drone bystanders (i.e., people who had no experience
operating drones but may be surrounded by flying drones) and found that bystanders had various
privacy concerns about drones such as stalking, photo/video recording and sharing [228].
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However, it is unclear how drone controllers (i.e., people who have directly operated drones)
think and do about privacy in their practices. Answering this question is important because it will
inform (1) whether controllers’ current practices may protect or violate bystanders’ privacy, and (2)
what mechanisms could help controllers better address these privacy concerns.
As a follow-up study of drone bystanders [228], we conducted interviews with 12 drone
controllers in the US about their perceptions and practices of drones. We focused on drones for
civilian rather than military purposes. Our controller interviewees were primarily concerned about
safety and felt that the privacy risks of drones are exaggerated. Most of them also believed that
they have the rights to fly drones and take photos/videos in public spaces without the need to get
others’ permission. While they adopted a legal definition of public space that is primarily based on
ownership, our prior study of bystanders found that some bystanders followed a “social” definition
in which the nature of a space is characterized by the social relationship within it, for instance,
shopping with a close friend in a mall makes the space private [228].
This chapter makes two main contributions. First, it provides a rich account of the perceptions
and practices of drone controllers. Second, comparing our results with the prior literature on by-
standers [228] uncovers significant privacy “mismatches” between drone controllers and bystanders.
We discuss future directions to help bridge these mismatches.
6.2 Related Work
Privacy issues of drones have been discussed in the literature. For instance, the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC), a civil liberty organization highlights aerial surveillance as a critical
privacy issue of drones [80]. Legal experts have also voiced ethical and privacy concerns regarding
the use of drones (e.g., [43, 72]). Dunlap argues that when drones are used for surveillance, they
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can violate Americans’ constitutional rights, particularly citing the Fourth Amendment, which
protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures [72]. As for regulations in the U.S., the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires drone controllers to register their drones with the
agency [1]. The FAA’s new rules on small drones focus on safety (e.g., prohibit night operations of
drones) [84].
People’s privacy concerns of tracking/recording technologies, such as wearable cameras (e.g., [106,
66, 108, 107]), CCTV (e.g., [216]), and RFID (e.g., [14]), have been studied extensively in the
literature. However, privacy issues of drones are understudied. Clothier et al. conducted a survey in
Australia and found that the respondents’ overall attitudes towards drones were fairly neutral but
less than one fifth of the respondents reported concerns about drone surveillance or spying [52].
Our prior study of drone bystanders in the US uncovered different privacy concerns about drones
in general and under specific drone usage scenarios [228]. While these two studies focused on
ordinary citizens or bystanders (i.e., who did not have experience operating drones), the literature
says little about drone controllers. Our present study fills the gap by focusing on drone controllers’
privacy perceptions and practices.
6.3 Methodology
From January to March 2016, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 12 drone controllers in
Syracuse, New York (US). We recruited our interviewees by posting study fliers in places such as
university campus and parks. The interviews were conducted in a drone hobbyist club, our lab, and
public places such as libraries. Each interview took about 1 hour with a payment of $10. 10 of our
informants were male, and two were female. Their ages ranged from 20 to 62 years old with an
average of 28. They also presented diverse occupations, including college students, a professional
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photographer, a tax officer, an office administrator and a retired worker.
To ensure the validity of comparison between this study and our previous study of bystanders, we
adopted the same interview protocol and data analysis approach [228]. We re-framed many interview
questions to focus on the perspective of drone controllers. The interview consists of general questions
about drone controllers’ perceptions of drones (e.g.,“Do you see any benefits or drawbacks of
drones?”); purposes and practices of using drones (e.g.,“Where do you fly your drone(s)?”); expected
notice and control (e.g.,“Do you feel people should get others’ (e.g., bystanders) permissions before
flying a drone or taking pictures/videos?”), and controllers’ attitudes towards drone usage under
different scenarios. We used the same five drone scenarios based on real-world drone usage from
our previous study of bystanders [228]. These scenarios are (1) recording a promotion event in a
shopping mall by a store owner; (2) delivering packages by Amazon; (3) recording a friend’s party;
(4) reporting a parade by a news agency; and (5) searching suspects in a residential area by the local
police. We asked our interviewees if they would operate the drone as described in each scenario and
why.
We audio recorded the interviews upon informants’ permissions. The interviews were then
transcribed and analyzed qualitatively. Similar to our previous study [228], we conducted a thematic
analysis. 12 Two co-authors (coders) used ATLAS.ti, a popular qualitative analysis software, to
manually and independently generate initial codes that capture meanings of the same subset of our
interview data at a fine-grained level (usually at the sentence level). Then, the two coders convened,
discussed, and converged their codes into a code book of 135 unique codes ranging from drone
usage (e.g., photography) to privacy concerns (e.g., identifying people) to drone community (e.g.,
irresponsible controllers). Next, the coders used the agreed-upon code book to code the interview
data. The inter-coder reliability was 0.85. We grouped 135 codes into ten themes: drones in
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general, drone usage, safety concerns, privacy concerns, permission, private/public spaces, scenario
questions, application design, drone community, and regulations.
6.4 Findings
We present major themes from our interviews and use pseudonyms for our interviewees.
General perceptions of drones. All of our interviewees have flown a drone themselves and
most of them own a drone. Overall, they were passionate about this emerging technology. However,
some of them preferred not to use the word “drone.” For instance, Mike (28, male, drone hobbyist)
avoided the term “drone” because it comes with certain connotations from which he wanted to
dissociate. He said, “usually I associate the word drone with the military drone that performs air
strikes and things like that.” So, instead, he used the term “quad” as he further explained, “I still
try to insist on calling them quads because I won’t fall into what the media has done in calling
them and dubbing them drones.” By using a different and arguably more neutral term “quad,” Mark
deliberately separated himself from the sensitive military use of drones and the media’s newsworthy
and often controversial accounts of drones (e.g., a drone crashed on the White House lawn [114]).
General use of drone. When asked why they fly drones, many interviewees mentioned that
radio-controlled drones are just fun to fly. Other interviewees talked about drones allow them
to pursue their personal interests such as photography and DIY (do-it-yourself) projects. Our
interviewees noted that safety is their highest priority in drone operations, including the safety of
both drones and people. Our interviewees reported relying on their common sense (e.g., avoid flying
near a crowd) and caution when operating drones. They were also thoughtful about where to or not
to fly their drones. They reported usually flying in public parks and deliberately avoiding places
such as surrounding areas of airports and schools with children.
96
Taking and/or sharing photos/videos. Many interviewees also used their drones to take
pictures/videos, mostly for landscape, as Mike explained, “they’re actually mostly landscape, that’s
sort of what I’m interested in as a sort of photographer.” They kept the photos for personal use, or
share with their friends in social media. For example, Tim (23, male, electronic engineer student)
described, “I share the photos/videos on Instagram [@***] and Facebook.” When asked whether
the photos captured bystanders, Tim continued “I would imagine that I have taken photos/videos
with bystanders in them, but nothing extremely close where someone watching the video could
recognize anyone. I have shared these photos/videos online, or have given them to friends who want
to use them.” These drone practices may explain their privacy perceptions.
6.4.1 Privacy Perceptions
While our interviewees valued privacy, they also felt that the privacy concerns about drones are
exaggerated and even misguided by the media’s sensational reports of drones. They framed
their opinions mainly along the lines of public vs. private spaces and claimed that they have the
(Constitutional) rights to fly drones in public spaces.
Public vs. private spaces. First, our interviewees had fairly consistent views of public and
private spaces based on ownership. Ross (26, male, software engineer), for example, described, “I
define [public space] as like places that are generally open to the public like anybody can walk by
and it’s open and free to access.” Tim put it more bluntly: “the way I think about it is that public
space is public space, you can do whatever you want in public space.” For private space, Mark had
a typical definition, “the space that’s owned by a particular person or particular business entity
then that’s private.”
However, our interviewees differed in their interpretations of a specific case. Some defined
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the airspace over people’s personal property as public space, as Dan (23, male, media student)
argued, “my definition is aligned with the legal definition of airspace ownership actually. So as I
currently understand that you might own your house and the land, however, you do not own the
airspace above you.” While this is legally true in the US, others were more sensitive socially. For
example, Jake argued, “generally I look at the fenced off area as private property and even though
you don’t really own the airspace above your property it’s still not a very nice thing to do.” Jake’s
comment points to the nuanced social expectations of privacy and his sensitivity in respecting such
expectations.
No privacy expectations in public spaces. Most interviewees generally felt that people should
have expectations of privacy in private spaces but not in public spaces. Dan was quite vocal about
this, saying “I think the American public needs to really understand that when they’re in public
they shouldn’t expect any privacy, that’s just pure and simple.” As a result, our interviewees usually
did not ask for people’s permission before flying their drones in public space. Alex, for instance,
had a clear view: “So if you are in a public property, you should not get permission from anyone
because you are flying in an area that is open to everyone, so you are allowed to use it like it’s open
to everyone.”
Some of them even stressed that they have the legal rights to take photos in public spaces without
people’s permissions. For instances, Alex reasoned, “if you think about First Amendment, we are
allowed to photography [sic], as a photographer, anyone in anywhere as long as you are in public
property.” Sasha (22, female, photographer) held the same belief, explaining “again I’m protected
by my First Amendment to take, as a free press, to take a picture so I do not. You know, if I’m having
a nice day I will tell you, but I know the law, therefore if I don’t I’m okay with my own conscience for
not asking.” Among other things, the First Amendment to the US Constitution prohibits abridging
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the freedom of speech and infringing on the freedom of the press.
Since we do not have the legal expertise, we consulted American lawyers regarding the validity
of the above interviewees’ claims. Both lawyers disagreed with interviewees’ claims regarding their
constitutional rights to fly drones in public spaces partly because airspace is not a public space. The
US government has “complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space” over this country.
In contrast, interviewees mostly agreed that people should have privacy in private space. How-
ever, one interviewee, Dan held the view that “If you don’t want your indoor activity to be reviewed
because there is a drone outside of your window, I’m sorry you just have to put a curtain down.”
Ask for permissions. While our interviewees claimed that they do not need to ask for permis-
sions to fly drones in public spaces, in practice they do sometimes. Jake told us one story, “the
last time I asked people was over the bridge in [a town], there were two people out there fishing
and I said hey I want to bring my quad up and film it, do you mind if I get you guys.” Jake got the
permission to film but he explained why he asked, “I don’t want to annoy people and I mean you
really can’t get into trouble per se...but they can scream at you, they can yell at you, they can be very
violent to you.” In this case, Jake asked for permission to show politeness and to avoid unnecessary
confrontation. But they were also practical about asking permission, as Jake illustrated, “When
there’s a large crowd, it’s not worth taking the time to ask everyone individually, just avoid.”
Drones vs. DSLR. Some interviewees felt the accusation of using civilian drones for spying
is misplaced. They compared drones with other photographic equipments, such as DSLR (Digital
Single-Lens Reflex) cameras. For instance, Alex explained, “Drones don’t have telephoto lenses
which can zoom in as well as shoot from the ground, which I think it’s sort of misguided privacy
concern people have because you can do more damage in privacy, invading privacy more with
DSLR and telephoto lens.” Mike stressed the intent of usage, “So if the intent is the same, you know
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the equipments might not be that different by the way of doing it.”
Scenario-based perceptions. Besides questions about controllers’ general perceptions of
drones, we also provided specific scenarios to further investigate their acceptance of drone usage
in each scenario. Our interviewees’ responses were relatively consistent across scenarios. They
indicated that they would fly the drone in the scenarios. Their decisions were mainly based on
whether they have the permission to fly. For instance, for the mall scenario, they said they would fly
if they have a Section 333 exempt, which allows individuals to fly drones for commercial purposes
in the U.S.
Drone regulations. While our interviewees reported being reasonable and considerate in
their own drone usage, they almost unanimously suggested the need for some form of drone
regulation. Our interviewees supported the FAA drone registration requirement. Furthermore, some
interviewees suggested having a drone license. Others disagreed, for instance, one interviewee
argued that drones are not deadly weapons, thus he did not need a license. In addition, some
interviewees also advocated for drone controller training so that controllers can know more about
how to fly and how to be safe and skillful.
Construct a positive community identity. Several interviewees talked about the overall image
of the drone community and disdained irresponsible/reckless drone usage. Jake shared his past
experience, “I drove by the prison and I actually saw a drone like hovering over the prison. That’s
definitely something very stupid . Very stupid and that could increase laws for us.” Jake’s concern
highlights the potential externalities (e.g., stricter laws) as a result of some drone controllers’
irresponsible behavior. John agreed, “they don’t have license, everybody can fly. Then some people
would do something stupid that can damage the whole community.” With drone registration, license
and training, their hope was that the drone controller community as a whole will behave responsibly
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which can improve the public perceptions of drones and the community.
6.5 Discussion
Our prior study focused on drone bystanders [228], while this study focused on drone controllers.
Both groups are important stakeholders of the drone ecosystem and their perspectives are useful in
understanding the privacy implications of drones. We highlight many notable differences between
the two groups.
Controllers vs. bystanders. First, while bystanders are fine with calling this emerging tech-
nology “drones,” some controllers deliberately use “quads” instead of “drones” to avoid the con-
troversial or negative connotations of drones, which are often associated with military drones for
spying.
Second, controllers are generally positive or even enthusiastic about this emerging consumer
technology of drones. Their highest priority is ensuring safety of drones and people. In comparison,
bystanders have mixed feelings about drones. They see potential benefits and applications of drones,
but they are also concerned about safety, security and privacy issues that drones can pose.
Third, bystanders have several privacy concerns about drones, such as peeking and stalking as
well as taking and sharing pictures/videos. They are also concerned that they may not see the flying
drones and their controllers, which limit their abilities to communicate their privacy preferences
(e.g., drones not taking pictures/videos that capture them) to the controllers. In contrast, most
controllers feel that the privacy issues of drones are exaggerated because they value others’ privacy
and rely on their common sense to operate drones appropriately. They also debunk the perceptions
that drone cameras can easily and clearly capture people’s faces from the air.
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Fourth, when determining their acceptance of specific drone usage, both bystanders and con-
trollers consider whether the drone is operating in a public or private space. However, their
definitions of public/private space differ. Controllers mainly use the ownership of a place to dif-
ferentiate public vs. private space. They believe that private space is legally owned by a private
entity (e.g., people’s houses), whereas public space is owned by the public (e.g., parks). This type
of understanding is more aligned with the legal definitions of public/private spaces. Bystanders’
definitions of private space and public space rest on three factors: ownership, sensitivity of the place,
and nature of activity in the place. In particular, some bystanders characterize spaces based on the
activities and social relationships within the space. For instance, shopping with a close friend in a
mall would make it a private space because of the close personal relationship between friends. This
highlights the “social” definition of space.
Fifth, when considering the specific drone usage scenarios, bystanders consider three criteria:
(1) whether the drone is operating in a public/private space; (2) what is the intended purpose of the
drone usage; and (3) notification and consent of the drone usage. In comparison, controllers mainly
focus on whether they have the permission to fly the drone in the scenario (e.g., need a permit for
commercial use of drones).
Sixth, several bystanders expect to be notified and asked for their permission before a sur-
rounding drone taking pictures/videos even in a public park. While controllers may sometimes
do that to be polite, many of them believe that they have the constitutional rights (citing the First
Amendment) to fly drones and take pictures and videos in public spaces without getting others’
permission. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) recently
released a document of voluntary best practices for commercial and non-commercial use of drones,
for instance, “If you can, tell other people you’ll be taking pictures or video of them before you
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do” [161]. Controllers’ belief that they are entitled to freely operating drones in public space may
dissuade them from following these best practices.
These mismatches between controllers and bystanders are perhaps not surprising given that
they have different roles and interests in the context of drones. But, these mismatches can lead to
tensions especially when bystanders’ privacy concerns about drones are not adequately addressed
by controllers.
Mitigate bystanders’ privacy concerns. One future direction is to enable bystanders and
controllers to communicate directly so that bystanders can express their privacy concerns or
preferences and controllers can explain their drone usage (e.g., purpose). Direct communication
can help bridge some of the mismatches between the two groups. Since bystanders may not see
drone controllers, enabling electronic communication channels (e.g., via a website of a mobile app)
would be useful. In addition, NTIA’s best practices of drones is a good step towards educating
controllers about potential privacy risk of drone usage and practical strategies to mitigate these
risks. However, these best practices are voluntary so controllers may not adopt them. Many of
our interviewees expressed their hopes to create a positive image of the overall drone community.
These best practices and other privacy mechanisms can be emphasized as improving the image of
the drone community, which can help incentivize adoption.
Study limitations. First, our study has a relatively small sample size. While we only interviewed
12 drone controllers, we did not find any significantly new findings from our last three interviews.
Second, we only interviewed controllers in the US, therefore it is unclear whether our findings would
be similar for controllers in other countries. Third, our interview data is self reported and might
be subject to the social desirability bias. In particular, our controller interviewees may withhold
sharing their drone practices that can be considered as privacy invasive, for instance, taking pictures
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that capture a bystander’s face and making the pictures public online. Lastly, self-reported data can
divert from actual behavior [194].
6.6 Conclusion
We interviewed drone controllers in the US to understand their privacy perceptions and practices
of drones. The results suggest that they treat safety as their highest priority but consider privacy
issues of drones overstated. Comparing with our prior study of drone bystanders, we highlight
important mismatches between controllers and bystanders on how they view drone privacy. Future
work should explore how to bridge these mismatches and mitigate bystanders’ privacy concerns.
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Chapter 7
Privacy Mechanisms for Drones:
Perceptions of Drone Controllers and
Bystanders
Drones pose privacy concerns such as surveillance and stalking. Many technology-based or policy-
based mechanisms have been proposed to mitigate these concerns. However, it is unclear how drone
controllers and bystanders perceive these mechanisms and whether people intend to adopt them.
In this chapter, we report results from two rounds of online survey with 169 drone controllers and
717 bystanders in the U.S. We identified respondents’ perceived pros and cons of eight privacy
mechanisms. We found that owner registration and automatic face blurring individually received
most support from both controllers and bystanders. Our respondents also suggested using varied
combinations of mechanisms under different drone usage scenarios, highlighting their context-
dependent preferences. We outline a set of important questions for future privacy designs and public
policies of drones.
7.1 Introduction
Drones are unmanned aircraft that can be controlled remotely by human controllers or operated
autonomously by onboard computers. In recent years, drones have entered the mainstream con-
sumer market. This type of drones often carry cameras and possibly other sensors such as GPS,
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accelerometers as well as altitude, temperature and infrared sensors. Drones enable innovative
applications but also raise privacy issues. For example, the Electronic Privacy Information Center
highlights surveillance as a key privacy issue of drones [80].
In the U.S., the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) released
a document of voluntary best practices for commercial and non-commercial use of drones, for
instance, having a privacy policy that explains an organization’s use of drones [161]. Many technical
privacy mechanisms for drones have also been proposed. For instance, LightCense uses LED
lights on a drone as its ID so that people could identify the drone and its information via a mobile
app [136]. However, most of these technical or policy-based mechanisms are voluntary and thus it
is unclear whether people will adopt them and even if adopted, whether they would be effective.
In this chapter, we focus on how drone controllers and bystanders perceive these technology-
based or policy-based privacy mechanisms for drones. We define drone controllers as people
who have operated drones and bystanders as people who have not operated drones but could be
surrounded by flying drones. This research question is timely and important because if people
perceive these mechanisms as requiring too much effort, being impractical or ineffective, they are
unlikely to adopt these mechanisms. As a result, people’s privacy concerns about drones may remain
largely unaddressed, potentially hindering the acceptance and adoption of drones and limiting their
benefits to society. Privacy mechanisms that are supported by both drone controllers and bystanders
have great potential to be adopted and useful in practice.
To answer the research question, we developed detailed descriptions of a diverse set of represen-
tative privacy mechanisms for drones and conducted two rounds of online survey to investigate how
drone controllers and bystanders perceive these mechanisms. In this research, we focus on drones
that are used for civilian purposes, excluding military usage. We found that when considering
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individual mechanisms, owner registration and automatic face blurring received most support from
both controllers and bystanders. However, under specific drone usage scenarios, our respondents
also suggested using multiple mechanisms together as they may contribute to different aspects of
privacy. But, the choices of mechanisms varied across different scenarios.
This chapter makes three main contributions. First, it sheds lights on how drone controllers
and bystanders think about different types of privacy mechanisms for drones. Second, it not only
discusses ways to improve these specific mechanisms but also outlines important questions for
future privacy designs for drones. Third, it makes a public policy contribution. While most of the
studied privacy mechanisms are currently voluntary, they could become mandatory in the future.
The findings on people’s attitudes towards and perceived effectiveness of these privacy mechanisms
can inform the policy development, for instance, mandating certain mechanisms.
7.2 Related Work
7.2.1 Perceptions of Tracking and Recording Technologies
Since drones often carry cameras, they are a type of tracking and recording technologies. Prior
studies have identified people’s privacy concerns (e.g., leaking personal information) about various
tracking and recording technologies, such as Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tags [14],
credit cards and store video cameras [163].
Prior research has also studied people’s perceptions of wearable devices (e.g., glasses). For
instance, Denning et al. find that people expect giving their permissions before Augmented Reality
(AR) glasses can record them [66]. These wearable devices can also enable “lifelogging” where
photos or videos can be automatically taken by these devices (e.g., SenseCam [105]) in a person’s
everyday life. Hoyle et al. find that people have various privacy concerns about lifelogging, for
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instance, sensitive information such as lifeloggers’ locations or credit card numbers as well as
bystanders’ faces or behaviors appearing in the “lifelog” [108]. In addition, robots equipped with
cameras can also be considered as a type of tracking and recording technology. For instance, Butler
et al. find that people desire mechanisms to help protect their privacy in the presence of remotely
tele-operated in-home robots [42]. Our work adds to this literature of tracking and recording
technologies but focuses on drones.
7.2.2 Privacy Issues of Drones
Similar to other tracking and recording technologies, legal scholars have argued that drones can
infringe on citizens’ privacy. For instance, Dunlap posits that when drones are used for surveillance
they can violate the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution, which protects citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures [72]. Wright et al. raise heightened concerns about drones due
to the fact that drones could be cheaper to obtain than before and could be so tiny, albeit equipped
with high-definition cameras (e.g., “dragonfly drones”) [225]. As a result, drones could take detailed
pictures of people and it would be difficult for people to notice the drones and to realize they are
being recorded by the drones [225].
There are few empirical studies of drone privacy. A survey of Australians’ perceptions of
drones find that their respondents did not consider drones to be overly beneficial or risky, but some
respondents (less than one fifth) did raise a general privacy concern about drone surveillance or
spying [52]. Our previous interview study of drone bystanders find that they had various privacy
concerns about drones and their perceptions of drones varied in different scenarios [228]. Unlike
these prior studies, we focus on specific privacy mechanisms for drones in this research.
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7.2.3 Privacy Mechanisms for Drones
Several mechanisms have been proposed that either directly or indirectly protect people’s privacy
against drones. For instance, traditional “sense and avoid” systems for drones have been re-designed
so that minimum personal data will be retained by the drones [15, 95]. In addition, B4UFLY, a
mobile app, was designed to help drone controllers “determine whether there are any restrictions or
requirements in effect at the location where they want to fly” [82]. Besides, a type of geo-fencing was
proposed to allow individual citizens to designate their addresses as drone no-fly zones, which can
be incorporated into the software or firmware of drones and/or honored by drone controllers [167].
LightCense uses a blink sequence of LED lights on a drone as its ID [136]. To learn information
about a particular drone, people can use a mobile app to scan the blinking light sequence to identify
the drone and look up its information [136]. There are also server-side privacy mechanisms for
drones. For instance, Yoohwan et al. propose a system that enables encryption, access control,
and image/video transformation of drone recorded data [120]. The NTIA recommends a number
of voluntary best practices for drone usage, such as informing bystanders before drones taking
pictures/videos if possible [161]. However, it is unclear how people perceive these mechanisms and
whether they will be adopted. To fill this gap, we surveyed drone controllers and bystanders, asking
them to assess a diverse set of privacy mechanisms for drones.
7.3 Methodology
We conducted two rounds of online survey of drone controllers and bystanders. Both surveys
focused on respondents’ assessment of specific privacy mechanisms for drones. After conducting
survey one, we learned many things that can improve the survey. For instance, many respondents felt
the descriptions of privacy mechanisms were not detailed enough and they raised many questions
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about the specifics. Therefore, we conducted survey two, which was very similar to survey one but
differed in three main aspects: making descriptions of privacy mechanisms more detailed, testing
a slightly different set of privacy mechanisms, and including specific drone usage scenarios and
demographic questions.
We recruited survey respondents from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) where workers were
based in the US and had at least 95% task acceptance rate. We also recruited respondents from
drone user forums such as the DJI forum and the Quadcopter.com forum. We conducted survey one
during March 2016 and received a total of 456 valid responses including 385 bystanders and 71
drone controllers. We conducted survey two during August 2016 and received a total of 430 valid
responses including 332 bystanders and 98 drone controllers. Each valid response from MTurk was
compensated for $2. We had about 100 controller respondents from drone forums and administrated
a raffle of four $50 gift cards. This research was approved by the Syracuse University IRB office.
7.3.1 Survey Flow
For both surveys, we first provided a working definition of drones as “an unmanned aircraft guided
by remote control or onboard computers” and a photo of a DJI Phantom 2 as an example drone. We
also told the respondents to focus on civilian not military uses of drones. Next, we asked “have
you ever flown a drone yourself?” If a respondent answered yes, then he or she would answer the
controller branch of the survey; otherwise, answer the bystander branch. We told controller and
bystander respondents to answer the remaining questions by representing themselves as a controller
or a bystander, respectively.
We then provided each respondent descriptions of a set of privacy mechanisms in a randomized
order. For each mechanism, we asked respondents to answer three questions (5-point Likert scale):
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“How practical do you think this mechanism will work? Are you willing to use this mechanism if
it is implemented? If this mechanism is implemented, how effective do you think it will protect
people’s privacy regarding drones?” Respondents were then asked to provide open-ended answers
to explain their ratings. The Likert-scale questions were inspired by our prior interview study
of bystanders where the interviewees talked about practicality and effectiveness of, as well as
effort/willingness to use a privacy mechanism when they proposed ways to address their privacy
concerns [228]. We checked the open-ended answers and found them to be consistent with the
corresponding Likert-scale ratings, suggesting the Likert-scale questions were understood correctly.
7.3.2 Survey One
We created brief descriptions of six privacy mechanisms based on the literature and industry
proposals. These mechanisms varied by their types (e.g., technology vs. policy, proactive vs.
reactive). Below are the descriptions (bystander version). We denote each mechanism in a format
of Name (Short name).
Deletion request (Delete): Drone controllers can receive requests from me to delete photos
or videos that capture my family, properties or myself via a mobile app [228]. Gesture opt-out
(Gesture): Have gesture recognition technology incorporated in the drone so that I can choose to
opt out of being recorded by using certain gestures (e.g., two hands pose as X), and the drone camera
can recognize the gesture and the camera will blur my face or figure in the recording (pictures or
videos) [46]. No-fly-zone (Zone): I enter my addresses (e.g. home) in a no-fly-zone database so
that drones controllers will be warned when they fly the drones near these addresses [167]. Owner
registration (Register): every drone owner must register with the government by providing his
or her real name and contact information. Before flying a drone, the owner must mark his/her
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Registration Number visibly on the drone. I can see the registration number on a drone and then
find out its owner information [83]. Controller-bystander app (App): a mobile app that allows
drone owners to provide information about his/her drone such as owner, purpose, drone model
and camera/sensor information as well as the current location of the drone. It also lists drones
near me and allows me to learn more information about these nearby drones. I can also directly
contact drone owners via the app [228]. LED license (LED): a drone will use a visible color blink
sequence of its LED lights to serve as its unique “license” and I can use a mobile app to capture
the color blink sequence, identify the drone, and look up the information about the drone (e.g., its
ownership or purpose) [136].
For controllers, these descriptions were framed from a controller’s standpoint, for example,
“people enter their addresses (e.g. home) in a no-fly-zone database so that I will be warned when I
fly the drone near these addresses.” Survey one also had many privacy concern questions. Since
they are not the focus of this chapter, we do not report them here. Besides, we did not ask about
demographics due to the survey length.
7.3.3 Survey Two
Privacy mechanisms. In survey two, we removed two mechanisms from survey one, i.e., deletion
request and gesture opt-out, because they were not well supported by both groups of respondents,
as well as they have not been implemented and are challenging to implement in practice. We added
two new mechanisms: privacy policy (Policy) and automatic face blurring (Blur). After survey
one, in June 2016, the NTIA recommends organizational users of drones to have a privacy policy
that describe their drone uses and the related data practices [161]. The face blurring mechanism
was modeled after a Google Street View privacy feature that has been used to automatically
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detect human faces and blur them [93]. For each mechanism, we tried to describe what it does,
how it is implemented, and what controllers and bystanders need to do to use it. To make these
mechanisms more comparable, we framed them as administrated/suggested by the US Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). Below are the descriptions.
No-fly-zone (Zone) is implemented using a database maintained by the FAA. If a citizen is not
comfortable of having drones flying around her house or apartment, she can go to the no-fly-zone
website and enter her home address to designate the area within 10ft of her address (including
backyard) as a no-fly zone. She needs to submit a document that verifies her residence (e.g., a utility
bill). After the no-fly-zone system validates the entered address, the self-designated zone will be
stored in the no-fly-zone database.
The drones incorporate the information of this no-fly-zone database either by directly connecting
to the database via WiFi or by downloading and updating the database in the drone firmware on a
regular basis. These no-fly zones will be highlighted on the map in the drone control interface. In
addition, when a drone flies into a no-fly zone indicated by a citizen, the drone operator will get a
warning on the drone control interface. Since there are no laws that require drone operators to honor
these no-fly-zone requests, the drone operators may or may not choose to honor these requests.
Owner registration (Register): Every drone owner in the US must register with the FAA by
providing his or her real name and contact information. Before flying a drone, the owner must
mark his or her Registration Number visibly on the drone. In the event that a drone behaves
inappropriately, a bystander may report to a law enforcement department. Federal law requires
drone operators to show the certificate of registration to any Federal, State, or local law enforcement
officer if asked.
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Controller-bystander app (App) is designed to improve communication between drone con-
trollers and bystanders. The app works with three assumptions: (1) drones have a GPS module;
(2) drones have a Wi-Fi module; and (3) both drone controllers and bystanders have installed
and created an account in this app on their mobile devices. The app is operated by the FAA. By
default, GPS and Wi-Fi will be turned on while a drone is flying. The drone will record its location
information as well as its recording status (e.g., whether the drone is taking photos or videos). This
information will first be transmitted from the drone to the controller’s app on his or her mobile
device through Wi-Fi, and then sent back to a central database on a regular basis.
A drone controller creates an account in the app with information about his or her drone (e.g.,
drone model, usual flight areas and times) as well as optional contact information. An app user
can choose a pseudonymous user name in the app. Registered users of the app can send each other
private messages via the app. In addition, the controller can choose to share photos, videos, or live
video feed taken by the drone in the app so that other registered app users can see.
When a bystander creates an account and then logs into this app on his or her phone, the app will
check with the central database on a regular basis. All the updated information, including drones
nearby, will show up in the app interface. For example, if there is a drone nearby, the drone will
show up on a radar map with the distance and direction from the bystander’s current location. If the
bystander would like to message the drone controller, the bystander just needs to tap on the drone in
the radar map. The bystander will see all public information about the controller and the drone and
can send a private message to the controller through the app.
LED license (LED): A drone has an array of color LED lights (e.g., blue, green, red) that can
be seen by more than 300ft without using any special equipment. These LEDs blink in a particular
sequence to help people visually identify the drone. In other words, the blink sequence of LEDs
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serve as the drone’s “license.” This system is operated by the FAA. A drone controller can sign up
to use this system by registering an account via the system’s website and can optionally provide
information about himself or herself as well as information about the drone. When a bystander
spots a drone nearby, he or she can use the companion LED license mobile app to capture the LED
blink sequence (with its camera), identify the drone, and look up the information about the drone
(e.g., its ownership or purpose) provided by its owner/controller.
Privacy policy (Policy): The FAA recommends any organization that uses drones to have a
drone privacy policy on their website. The privacy policy should include information about how
they use drones, such as what kinds of drones they use; where, when and why they fly the drones;
what kinds of data the drones will capture (e.g., pictures or videos) and for what purposes; how long
the recorded data will be retained; how the recorded data will be processed and/or shared to others;
and if citizens have questions about their drone use, how to contact them. This drone privacy policy
can either be a standalone privacy policy or part of an organization-wide privacy policy. Ordinary
citizens can visit the organization’s website to find and review its drone privacy policy.
Automatic face blurring (Blur): Drones have a built-in feature that can enable automatic
identification and blurring of human faces in the pictures/videos taken by the drone camera. By
default, this feature is turned on. The FAA recommends drone controllers to use this feature unless
there is a legitimate reason not to do so.
We aimed to model these mechanisms realistically. Some mechanisms have been implemented
for drones (owner registration, no-fly-zone, and LED license) or used in other domains (privacy
policies for websites, and face blurring for Google Street View). The controller-bystander app has
been proposed but not implemented [228]. All mechanisms are voluntary except for owner registra-
tion, which is required by the FAA. Some mechanism descriptions (e.g., controller-bystander app)
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were much longer than others (e.g., owner registration), but that reflects their relative complexities
from users’ perspective.
Scenarios. Next, we provided respondents three concrete drone usage scenarios, adopted from
our prior work [228]. Below are the descriptions.
Neighborhood safety scenario: Your neighborhood recently had several public safety incidents
(e.g., burglaries). The local police department hires a few drone controllers to fly multiple drones
with cameras in the neighborhood for public safety purposes. As a result, the neighborhood will be
continuously monitored. The drones will be streaming a live video feed to the police department
but will not record any photos or videos.
Public park scenario: A drone controller is flying his drone in a public park and taking photos
and videos for fun. You and your family, together with several other families with kids are playing
in the park. You and your family members may be captured in the pictures and videos taken by the
drone.
Real estate photography scenario: A real estate agency company hires a drone controller to
shoot photos and videos of a house for sale. When the controller flies the drone to take photos and
videos of the house, these recordings might capture your houses and/or your backyard.
These scenarios varied by the type of controllers (e.g., companies vs. individuals), the purpose
of drone usage (e.g., personal enjoyment vs. public safety), the number of drones used (e.g., single
vs. multiple), the duration of drone usage (one-time vs. continuous), and the nature of recording
(e.g., streaming without recording vs. recording). We randomized the order of scenarios. For each
scenario, we asked respondents which privacy mechanism(s) they want to use and why. We finished
with demographic questions such as age and gender.
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7.3.4 Data Analysis
We computed descriptive statistics of the quantitative data (e.g., ratings of privacy mechanisms).
We also coded the open-ended answers using a thematic analysis, “a method for identifying,
analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data” [34]. First, we carefully read through
the open-ended answers. Second, we independently open coded a subset of open-ended answers.
Third, we discussed and created a code book containing codes that cover the respondent’s overall
sentiment of the mechanism (e.g., positive), specific pros (e.g., easy, practical, effortless, similar
to existing mechanisms) and cons of the mechanisms (e.g., inaccurate, subject to hack, requiring
too much effort, useless, impractical, increasing government surveillance), implementation details
of the mechanism (e.g., scope of effective operation, communication channel, mobile app), and
suggestions to improve the mechanism (e.g., legal requirement, automatic enforcement, restricting
access to the controller data). We then used the code book to code the rest of the open-ended data.
se themes.
7.4 Results
We now report drone controller and bystander respondents’ quantitative ratings of and qualitative
feedback on different privacy mechanisms in both surveys.
7.4.1 Results of Survey One
Figure 7.1 shows the percentages of controller and bystander respondents who were either “positive”
or “very positive” that a privacy mechanism is effective, practical, and that they are willingness to
use it. For instance, 51% of bystanders thought owner registration is practical, whereas 42% of
bystanders thought so for LED license. Therefore, we say that owner registration received more
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support than LED license, from bystanders, based on the practicality measure. In general, owner
registration and no-fly-zone received more support than the other four mechanisms tested in this
survey, from both bystanders and controllers, across all three measures.
Since we removed deletion request and gesture opt-out from survey two, we will focus on
people’s qualitative feedback on these two mechanisms here. We will discuss the feedback on the
other four mechanisms using the data from survey two because it had more detailed mechanism
descriptions and a wider range of feedback than survey one. Whenever possible, we report the
percentages of bystanders and controllers expressing a main opinion of a mechanism.
Deletion request (Delete). Many bystanders (17%) felt this mechanism can be useful if their
requests are honored. Some bystanders also raised two main issues: (1) there is too much work
for bystanders (22%), and (2) controllers may ignore/reject the requests (15%). One bystander
summarized both points, saying “This requires too much effort, and there doesn’t seem to be any
consequences if the drone owner chooses to do nothing.” Another bystander highlighted his concern
about malicious controllers: “A drone that is trying to spy on me or, otherwise, has ill intentions
is not going to cooperate anyway.” For controllers, some of them (5.9%) felt this mechanism
is unnecessary partly because they only publish photos that they deem safe to post. Besides,
some controllers (6%) were concerned that bystanders can abuse this mechanism by sending an
overwhelming number of requests.
Gesture opt-out (Gesture). Many controllers (29%) and bystanders (10%) thought this can be
a good solution if people know it. The burden is on the bystanders to learn the gesture. However,
some bystanders (15%) argued that it is the controllers’ responsibility to protect bystanders’ privacy.
One bystander explained, “I feel like I shouldn’t have to make gestures to protect my own privacy
and that I would have to constantly be watching out for drones for this to be effective.” On the
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Figure 7.1: Survey one results.
Percentages of bystander and controller respondents who were either “positive” or “very positive”
that a privacy mechanism is practical, effective, and that they are willing to use it. The six
mechanisms include (left to right): Delete request (Delete), Gesture opt-out (Gesture), No-fly-zone
(Zone), Owner registration (Register), Controller-bystander app (App), and LED license (LED).
other hand, some controllers (6%) felt there is really no need for opt-out because drone cameras are
usually not good enough to capture people’s faces in the air. One controller explained, “There is a
real lack of knowledge about the cameras on drones. Unless it is a large octo-copter being used by
a professional operator with a high priced DSLR camera, then the images/videos you get would be
grainy, and if taken from more then about 15ft up unable to identify faces.” This quote also suggests
that an information asymmetry about drones’ capabilities exists between controllers and bystanders.
7.4.2 Results of Survey Two
In survey two, 42% of bystanders were male and 58% were female, whereas 66% of controllers
were male and 34% were female. In terms of age, controllers (20% 18-25, 52% 26-35) were slightly
younger than bystanders (14% 18-25, 42% 26-35). 70% of controllers had less than one year of
experience in drone usage and 30% had more than one year of experience. Most bystanders were






+ Helpful if requests are respected
(both)
- Too much work for bystanders
(both)
- Controllers can ignore or reject
requests (both)




+ Good solution if people know about
it (both)
- Too much work for bystanders
(both)
- Have to learn the gesture (both)
- No need for opt-out (both)
3. No-fly-zone + Simple and requires little effort
(both)
- No law enforcement (both)
(Zone) + Add control over controllers (by-
stander)
- Practical issues due to proximity
of homes (both)





+ Practical in tracking down con-
trollers (both)
- Not directly protect privacy (both)
+ Similar mechanisms in other do-
mains (both)
- Privacy issue for controllers (con-
troller)
+ Discourage irresponsible use (by-
stander)






+ Enhance controller-bystander com-
munication (both)
- Too much work for bystanders
(both)
+ Improve controller accountability
(both)
- Privacy issues for controllers
(both)





+ Help identify controllers (both) - LED patterns can be changed or
hacked (both)
- Phone camera cannot recognize
the pattern (both)
- Not directly protect privacy (both)





+ Give bystanders peace of mind (con-
troller)
- People rarely read privacy policies
(both)
+ Provide information about drone use
(controller)
- Not directly protect privacy (by-
stander)
+ Hold organizations more account-
able (bystander)






+ Effective in hiding people’s identity
(both)
- Conflict with controllers’ purpose
of use (both)
+ Make people feel more secure (by-
stander)
- Slow or inaccurate facial recogni-
tion (controller)
+ Need little effort, turn on by default
(both)
- Can be turned off (both)
Table 7.1: The pros and cons of each mechanism suggested by controllers and bystanders.
We denote each point as raised by bystanders only, controllers only, or both. Mechanisms 1-6
and 3-8 were studied in survey one and two, respectively. Data about mechanisms 1-2 was from
survey one, while data about mechanisms 3-8 was from survey two because it had more detailed
mechanism descriptions and a wider range of feedback than survey one.
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Recall that survey two also tested six privacy mechanisms, excluding deletion request and
gesture opt-out from survey one, but including the other four mechanisms from survey one as well
as two new mechanisms: privacy policy and automatic face blurring. Similar to Figure 7.1 of survey
one, Figure 7.2 shows the rating results of the six mechanisms in survey two. In general, owner
registration and automatic face blurring received more support than the other four mechanisms
tested in this survey, from both bystanders and controllers, across all three measures. Since the
controllers and bystanders differed in their age and gender distributions, we controlled for these
demographic differences by taking subsets of the original data set and checking the subset results.
For instance, we extracted the data of all female respondents of age 26-35, and compared the
controllers and bystanders within this subset. The subset results were in line with the results in
Figure 7.2.
Next, we present respondents’ qualitative feedback on each mechanism. Table 7.1 summarizes
the perceived pros and cons of each mechanism in survey one and two. We provide examples of
these opinions below.
No-fly-zone (Zone). Both controllers (30%) and bystanders (20%) appreciated this mechanism
is simple and requires little effort. One bystander highlighted, “I think the concept of a no-fly
database is simple enough, and practical enough because little is required to get your property
included in it.” Many respondents from both groups also associated it with the do-not-call list that
they were already familiar with. One controller said, “I like this system and I think it’s a unique
idea. This would give bystanders the option of ‘opting out’ of having drones around their space
in much the same way as the ‘no call list’ works for telemarketers.” In addition, some bystanders
thought it will add a layer of control and responsibility over controllers. For instance, one bystander
said, “I think this is effective because it puts the responsibility mostly on the drone operator and
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Figure 7.2: Survey two results.
Percentages of bystander and controller respondents who were either “positive” or “very positive”
that a privacy mechanism is practical, effective, and that they are willing to use it. The six
mechanisms include (left to right): No-fly-zone (Zone), Owner registration (Register), Controller-
bystander app (App), LED license (LED), Privacy policy (Policy), and Automatic face blurring
(Blur).
allows bystanders to opt in or out.”
However, both controllers (28%) and bystanders (55%) raised concerns about the lack of
enforcement because of its voluntary nature. Many respondents from both groups suggested
mandating this mechanism by legislation. For instance, a controller said “I don’t think the ‘no fly
zones’ will be respected. There would have to be a law requiring the zones to be respected or it
probably won’t work.” This speaks to the concern that some controllers might choose to ignore this
mechanism. Besides, both groups (controller: 14%, bystander: 13%) also raised practical issues due
to proximity of addresses. One controller questioned, “If my neighbor didn’t want a drone flying
near their house would that keep me from flying my drone ten feet away above my yard?” Some
controllers (5%) also raised a practical concern about maintaining the large amount of data this
mechanism may generate, as one controller noted, “That would be a massive geographic database,
with all the design, operation, and maintenance problems such a thing has.”
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In addition to laws, some bystanders suggested making drones respect these no-fly-zone signals
automatically. For instance, a bystander proposed, “Like, the drone operator gets a warning
that they are within so many feet of a no-fly zone, and warnings up until they reach it, then the
drone be deactivated if they ignore the warnings and enter the zone.” While completely automatic
deactivation of drones might be unsafe, configuring the drones not to enter a no-fly zone is doable
similar to how some drones are configured to stay away from sensitive places such as airports via
geo-fencing [69].
Owner registration (Register). Many bystanders (43%) praised that this mechanism can help
make controllers more accountable for their drone practices. Some even suggested that people
need to take lessons and get a license before they can operate drones. For example, one bystander
suggested, “This will help to hold flyers accountable for their actions while flying a drone and could
be extended to require lessons and certification in the actual flight of the drone just like a driver’s
license.” This mechanism was also positively received by the controllers (42%). In fact, many of
them self-reported having done the registration, which is required in the US by the FAA.
However, many bystanders (39%) and controllers (28%) felt this mechanism does little to
directly protect people’s privacy. One bystander expressed, “It seems like a good basic requirement,
but would not necessarily protect people much.” Another controller believed it is more for safety
than privacy, saying “owner registration is a good idea but it will not have any effect on ‘privacy.’
It will be more useful in identifying the owner in case of an accident with the drone.” In addition,
some controllers (5%) were concerned about who can access their registration information and
explicitly mentioned that only the government can access that information. Furthermore, some
controllers worried that this mechanism can increase the government’s ability to track their activities.
One controller summarized the pros and cons, saying “I think it’s a good and a bad thing. Good
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in that if someone is using their drone for illegal activity it would be easy to identify their drone
information if they are reported. It’s a bad thing because it’s another way for the government to
monitor people’s activities.”
Controller-bystander app (App). Both controllers (19%) and bystanders (21%) commended
that this app can enable or enhance the communication between bystanders and controllers. For
example, one controller said, “Controller-bystander app is a very effective way of using Drone. It
provides a direct way of communication between drone controllers and bystanders.” Some respon-
dents (controller: 3%, bystander: 10%) also felt it can increase the accountability of controllers. For
example, one bystander expressed, “I think the app will provide better protection to bystanders and
make the controller more accountable.” Allowing bystanders to see nearby drones and information
about their usage would hold the associated controllers responsible for their behaviors.
However, some controllers (12%) and bystanders (2%) raised a potential privacy violation of
controllers since their drone practices are tracked. One controller complained, “I feel that this is a
huge invasion of privacy for the drone owner him/herself. It seems that it will record all activities
and where the drone is and where it has been and if it was used for pictures/video. This is worse
than someone accidentally having their face recorded.” This highlights the challenge of making
drone usage transparent while protecting controllers’ privacy.
In addition, many bystanders (27%) complained that this mechanism demands too much effort.
One bystander commented, “This requires a lot of work for the bystander. Some people will not
know about this app and the fact that they can use it.” Even if they are aware of the app, they still
need to install, learn how to use, and actually use the app. Another bystander felt this voluntary
mechanism would fail to detain malicious controllers, saying “This seems like an honor-system
thing and I don’t think that would solve much with people who are using drones inappropriately.
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They’ve already proven they won’t follow an honor system.” This highlights the concern that some
controllers may intend to bypass this mechanism. To improve this mechanism, many bystanders
proposed that controllers should be required to use it by regulations. For instance, one bystander
suggested, “I think maybe it would have to be mandatory to install and use this app to fly a drone
or the operator could face federal charges. Maybe a live feed of what the drone is recording could
be useful to bystanders.”
LED license (LED). Many controllers (22%) and bystanders (16%) felt this mechanism can help
identify drones and their controllers, as one bystanders noted, “I think it would help in identifying the
drones owner.” However, both groups (controller: 38%, bystander: 50%) also raised practical issues,
such as the LED lights can be obscured or altered by the controllers. For instance, one bystander
said, “there are some less honest people out there would be obscure the lights to prevent detection.”
This underlies the concern that some controllers may intend to circumvent this mechanism. Another
bystander further suggested mandating this mechanism, “That seems kind of silly, because people
who are using drones maliciously will simply not sign up to register their drone. It needs to be
made mandatory somehow upon purchase of a drone/built into all new drones.” In addition, a few
controllers (8%) and bystanders (11%) suspected that cameras on phones are not good enough to
capture the blinking sequence correctly. For instance, one controller said, “it would be hard for a
camera to pick up blinks with a phone camera.”
Some bystanders were also concerned about the effort needed including learning about, finding
and downloading and then using the app. One bystander summarized, “It’s not practical to the
every-day bystander. It’s too much work for the average person to go through and they shouldn’t
have to go through such lengths to ensure their right to privacy.” In addition, some controllers
complained that this mechanism can violate their privacy because people can see their information
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via the app. One controller said, “I wouldn’t want just any bystander with an app to have the ability
to look my info up.”
Privacy policy (Policy). Many controllers (16%) noted a privacy policy can provide bystanders
information about drone practices. One controller said, “I think it is a decent policy. It would be
easy to implement and would be good for bystanders who want to know what you’re doing with
the drone.” Besides, some controllers (12%) thought it can provide bystanders peace of mind, as
one controller explained, “I think it gives people more peace of mind about drones knowing they
can request information on why they’re being used.” However, some respondents from both groups
(controller: 4%, bystander: 21%) felt it does not directly protect privacy, as one bystander put it,
“it doesn’t protect people of prevent anything.” Another issue was that people rarely read privacy
policies (controller: 14%, bystander: 16%). One controller said, “I think this is a necessary feature,
although I’m not sure how effective it will be. Most people do not pay attention to privacy policies
in general.” This suggests that they felt this mechanism is needed but not sufficient by itself.
Bystanders generally appreciated this mechanism. Some bystanders (8%) also felt it will
help hold controllers accountable. One bystander said, “This could help with accountability and
discourage inappropriate behavior.” However, many bystanders (32%) also questioned whether
organizations will follow their policies. One bystander was pessimistic, saying “It’s highly debatable
how many organizations actually even follow their own privacy policies. This would do ZERO,
literally ZERO to help curb privacy violations and privacy concerns.” This highlights the need for
enforcement. In the US, the Federal Trade Commission can prosecute companies that do not follow
their own privacy policies as deceptive practices.
Automatic face blurring (Blur). Many controllers (22%) and bystanders (18%) valued this
mechanism’s potential in hiding people’s identities. One controller commented, “Auto blur would
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absolutely protect privacy.” One bystander said, “Seems practical enough because it’s turned on by
default. I would feel more safe should this feature be implemented.”
However, both groups also had reservations about this mechanism. Some controllers (27%)
and bystanders (48%) were concerned that this mechanism can be useless because controllers can
easily turn it off. For instance, one bystander said, “If you can disable the setting, it is worthless.
People all like to spy and see things so they won’t care about privacy if they can disable the setting.”
Another issue was that bystanders do not have an easy way to know whether this feature is on or off.
Even if it is on, some controllers and bystanders suspected that it can be reversed. One controller
commented, “I’m sure any half way decent hacker can un-blur this picture.” This comment
highlights the concern that some controllers may have the ability to circumvent the mechanism.
Some controllers complained that this mechanism is on by default. For instance, one controller said
“It sounds stupid. And what if I’m trying to identify someone? I don’t want anything blurred.” A few
controllers (8%) also questioned the capability of this mechanism. For example, one controller said,
“I just don’t think the facial recognition software can work fast enough to block out all faces as soon
as they appear.” While this mechanism might not be able to blur faces during the recording, it has
been shown to work well on recorded images/videos [93].
Drone Usage Scenarios
We next asked respondents to select the mechanism(s) they want to use under three concrete
scenarios and explain why. They all chose their preferred individual mechanisms and many also
suggested using multiple mechanisms together. Their choices of mechanisms varied across scenarios,
showing their context-dependent preferences.
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Neighborhood safety scenario. In this scenario, the largest percentages of bystanders chose the
following three mechanisms: privacy policy (48%), automatic face blurring (36%), and no-fly-zone
(34%). Controllers instead chose: drone owner registration (49%), privacy policy (41%), and
automatic face blurring (39%). Many respondents desired both privacy policy and face blurring.
They felt that a privacy policy provides information and serves as a notice and face blurring protects
their identities. For instance, one bystander explained, “considering the drone privacy policy, I
would like to know how and to what extent the police will be using this footage. Since they will be
on constant patrol, I would like to have all faces blurred to protect anonymity and privacy.”
Public park scenario. In this scenario, bystanders preferred face blurring (82%), controller-
bystander app (31%), and drone owner registration (31%). Controllers preferred face blurring
(71%), drone owner registration (39%), and privacy policy (29%). Many bystanders and controllers
considered face blurring the most effective mechanism partly because its protection for children.
One bystander explained, “The face blurring thing is the best option to protect their children and
the families at the park since there is nothing else that can be done about it.” Some bystanders liked
the combination of owner registration and controller-bystander app. For instance, one bystander
explained, “It would be helpful to know the drone is registered with the FAA and the controller-
bystander app would be perfect in this case. It would make the bystander feel safer and may even
help to make friends.” This comment also suggests that the app can help people socialize. Another
bystander added, “I believe in asking for something. ‘Please do not record myself or my family,
thank you.’ would send a polite and clear message.”
Real estate scenario. In this scenario, the three most chosen mechanisms by bystanders were:
no-fly-zone (64%), face blurring (61%), and privacy policy (38%). For controllers, it was the
same set of mechanisms but in a different order: face blurring (51%), privacy policy (49%), and
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no-fly-zone (45%). Bystanders felt no-fly-zone can at least signal their intent to opt out. 45% of
controllers indicated they would respect no-fly zones. One controller said, “It would show which
houses to avoid, as in, shoot from a different angle if a neighbor is on the list.” Both groups also
valued the face blurring mechanism as it can protect people’s identities. Since this scenario was
related to organizational uses of drones, several bystanders and controllers thought that a privacy
policy would be helpful. One controller also suggested combining multiple mechanisms for better
privacy protection, “Given the purpose and who is controlling it, I think the privacy policy would
be effective, but added protection of face blurring and, if I was so inclined, respecting my no-fly
zone would be beneficial.”
7.5 Discussion
We discuss respondents’ perceptions and relative preferences of different mechanisms as well as
important questions for how to address privacy challenges of drones.
7.5.1 Perceptions and Preferences of Privacy Mechanisms
While the privacy mechanisms that we explored are not exhaustive, they cover a wide range
of designs ranging from technical mechanisms (e.g., LED license and face blurring) to policy
mechanisms (e.g., own registration and privacy policy). These privacy mechanisms can be roughly
categorized into two groups based on our respondents’ ratings of and feedback on each mechanism.
While no mechanism was perceived as a silver bullet, owner registration and face blurring
gained relatively more support from both bystanders and controllers than other mechanisms. This
matters because this result suggests these two mechanisms are more likely to be adopted and to
help mitigate bystanders’ privacy concerns. In other words, they have great potential to succeed
in practice. Owner registration was already in use and was perceived by both controllers and
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bystanders as useful but insufficient by itself. Face blurring was perceived by both groups as useful
and something that requires little effort. It has not been applied for drones but should be considered
by drone manufacturers as a useful privacy feature.
Privacy policy and no-fly-zone also received some support, albeit more controllers perceived
them to be practical and effective than bystanders. This suggests that while controllers may
adopt these two mechanisms, bystanders may consider them ineffective. The remaining four
mechanisms received even less support, but this does not mean they are completely useless. For
instance, in the public park scenario, the second most selected mechanism by bystanders was the
controller-bystander app because it allows them to directly communicate with controllers about
their privacy concerns about the drone. Our prior research shows that bystanders are concerned that
drone controllers can be invisible or cannot be reached for communication [228]. The FAA has
promulgated new drone safety rules, such as prohibiting flight over people and night operations,
and requiring drones to be in visual line of sight of the drone controllers [84]. These new rules do
not require drones nor drone controllers to be visible to bystanders. Therefore, bystanders’ concern
about invisible controllers remains largely unaddressed. The controller-bystander app can allow
bystanders to contact controllers, but our controller respondents did not value this mechanism as
much partly because its usage might infringe on their own privacy.
7.5.2 Important Questions for Addressing Drone Privacy Issues
We now discuss important questions and suggestions for designing future privacy mechanisms and
policies for drones.
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Improving individual privacy mechanisms
How to improve individual privacy mechanisms? We suggest to consider three aspects: effort,
practicality, and effectiveness.
Effort. One important question is how much effort a mechanism demands from a bystander or
controller. If people think a mechanism requires too much effort, then they are unlikely to use it
because privacy is often not their main or immediate goal. Deletion request, gesture opt-out, and
controller-bystander app were not rated higher partly because they were considered as requiring too
much effort from bystanders. In addition, many bystanders believed that it should be the controllers’
responsibilities to protect the bystanders’ privacy. However, this can be a risky belief because
controllers may care more about protecting their own privacy rather than the bystanders’ privacy.
One reason that face blurring was highly rated is because it requires minimum effort from controllers
and bystanders.
Practicality. Another question is how practical a mechanism is in reality. Many common
privacy strategies are challenging to implement in the context of drones. For instance, it is hard to
implement user consent when a drone is operating in a public space (e.g., a park) where there are
many people present. Do we require the drone controller to get consent from each person before
flying the drone or using the drone to take pictures/videos? What if bystanders have conflicting
preferences? Another example is providing privacy notices. When drones are flying in the air, it
would be difficult for people to see or read any privacy notice on the drones. How to help bystanders
identify drones’ privacy policies or notices, and understand what privacy mechanisms have been
applied is important for future privacy designs and policies for drones.
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Effectiveness. The third question is how effective a mechanism is in practice. This is particularly
important in the context of drones because most of the existing privacy mechanisms for drones
are voluntary. Both controllers and bystanders believed some controllers have the ability and/or
intention to circumvent these mechanism. For instance, un-blurring face blurred images highlights
not only the potential technical weakness of the face blurring mechanism but also controllers’
ability to reverse it. In contrast, malicious controllers who spy people would intentionally ignore
no-fly-zone requests, speaking more about controllers’ intention to avoid the mechanism.
Our respondents suggested using laws and/or technical means to enforce these voluntary mecha-
nisms. For instance, some controllers suggested “hard coding” no-fly-zone information into drones
that automatically prevent them from flying into a no-fly-zone. This is known as geo-fencing,
which currently works for sensitive locations such as airports and does not include people’s homes.
Other respondents suggested making laws to mandate and enforce mechanisms such as no-fly-zone,
privacy policies, and face blurring.
Combining multiple mechanisms
Our scenario-based results suggest that respondents from both groups had desires of using a
combination of mechanisms. For instance, privacy policy and owner registration were often
considered helpful but not sufficient because they do not directly protect people’s privacy as many
respondents put it. Therefore, our respondents suggested combining multiple mechanisms such as
privacy policy, owner registration, and face blurring since they can improve different aspects of
privacy. For instance, privacy policy can provide notice about drone usage, owner registration can
help hold controllers accountable, and face blurring can hide bystanders’ identities. Our respondents’
choices of mechanisms also varied across different scenarios, suggesting that they had context-based
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preferences of privacy mechanisms. Future research can explore packages of mechanisms based on
the changing scenario or context.
Bridging the bystander-controller mismatch
Our results also indicate that our bystander and controller respondents often had different percep-
tions of the same privacy mechanisms (e.g., the effectiveness of privacy policy). In the case of
deletion requests, some controllers were concerned that bystanders may abuse this mechanism by
sending them an overwhelming number of requests. These differences between controllers and
bystanders are perhaps not surprising because of their roles. Their behaviors can be thought as
the in-group (controllers) versus out-group (bystander) behaviors in an inter-group process (drone
operations) [37]. In drone operations, controllers directly operate drones and presumably focus on
utilizing and enjoying drones, whereas bystanders do not directly participate in drone operations
and thus prioritize their welfare such as safety and privacy against drones.
One way to bridge the bystander-controller mismatch is to improve the trust between them.
Prior research has also shown that lack of trust is an antecedent to privacy concerns [192]. When
controllers are organizations, we can learn from the e-commerce literature, which has shown that
companies can build consumer trust and thus reduce consumer privacy concerns by using a number
of measures such as adopting fair information practices (e.g., notice and consent) [61], presenting
privacy policies [76], and displaying privacy notices or seals [209]. We studied some of these ideas,
for instance, privacy policy and gesture opt-out (a form of user consent).
Prior literature has also proposed different ways of providing notice and consent to users in
ubiquitous computing environments in order to improve users’ privacy awareness [128, 123, 183].
Future work can explore these ideas (e.g., broadcasting a user’s privacy preferences [123] in a
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physical location) for drones. Displaying privacy notices or seals directly on a drone might be
hard for people to see or read, but they could be shown on the information page of the drone once
people have identified a drone by LED license or controller-bystander app, for instance. When
the controllers are individual users, we can learn from ways to increase interpersonal trust such
as providing transparency in decision-making (e.g., why use drones to take pictures) and holding
people accountable [7]. Many respondents commended that the controller-bystander app and owner
registration help hold controllers accountable.
Protecting the privacy of both bystanders and controllers
While bystanders valued their privacy, controllers were also concerned about protecting their own
privacy. For instance, when considering owner registration and controller-bystander app, many
controllers did not want bystanders (in theory, almost anyone can be a bystander) to know their
information. Some controllers also expressed concerns that these mechanisms could increase the
government’s abilities to track them. Therefore, another important privacy design question for
drones is - how to balance the privacy of bystanders and controllers. For instance, one idea to help
protect controllers’ privacy against bystanders is that bystanders can only report problematic drones
to the government using the controller’s registered ID but cannot access other controller information.
Alternatively, bystanders can only view a controller’s information when they are physically close to
the flying drone.
Lastly, privacy has been a key research theme in the HCI community. Our research highlights
that the design of human-drone interaction should not only consider controller-drone interaction but
also the indirect involvements of bystanders, as their privacy can be intentionally or inadvertently
violated by drone operations. Identifying privacy mechanisms that are supported by both controllers
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and bystanders is thus important to inform the development of public policies and future designs of
drone technologies.
7.5.3 Study Limitations
First, we cannot completely guarantee that all controller respondents were actually drone controllers.
However, we double checked with the open-ended question on what brand/model of drones they
have and they had reasonable answers.
Second, our sample cannot generalize to all drone controllers and bystanders. We recruited
respondents from Amazon Mechanical Turk and multiple drone forums. We also focused on the US.
Thus, our results may not apply to other countries.
Third, the privacy mechanisms studied in our research are by no means exhaustive, but we chose
a diverse set of technology-based and policy-based mechanisms. While we attempted to provide
detailed and realistic descriptions of these mechanisms, some descriptions are hypothetical because
the described mechanisms have not been fully implemented in practice and we had to imagine
their implementations. Besides, the drone usage scenarios are hypothetical, but they were modeled
largely after real-world uses of drones.
Lastly, our study focused on people’s perceptions of privacy mechanisms rather than their actual
adoption behavior. We only collected self-reported data, which can divert from actual behavior, as
shown in the privacy paradox literature (e.g., [194]). However, we note that people’s perceptions or
behavioral intentions (e.g., willingness to use a mechanism) is important to study because they can
influence people’s real behavior.
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7.6 Conclusion
As drones continue to be adopted and used by governments, organizations, and ordinary consumers,
how to protect people’s privacy against drones is a critical and timely question. We conducted
two surveys to investigate how drone controllers and bystanders perceive a diverse set of privacy
mechanisms for drones. Our respondents raised various pros and cons of each mechanism. While
owner registration and face blurring received most support individually by both groups, many
respondents also suggested using a combination of mechanisms, which varied across different drone
usage scenarios. We highlight a number of important questions for future privacy designs and
policies of drones.
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Part IV
Case 3: Smart Home
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Chapter 8
Smart Home Privacy: Users’ Perspectives
Home is a person’s castle, a private and protected space. Internet-connected devices such as locks,
cameras, and speakers might make a home “smarter” but also raise privacy issues because these
devices may constantly and inconspicuously collect, infer or even share information about people in
the home. To explore user-centered privacy designs for smart homes, we conducted a co-design
study in which we worked closely with diverse groups of participants in creating new designs. This
study helps fill the gap in the literature between studying users’ privacy concerns and designing
privacy tools only by experts. Our participants’ privacy designs often relied on simple strategies,
such as data localization, disconnection from the Internet, and a private mode. From these designs,
we identified six key design factors: data transparency and control, security, safety, usability and
user experience, system intelligence, and system modality. We discuss how these factors can guide
design for smart home privacy.
8.1 Introduction
A smart home consists of different sensors, systems, and devices, which can be remotely controlled,
accessed and monitored [41, 115]. The massive amount of data collected by Internet of Things (IoT)
devices in a smart home allows entities to infer sensitive information without actually collecting
them [56, 152]. Even seemingly innocuous data, such as home temperature and air conditioner
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status, could be used to determine whether a house is empty or not [137, 197]. In addition, people
have expressed privacy concerns about smart homes, such as continuous data collection, sharing,
and even misuse [235, 40, 223]. Privacy has thus been identified as a road blocker in the wide
adoption of smart homes [110, 125].
To mitigate these concerns, different privacy mechanisms have been proposed, e.g., introducing
noise to shape the smart home network traffic to prevent data inference [17]. However, little is
known about what kinds of smart home privacy controls people desire. This is an important question
to answer because privacy designs that address these desires are likely to be adopted.
To answer this question, we adopted a co-design approach to empower end users and engage
them directly in the design process. Co-design [187] is a collaborative design approach in which
stakeholders–such as researchers, designers, and users or potential users who are considered as
“experts of their experiences” [206]–share their perspectives and cooperate creatively to generate
new designs [195]. Kraemer and Ivan advocated that privacy issues in the smart home context
should be approached by considering different stakeholders [124]. In our work, we collaborated
Figure 8.1: A photo was taken during one study session.
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closely with many groups of participants with diverse backgrounds in designing privacy mechanisms
through a series of co-design sessions.
Our main contribution is that we identified six key design factors from our participants’ designs
of privacy mechanisms for smart homes. These factors include data transparency and control,
security, safety, usability and user experience, system intelligence, and system modality. They
reflected our participants’ expectations in privacy mechanisms for smart homes and can be used as
a good starting point to think about the design space of smart home privacy mechanisms.
8.2 Related Work
8.2.1 Smart Home Privacy Concerns and Risks
Prior literature identified a number of privacy and security risks of smart homes. Arbo et al.
pointed out the possibility of identity theft and device reconfiguration, suggesting the need for
effective malware management [19]. With an experiment, Apthorpe et al. demonstrated how to infer
sensitive user interaction with smart home devices through network traffic analyses with reasonable
accuracy [16, 17]. A risk analysis of a smart home automation system by Jacobsson et al. pointed
out that human-related risks (e.g. poor password selection) and software component risks (e.g.,
unauthorized modification of functions in the app) were the riskiest ones [109].
End users’ privacy concerns have also been examined. By understanding people’s mental model
of how smart homes work, Zimmerman et al. uncovered participants’ privacy concerns about hacker
attacks and data abuse [240]. Brush et al. identified four barriers that defer the broad adoption of
smart homes, such as “difficulty achieving security” in smart door locks and cameras [40]. Zeng et
al. identified a number of concerns people have, such as continuous video recording, data collection
and mining, network attacks on local networks, and account hacking [235]. However, people tend
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to outweigh cost and interoperability over privacy and security [235]. Worthy et al. found that the
fewer trust participants had towards the entities who used their information, the greater control over
information collection participants desired [223]. Zheng et al.’s study, on the contrary, found that
their participants assumed their privacy is well protected because they trust their smart home device
manufacturers [237].
Other studies focused on specific smart home devices. Malkin et al.’s survey about smart
TVs revealed their respondents’ uncertainty of data collection and usage as well as the common
nonacceptance of data being re-purposed or shared with third parties [143]. McReynolds et al.’s
study on smart toys unveiled parents’ concerns about the toys’ recording and data sharing abilities
and children’s concerns about being heard by their parents [149]. Lau et al.’s study about smart
speakers found that users’ rationales behind a lack of privacy concerns could lead them to serious
privacy risks [129].
8.2.2 Smart Home Privacy Mechanisms
Researchers have proposed various solutions to mitigate privacy concerns and risks in smart homes.
For instance, Apthorpe et al.’s solution decreased the inference of sensitive user activities by
introducing a minimum amount of noise data to shape the smart home network traffic [17]. Datta et
al. developed a Python library for IoT developers to easily implement privacy-preserving traffic
shaping [64]. By injecting synthetic network packets, Yoshigoe et al.’s solution obscured the real
network traffic and reduced potential privacy vulnerabilities [234]. Wang et al. built a live video
analytic tool for denaturing video streams by blurring faces according to user-defined rules [208].
To reduce improper access to users’ data, Moncrieff et al. developed a tool to dynamically
manage access privileges based on a number of contextual factors in smart home surveillance
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Figure 8.2: The flow of our co-design study, including its various components.
(e.g., occupants’ location and content of ongoing conversation) [156]. Arbo et al. proposed a
framework to ensure data security for smart home devices by providing dynamically generated
policies and interfaces in which end users could use to set up their privacy zones [19]. Chakravorty
et al. designed a system to collect and store users’ data, then only allow users to access their data
upon successful re-identification [47].
To increase transparency and user control, Das et al. proposed an infrastructure for IoT de-
vices and sensors to send personalized privacy notice and choice based on individual users’ pref-
erences [63]. McReynolds et al.’s study on smart toys suggested that toys should effectively
communicate with both parents and children that toys could record [149].
More broadly, to ensure an overall safe environment of smart homes, Lin et al. suggested that
auto-configuration support should be developed for smart home network so that whenever a new
device is plugged into the network, the supporting system could auto-configure itself and find
the most secure settings for the new devices, such as security protocols and essential firmware
updates [137].
The commonality of the above mechanisms is that they were proposed or developed solely by
experts or researchers. Our work focuses on end users’ needs and perspectives, helping fill the gap




To explore how people desire to protect their privacy in the context of smart homes, we conducted a
set of co-design sessions with a total of 25 participants. Figure 8.2 shows our study flow including
participant recruitment and two co-design sessions. Each session took about 1.5 hours and each
participant was paid $15 for each session they participated in. Our study was approved by our
university IRB.
8.3.1 Participants
Recruitment. We recruited our participants primarily through word-of-mouth, Craigslist, local
community centers, libraries, and senior citizen centers. We framed our study as “a design study for
smart home technology” and did not mention the word “privacy” to avoid any potential bias. We
designed a pre-screening survey to get participants’ demographic information and their experiences
with smart home devices.
Participant data. The ages of our 25 participants ranged from 22 to 76 (mean: 41). 13
participants were cisgender female and the other 12 were cisgender male. They had various
occupations, such as university staff, librarians, students, software engineers, retired workers, a
security guard, a researcher, and a plumber. They were categorized into three types of participants
based on their levels of experiences with smart homes: 12 participants owned smart home devices
(users), 7 participants were interested in buying smart home devices (interested users), and 6
participants did not use or plan to buy smart home devices (non-users).
Study groups. Participants were divided into five groups (Group A, B, C, D, and E) primarily
based on their schedules and levels of experiences with smart home devices. Each group had four to
six participants (A:6, B:4, C:5, D:4, E:6). Each session had at least four participants except that
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Session 2 of Group D only had two participants due to schedule conflicts. Group E consisted of
participants from a senior citizen center. Due to their mobility needs, we chose to conduct the study
in their center with the participants from that center only. All other sessions were conducted in our
lab.
All participants were invited to both sessions, however not everyone could attend both sessions
due to practical constraints (e.g., conflicting schedules). To mitigate this issue, similar to [148], we
started each Session 2 with a 15-minute recap of the discussion from the corresponding Session
1 (e.g., pros and cons and privacy concerns of smart home devices) to bring all participants to
the same page. In the end, ten participants completed both sessions. Eleven participants only did
Session 1 and four participants only did Session 2.
8.3.2 Session 1
The goal of the first session was to understand participants’ privacy and security concerns of smart
homes and to conduct the initial brainstorming and design. Each session started with a round-table
introduction. We then asked each participant to talk about their experiences with smart home
technologies and general perceptions. We then provided a working definition of a smart home, “a
home that has different sensors, systems, and devices, which can be remotely controlled, accessed
and monitored” based on the literature [41, 115]. We showed and explained pictures of a few
smart home devices (e.g., voice assistants, smart thermostats, security cameras, and smart toys) to
illustrate this smart home definition and potential uses of these devices [151].
Next, we asked our first group-based discussion question, “what are the pros and cons of these
devices in your opinion?” This question was meant to frame the discussion in a neutral/balanced
manner. In our pilot study, we found that our participants were overly excited about smart home,
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tended to fixate on the pros, and hardly considered the cons. To encourage participants to think more
about the risks, we added a follow-up question in the actual study that asked, “have you experienced
or heard of any negative incidents of smart home technologies, and what can potentially go wrong
with smart home technologies?” This question did not prime our participants to only consider
the negative aspects because we asked the pros first and they mentioned many pros. The careful
consideration of both benefits and risks helped them to consider the trade-off in later co-design
activities.
The next two activities were scenario-based because smart home devices can be used in various
scenarios or for different purposes and privacy is highly contextual [164, 165]. As such, we
hoped to provide opportunities for our participants to explore nuances of smart homes and their
contextualized privacy implications. The first activity was a role play. We presented three scenarios
adapted from the literature: (1) an Amazon Echo records a conversation between a couple and sends
it to other people [201], (2) a security camera monitors a senior citizen’s well-being at home in case
of emergencies [238], and (3) a smart toy records and processes a child’s conversation with it in
order to respond, but also allows the parents to hear the conversation via a mobile app [149]. These
scenarios were chosen to represent different devices, social relationships and power dynamics in the
home (e.g., a couple and a co-worker, an older adult and an adult child, and young children and
parents). In each scenario, we designed two to four roles for our participants to choose from. Once
each participant picked a role, they discussed the potential privacy issues from the standpoint of the
role.
The next activity was to co-create smart home usage scenarios. We encouraged our participants
to work in groups of two or three. Each group chose a specific smart home device and co-created
a usage scenario of that device with one or two researchers. We used six questions to guide the
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scenario creation process, i.e., what the device is, where the device is used, who uses the device,
when to use the device, why uses the device, and how the device is used. Participants then presented
the scenario and discuss any potential privacy implications in that scenario.
Through the above two activities, our participants discussed a wide range of usage scenarios
and privacy issues of smart homes. We then moved on to the co-design activity. Specifically, we
asked our participants to brainstorm their desired ways to mitigate these privacy issues and draw
their design ideas. We provided a number of creation tools (e.g., colored papers, post-it notes, color
pens). A student designer was also on site to provide help with sketching if needed. We deliberately
asked our participants to work individually, think outside of the box, and consider different kinds of
potential solutions. We also explained that the solutions could be futuristic and speculative without
considering the status quo. Each participant then presented their ideas to the group.
8.3.3 Session 2
The goal of Session 2 was to continue the co-creation of privacy mechanisms, moving from ideation
to creation of prototypes. We started the session by recapping the discussion from Session 1. To
help our participants understand different forms of prototypes, we show various examples (e.g.,
paper prototypes of smartphone screens and a website). Similar to Session 1, we provided different
creative tools and had a student designer on site to help them draw.
Each participant had about an hour to work on their prototypes. We encouraged them to discuss
their ideas with other participants and the researchers, and then to create the design individually.
Then each participant presented and discussed their prototypes with the group.
8.3.4 Data Analysis
Transcriptions and notes. All sessions were audio-recorded upon participants’ permissions. The
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recordings were transcribed and then analyzed using a thematic analysis [32] by three co-authors.
First, we immersed ourselves in the data by reading through the transcripts multiple times. Then we
coded one transcription together at the sentence level to develop an initial codebook. Second, we
independently coded the same transcription of another session using the codebook. We added new
codes to the codebook in that process. Once finished, we compared and discussed our coding, and
converged on an updated codebook. The inter-coder reliability was 0.91 (Cohen’s Kappa), which
is considered good [86]. Next, we coded the rest of the data using the updated codebook, which
contains more than 100 unique codes, such as “self-driving car risks,” “voice assistant authentication,”
“home context,” “block data collection,” “sharing decision,” and “intrusion detection.” Once finished
coding, we grouped all codes into several themes, such as “data transparency and control,” “security,”
“safety,” “usability and user experience,” “system intelligence,” and “system modality.” We examined
and ensured the codes were assigned to the correct theme.
Image data. We collected participant drawings of their design ideas. Following Poole et al.’s
methodology [174], three co-authors coded all elements in every design, including all components
involved (e.g., stakeholders, devices, users), information flow, context, as well as other visual
elements (e.g., icons, symbols, colors). Over 80 codes emerged from the analysis, and all the codes
were grouped into the aforementioned themes in the analysis of audio transcriptions and notes. The
inter-coder reliability was 0.84 (Cohen’s Kappa).
8.4 Results
Our work contributes to new understandings of how people conceptualize privacy control mech-
anisms for smart homes. Our participants started with creating their own smart home device
usage scenarios. They created a wide variety of usage scenarios covering different devices and
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purposes (e.g., smart security cameras for home safety, smart doorbells and locks for remotely
locking/unlocking doors, a smart fridge to automate food refill and alert food expiration, and a
smart robot to support indoor navigation for people with visual impairments). This activity allowed
our participants to explore and discuss possible ways of using smart home devices and potential
privacy implications. These scenarios also served as a basis for the subsequent co-design of smart
home privacy controls. Next, we will turn to our participants’ smart home privacy designs, focusing
on the major factors considered in their designs and identified via our thematic analysis. Table 9.2
shows an overview of these factors. It is worth noting that these factors are not mutually exclusive.
One design might consider multiple factors. We present these factors below.
8.4.1 Data Transparency and Control
A major privacy concern shared by our participants was smart home devices collecting data about
them. They created various designs to increase the transparency of data collections and user control
over their data. Seventeen participants considered this factor (P2-6, 9-10, 12, 15-21, 24-25).
Transparency and user awareness. Seven participants’ designs (P2-3, 6, 12, 15, 18-19) were
centered around improving transparency of data collection and usage of smart home devices. For
example, P15 designed a transparency feature for a self-driving car. She considered the car part of
the smart home because the car is often parked/charged at home and she can control the car (e.g.,
start the engine) remotely using voice assistants (e.g., Google Home). However, she was concerned
that the car manufacturer might collect her car usage data (e.g., when she used the car, where she
had been to) and then use that data to predict her future activities. To address these concerns, she
designed the car with two modes, an invisible mode and a visible mode. When she wishes not to be
tracked, she can turn on the invisible mode (e.g., by plugging in a dedicated USB drive to the car)
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to hide her activities. In contrast, under the visible mode (default mode), her driving data can be
tracked but she can use an app interface to see what data about her has been collected.
P15 explained, “so the visible basically tells you what you have done with this car, like a
transparency tool... [the tool] can also make sense of how the manufacturer uses the data. Like they
can infer whether I’m a night person or not to increase my insurance payment.” (P15) Her design
of the visible mode provides more transparency about the car’s data collection and usage practices.
However, she suggested this feature should be provided by third-party companies because she felt
the car manufacturers might not tell the truth.
It is also worth noting that, our participants considered the purposes of data collection in their
smart home scenarios when designing the privacy controls. For instance, even in the invisible mode
of P15’s design, she would share when/where she uses the car with a trusted third party (e.g., for
better navigation purpose) but would not with the car manufacturer. In P3’s design, the security
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camera monitors his home for safety (i.e., purpose), but the associated app does not show the actual
images or videos and only offers text descriptions thereof to mitigate privacy risks.
Data localization. A common element across seven participants’ designs (P2, 4-5, 15-16, 20,
24) was data localization, the idea that smart home devices store and process the collected data
locally as opposed to sending the data to a remote server. For example, P16 designed a smart door
lock with a fingerprint reader to improve the safety of her home. Since the fingerprint reader collects
her biometric information, she designed an additional privacy feature to protect her fingerprint
data by only storing it locally in the lock. She explained, “the fingerprint will be stored onsite
only. There is no need to have it connected to anything. If you didn’t have your original key and
you didn’t get in with your fingerprint for some reason, the only thing that the company can do
is complete pledge it and you would start it as a brand-new device because they would not have
access to get into that.” (P16) According to P16’s design, her fingerprint data will reside in the lock,
but the smart lock is still network-connected because the company could remotely reset the lock
if the user lost her key or the fingerprint reader stopped working. However, we note that remotely
resetting locks can pose security risks.
Disconnection from the Internet. This privacy mechanism means disconnecting smart home
devices from the Internet, essentially working in an offline manner. Five participants’ designs (P2-4,
24-25) included this idea. For instance, P2 was concerned about home security cameras collecting
personal data and storing these data in cloud storage, which may not be secure. To address these
concerns, he proposed a design of a physical lock that could be plugged into a security camera to
protect his personal data. He explained, “I think what people need is something like a lock that can
be plugged into the security camera to lock our data like gender or activities. Now they [security
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cameras] are using cloud services like the iCloud to store my personal data, but I don’t know
whether they are secure or not because they are stored at some other place, so if I have my own
device without the Internet, that is safer. It’s like a physical control and my things are stored only
in my place.” (P2) Several interesting ideas are behind this design. First, the lock is intelligent in
selectively filtering out certain types of data (e.g., gender). Second, the lock can disconnect the
security camera from the Internet/network. A defining characteristic of smart home devices or IoTs
more broadly is their Internet connectedness, which often supports data transfer, remote control, and
other system intelligence (e.g., predictions). However, here we see P2’s desire to directly control
(enable/disable) the Internet connectedness. By disconnecting the security camera from the Internet,
P2 felt that he has more (at least perceived) control over the data. Third, the lock (as a standalone
hardware device) is physical, which affords more tangible control.
Other user controls of data. Besides data localization and disconnection from the Internet,
nine participants (P5, 9-10, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24-25) desired explicit controls of their data, from
preventing data collection to deleting collected data. The aforementioned P15’s example of the
invisible mode of a self-driving car was designed to prevent car manufacturers from collecting data
about her car activities. In comparison, P5 designed a conceptual model of smart home privacy
mechanisms and emphasized that a key aspect of his model was users’ ability to delete data. He
explained, “the user should have a hardware option to delete data. So they don’t have to necessarily
go to the software to delete it.” (P5) He believed that users should be able to delete the data collected
about them and the deletion feature should be implemented as a hardware option (e.g., a physical
button on the smart home device), which would be easier to use than a software control.
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8.4.2 Security
Another underlying factor of participants’ designs was related to security, including aspects such as
authentication of multiple users, access control of user data, and network intrusion detection. Twenty
participants (all participants except P15, 18-19, 24-25) considered this factor in their designs.
Authentication of multiple users. Eleven participants (P1, 4-5, 10-13, 17, 21-23) spoke to the
social relationships and power dynamics in homes where there could be multiple users sharing one
device. They emphasized the importance of enabling proper authentication in order to protect each
family member’s privacy. For example, P13 was concerned that other members in the household
might be able to access her credit card information and order food from the smart fridge. To address
this concern, she incorporated voice recognition in her design as an authentication mechanism for
the smart fridge. She explained, “even if someone hacks your details about the credit card to make
payment, but it will still need your voice to recognize and authenticate that transaction. So that
can’t happen unless you do it yourself. Even if someone has credit card details, the transaction
won’t go through.” (P13) While P13’s voice could uniquely identify/authenticate her, she did not
speak to the possibility where someone else might record and replay her voice to impersonate her
(i.e., replay attacks).
Access control. In addition to authentication, authorization or access control of who can access
what data was another security feature that 16 participants (P1-11, 14, 16-17, 20, 23) considered in
their designs. For instance, security cameras (e.g., Nest Cam [162]) often allow anyone who logs
into the compatible mobile app to see the same video content. However, P3 wanted to give users
different access rights, as shown in the left screen in Figure 8.3. He designed two modes. In the
online mode, the app shows the video feed from the camera. In the offline mode, the app provides a
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textual description of the video feed (e.g., a person is walking), as shown in the middle screen in
Figure 8.3. The access control (the right screen in Figure 8.3) determines who gets to use which
mode. He elaborated, “you can decide who should be in which mode from this access management
page, so some will see the text description, some will see the live video.” (P3) This feature is similar
to sharing location data at varying granularity (e.g., actual address vs. city) with different entities.
In addition, some participants also designed location-based access controls. For example, P1
explained that in his design of a home automation system, the app to control his smart home devices
should have a local mode and a remote mode. He should have full access to all the functions and
data only when he is physically at home, which triggers the local mode. In comparison, when he is
away from home, the system will enter the remote mode and should only give him partial access to
the devices and none of his data should be transmitted through the Internet. We are not aware of any
existing home automation products that support this feature.
Network intrusion detection. Another security feature included in three participants’ designs
(P6, 22-23) was the ability to detect external intrusions into the smart home network. For example,
Figure 8.3: The online and offline modes of security cameras (P3)
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P6 had a technical background, and he was particularly concerned that hackers might hack into his
home network and steal his information, that his neighbors could connect to his home network and
invade his privacy, or his devices could send his personal information to third parties other than the
device manufacturers. To address these concerns, he designed a smart router with a built-in firewall
and an app that worked with the smart router, which could be used to notify users whenever an
outside intrusion was detected. He elaborated, “the app will be able to track data sending from each
device and its destination. If there is anyone who is trying to penetrate your network or trying to
use your data, collect your data, this app should send you identification. You can probably reboot
the device from the app to stop, kind of like a filter.” (P6) This smart firewall would be able to track
each smart home device’s data flow and notify users of any third party attempting to collect data.
8.4.3 Safety
Since our participants designed for the home environment, safety was also a concern. Twelve
participants (P1, 7-8, 11, 15, 17-18, 21-25) considered this factor. For example, our participants
expected that security cameras or voice assistants should be able to notify either the homeowner or
the police department if someone broke into their house. If the users were in an emergency and
needed help, they should be able to call for help quickly from these devices. These features are
often already supported by existing products. Some participants also tried to ensure the physical
safety of the home while preserving people’s privacy. For instance, P18 was concerned about the
unknowingly recording of passersby by doorbell cameras. She then created a long list of key points
that should be written into policies. She explained, “I suggested that it could be first a law by the
government that owners have to somehow make other people somehow aware whether that’s a sign
that says you’re being recorded.” (P18) While the doorbell cameras can arguably help improve
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people’s (safety) awareness of their home door area, P18 was concerned about the privacy of other
people (e.g., passersby). By calling for legislation that requires a clear notice of such recording
practice, P18 attempted to strike a good balance between homeowner safety and passersby privacy.
8.4.4 Usability and User Experiences
Many participants explicitly considered the usability of their privacy designs, ensuring that users
have good user experiences with the designs. Twelve participants (P3, 11-15, 17-19, 21-23)
considered this factor in their design. There were two broad categories of usability considerations:
user characteristics and user effort.
Considerations of user characteristics. Seven participants (P11, 13, 18-19, 21-23) took
people’s characteristics (e.g., abilities) into account when designing their privacy mechanisms,
hoping to make their designs more inclusive to a wide range of users. For instance, P11 designed
an in-home robot, which could help people with various tasks in their homes. He then designed
hardware access control interfaces to manage who could access the robot remotely. In the group
discussion, P13 asked the following questions about P11’s design, “if the person is blind, or is it like
an elderly person who cannot walk?” (P13) These questions prompted P11 to reconsider his design.
P11 then reduced the number of buttons in the interface so that it might be easier for a variety of
users (e.g., children, older adults). Similarly, P18 originally designed an authentication mechanism
for Amazon Echo using a physical fingerprint reader. Later he added a voice recognition mechanism
for authentication because he realized that a physical fingerprint reader may be impossible or hard
to use for people who lost their fingers or who have mobility impairments.
Considerations of user effort. Another usability consideration was the amount of effort
required from users to utilize the privacy designs. The majority of design ideas were based on
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automation (e.g., users receiving automatic alerts about their information being used). However,
eleven participants’ designs (P3, 11-15, 17, 19, 21-23) intentionally required explicit user effort.
For example, P19 designed an improved privacy policy (summaries of most important points) for a
smart thermostat and he believed that companies should be required to show the policy and users
should be required to read these policies to understand the data collection. However, we note that
people tend not to read privacy policies.
8.4.5 System Intelligence
Twelve participants (P1, 4-9, 13, 15, 21-23) considered system intelligence in their design. Among
participants’ privacy designs, we noticed two types of system intelligence: context detection and
personalization.
Context detection. Since homes can have various social relationships, contexts, and thus
privacy implications, six participants’ designs (P1, 9, 13, 21-23) included a component of automatic
context detection. For instance, P9 designed smart toys for her children but was concerned that
her sensitive data might be accidentally recorded by these toys. For instance, she might be calling
the bank with her credit card information while her children play with the toys, which may record
and leak her private information outside the house. To address this concern, she embedded a
context detection feature as part of her design. She explained, “like when we want to have a private
discussion, they [smart toys] are not allowed to [record].” (P9) She expected the toys to be able
to automatically detect when she is having a private conversation and the toys will pause their
recording. Similarly, P23 designed a security camera that can automatically detect that she is not at
home and start recording in the home.
Personalization. Since the home might have multiple people with different needs, twelve
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privacy designs (P1, 4-9, 13, 15, 21-23) were personalized. For instance, P21, a senior citizen who
lived with a portable oxygen concentrator, expected that her daughter can access her security camera
to check on her well-being. However, P21 desired personalized preferences in terms of when her
daughter can access the camera feed and when she cannot. P22 echoed her support, “if I don’t
want them to see certain things, I can deny them. Don’t have them on camera when I do this, this
and this. I got company, I’m eating ice cream, don’t bother, that’d be good. Program it so that we
don’t have to worry about it. Like an alarm, you can set an alarm based on what you are doing.
That’s what a true friend would do. Let Alexa be your true friend. Tweak it up!” P22 expressed her
desire of setting her personalized preferences of access control via a voice assistant, which then can
automatically enforce these preferences.
8.4.6 System Modality
We observed four forms or modalities of how participants’ privacy designs were embodied: hardware
devices, apps, system modes, and policies. These modalities are not mutually exclusive. Some
privacy designs had two or more modalities.
Hardware devices. Ten participants’ designs (P2, 6-9, 11-12, 14-16) were proposed as hardware
devices, such as P2’s design of a physical lock for security cameras, P6’s design of a smart router,
and P15’s design of a USB device for self-driving cars. In some cases, our participants intentionally
designed their privacy mechanisms as a hardware solution. For example, P15 explained, “it is just a
USB, you plug it in, it will record the data, you can plug it into a computer to read...it’s small, I
can take it with me and plug it in whenever I want to hide my activities...I don’t know whether it is
possible to connect just using Bluetooth. So with the Internet, it can upload the data by itself, but
with the Bluetooth, it can only transmit data from the device to your phone, then your phone can
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analyze the data itself, so the USB is safer.” P15’s choice of a USB was due to its portability and its
perceived security (no connection to the Internet).
Apps. Another common modality was a mobile app, often features of the mobile app associated
with the smart home device. Twelve participants’ designs (P1, 3-5, 9, 12, 14-15, 17, 21-23) took the
form of an app. We have presented examples, such as P3’s privacy design of the security camera
app, and P15’s privacy design of the app for self-driving cars.
Modes. Four privacy designs (P3-4, 12, 15) were envisioned as system modes in hardware
devices or mobile apps, such as P3’s design of online and offline modes for security camera and
P15’s design of visible and invisible modes for self-driving cars. These modes were often binary,
privacy mode vs. regular mode. They mapped to some participants’ coarse categorizations of
privacy implications (e.g., I need privacy in this case). Some of them explicitly mentioned the
incognito mode (of the Google Chrome browser), which likely inspired their designs.
Policy. In addition to technological solutions, six participants’ privacy designs (P10, 18-20,
24-25) were in the form of laws and/or policies, for instance, P18’s example of legislation, which
would require smart doorbell cameras to clearly notify passersby that the cameras can record them.
8.5 Discussion
8.5.1 Smart Home Privacy
The home context is complicated for privacy. First, smart home privacy covers not only information
privacy (e.g., data collection and sharing) but also physical privacy (e.g., the privacy of the physical
space of homes). Our participants paid attention to both types of privacy in their privacy designs
(e.g., data transparency, safety).
Second, the complex social relationships and power dynamics in a home, such as parents
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and children, brothers and sisters, husband and wife, owners and guests, patients and remote
doctors [92], can significantly affect whose privacy is at risk or how privacy can be enacted. Many
privacy designs in our study supported multiple user accounts which have been explored for shared
home computers [79], but also included multi-user authentication and access control.
Third, different social relationships may suggest varying privacy norms [164]. For example,
having visitors in a home changes the social context of the home and its privacy norms. Homeowners
might choose not to say things in front of their visitors. Similarly, if the smart home devices record
or process the conversations in the home, visitors may feel their privacy is violated. An open
question for designing smart home privacy mechanisms is, whose privacy should be protected and
who should make the decision? While most of the participants’ designs were for people who live in
the home, we saw some cases where the privacy of other people (e.g., passersby) was considered.
8.5.2 Design Implications
Next, we will discuss how the list of design factors we identified from our participants’ privacy
designs can be used to guide the design of smart home privacy mechanisms.
Data transparency and control are relevant whenever smart home devices collect data and/or
can infer data about people in the home and around the home (e.g., passersby). While notice and
choice are well-respected privacy principles, how to best provide and implement them is still an
open question for smart homes. In terms of notice, our participants desired more transparency
about what data individual smart home devices, as well as the smart home system as a whole, can
collect, infer, share and use about them. Therefore, privacy designs should be considered at both the
individual device level and the whole system level (e.g., P6’s design of a smart router that monitors
the entire smart home system).
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In terms of user control, many participants desired data localization, the ability to have the
smart home devices store and process the collected data in the devices locally. While client-side
data storage/processing has been proposed as a privacy-enhancing technique (e.g., in targeted
advertising [31] and recommender systems [97]), most smart home devices rely on servers and
cloud services to store and process the collected data [41]. In fact, some proposed mechanisms
in the literature also require cloud storage [70], which conflicts with our participants’ desires. We
suggest that designers should consider data localization as a possibility.
In addition, many participants incorporated the idea of disconnection from the Internet in their
privacy designs because they felt it will give them a peace of mind because their data cannot leak
out via the Internet. We note that this is concerned with the public Internet rather than the private
home network (Intranet). This idea challenges a typical assumption that all smart home devices are
Internet connected. Do these devices always need to connect to the Internet and should they pause
their data collection and sharing if users demand so? We believe that these are important questions
that designers should consider. We also note that just because devices can disconnect from the
Internet does not mean they cannot collect and send data after they resume Internet connections.
Fundamentally, this idea is about giving users the option to say no to data collection and sharing.
Disconnection from the Internet is a simple concept that people can understand and perceive better
privacy/security.
Security is closely related to privacy. Our participants considered different kinds of security
attack scenarios, ranging from other members of the home accessing their data to hackers breaking
into the home network (gaining control of their devices and/or stealing their data) to the devices
sending their data to external third parties. In response, our participants’ designs covered multiple
user authentication, authorization (access control of who can see what data), and network intrusion
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detection. Our participants were particularly concerned about information related to their health,
finance, gender, location, and activities. Most of the current smart home devices lack these security
features. We recommend designers to consider these options to address users’ security concerns,
e.g., if the devices allow direct interactions with users, then user authentication and authorization
should be considered.
Safety was a natural concern for the home context. Many participants’ designs included safety
features (e.g., security cameras identifying suspicious activities). We recommend designers to
consider these safety features, but more importantly, we encourage designers to think about whether
safety and privacy might be in conflict. For instance, in P18’s example of a doorbell camera,
homeowner safety and passersby privacy might be at odds. How to reconcile when these two values
conflict is another open question for further research.
Usability and user experiences are arguably important for any user-facing design. Our par-
ticipants desired simple and easy-to-understand privacy mechanisms, for instance, the feature of
disconnection from the Internet. In addition, they paid attention to the diversity of users and their
varying needs as well as the amount of user effort required to use the designs. Our suggestion here
is that designers should consider how to make their design more inclusive to various user groups
and how to reduce user effort to use the privacy controls (e.g., designing privacy-friendly default
settings).
System intelligence in our study covers automatic context detection and user personalization.
While context-aware computing has been extensively studied, some of the designs included intel-
ligent context detection that is currently hard to implement (e.g., security cameras automatically
detecting and describing what is happening in a home). Supporting users’ personalized privacy
preferences has been explored in the IoT space (e.g., [63]) and designers should consider supporting
161
this feature in their smart home privacy designs.
Lastly, system modality presents the form(s) in which these privacy designs are embodied. Our
participants covered four modalities: hardware devices, apps, system modes, and policies. Designers
should consider this question of modality because it could influence other aspects of their privacy
designs, for instance, usability and user experiences. Some of our participants’ privacy designs
were deliberately envisioned as hardware controls (e.g., a USB device to turn on the invisible mode)
due to its perceived ease of use and portability. Many designs were also based on binary modes
(visible/invisible, or online/offline). This binary model is easy to understand and use in part because
people have experiences with similar models in other domains (the private mode in web browsers).
8.5.3 Policy Implications
Some participants designed privacy policies (e.g., P18’s suggested policy on smart doorbell cameras).
They believed that the government should play an important role in ensuring device manufacturers
behave appropriately, for instance, what they are allowed and not allowed to do. Our participants
also discussed the following scenario: if a user encountered some negative incidents (e.g., robbery)
due to data collection or sharing by the device manufacturers (e.g., the user’s personal information
was collected and leaked to the wrong hands, then the user’s daily schedule was inferred), will
the manufacturers be held accountable? To what extent current privacy laws such as the European
Union (EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California Consumer Privacy Act
address these questions remains to be seen.
8.5.4 Reflections on Participants’ Privacy Designs
Our co-design study aimed to give voice to people (users and non-users of smart homes), who
are often not included in the design of privacy controls. Our participants contributed many novel
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ideas, such as stand-alone hardware devices as privacy controls (e.g., a physical lock for security
cameras), seamless identification and authentication of multiple users, and automatic context-based
personalized privacy controls (e.g., a smart toy selectively pausing its recording based on the
detected context and a user’s contextual preferences).
However, our participants’ privacy designs also have limitations. First, since most of our
participants were not technically savvy, so their designs did not cover all the privacy-enhancing
techniques found in the literature, for instance, adding noise to the home network traffic to reduce
data inferences [17]. Second, their designs did not address all potential privacy risks in smart
homes, for instance, the risk of secondary use of data (using the collected data for a different
purpose) [143]. Their designs also did not address the case that the manufacturers collected users’
data for a reasonable purpose but then shared the data with third parties. Third, some of their designs
are currently hard to implement (e.g., security cameras providing real-time textual descriptions of
the video feed). However, this was by design because we did not want to limit our participants’
creativity. Fourth, many designs could potentially pose privacy or security risks themselves. For
example, the smart router monitoring the entire home network could be privacy intrusive itself.
Remotely resetting a door lock could also have security risks.
All of these novel design ideas and concrete limitations suggest that when designing privacy
mechanisms for smart homes, inputs from both users and privacy experts are needed.
8.5.5 Limitations of Our Research
Our study also has several limitations. First, we asked the participants “what can potentially go
wrong with smart home devices,” which may prime our participants to focus on the negative aspects.
However, we believe that our participants were unlikely to make up issues because (1) participants
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were not required to answer this or any question, (2) the privacy concerns were often raised by
multiple participants voluntarily, and (3) participants discussed similar concerns in other domains
(e.g., web tracking). In addition, as we discussed in the method section, we asked about the pros
and cons of smart homes first. Our results showed that our participants covered both the pros and
cons in their considerations and their designs often reflected the trade-off between benefits and risks.
Second, while our participants had very diverse backgrounds, we did not include anyone younger
than 18. While our study did not focus on smart toys, some participants designed for smart toys.
Having children as part of the co-design team would have been valuable for the privacy designs for
smart toys. Third, all of our participants’ designs were low-fidelity paper prototypes rather than
interactive high-fidelity prototypes. Therefore, they might have missed potential challenges of their
designs or opportunities to improve the designs. Fourth, our study focused on users and might have
missed perspectives (factors) from other stakeholders such as device manufacturers. Our student
designer who helped our participants with their design was not experienced in hardware designs, so
the help was also limited.
8.5.6 Future Directions
The aforementioned limitations point to a few directions for future research. The limitations of
our participants’ privacy designs suggest that future work should not only continue to explore
user-generated designs but also critically evaluate these designs in terms of their feasibility, usability,
privacy, and security. These evaluations can shed light on how to effectively combine end users’
ideas and expectations with experts’ knowledge. These insights can then inform how these designs
should be adapted and implemented in practice. Furthermore, future co-designs could consider
educating users on privacy/security risks and countermeasures before starting the actual design. This
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might lead to additional designs. Lastly, we did not observe any differences in terms of perceptions
or design factors among the users, non-users, and interested users. This might be due to the small
sizes of different user groups in our study. Future work can further explore potential differences
among various types of users.
8.6 Conclusion
Smart home devices are gaining momentum albeit with serious privacy challenges. We conducted a
co-design study to understand how people desire to protect their privacy in the smart home context.
From participants’ designs of smart home privacy mechanisms, we identified six important design
factors they considered: data transparency and control, security, safety, usability and user experience,
system intelligence, and system modality. We discuss how these factors can guide the design of
smart home privacy mechanisms. Future research should try to involve more stakeholders (e.g.,
device manufacturers) in the privacy design process, and further explore and evaluate user-generated
privacy designs.
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Chapter 9
Smart Home Privacy: Bystanders’
Perspectives
As the Internet of Things (IoT) devices make their ways into people’s homes, traditional dwellings
are turning into smart homes. While prior empirical studies have examined people’s privacy concerns
of smart homes and their desired ways of mitigating these concerns, the focus was primarily on
the end users or device owners. Our research investigated the privacy perceptions and design ideas
of smart home bystanders, i.e., people who are not the owners nor the primary users of smart
home devices but can potentially be involved in the device usage, such as other family members
or guests. We conducted focus groups and co-design activities with eighteen participants. We
identified three impacting factors of bystanders’ privacy perceptions (e.g., perceived norms) and a
number of design factors to mitigate their privacy concerns (e.g., asking for device control). We
highlighted bystanders’ needs for privacy and controls, as well as the tension of privacy expectations
between the owners/users and the bystanders in smart homes. We discussed how future designs can
better support and balance the privacy needs of different stakeholders in smart homes.
9.1 Introduction
Various Internet of Things (IoT) devices have made their way into people’s homes, turning traditional
dwellings into smart homes. These devices infiltrate households and aim to provide efficiency and
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usability for homeowners. At the same time, the Internet-connected nature and the amount of data
collected by these IoT devices pose great privacy risks to users. A 2015 report by the Federal
Trade Commission has shown that fewer than 10,000 households with smart home IoT devices can
generate 150 million discrete data points per day [56]. This massive amount of data allows a variety
of analyses which are not possible using other data [56].
From the perspective of smart home users, many prior studies have investigated users’ privacy
perceptions of smart homes and have discovered a number of privacy concerns, such as sensitive data
collection [237], data sharing [235], and data misuse and re-purpose [143]. However, little is known
about other stakeholders’ privacy perceptions in smart homes, such as visitors, tenants, other family
members, etc. This is an important aspect to consider in the development of smart homes because
these other stakeholders’ privacy is often ignored and can even be violated without their knowledge.
For example, a recent news article reported that smart home devices that can record people’s voice
often pick up other people (e.g., spouse, friends, kids) talking in the background [207]. In the real
world, such cases often happen in scenarios where guests visit other people’s homes and are exposed
to other people’s smart home devices. This case demonstrates that the privacy risks for other people
in smart homes indeed exist, however, their understanding and privacy perceptions are understudied
in the prior literature. In addition, people may face other situations that can potentially invade their
privacy, e.g., an Airbnb host may have access to security camera data while the tenant may not due
to the power imbalance between the owner and the tenant [68].
This chapter focuses on one specific group of stakeholders in smart homes, i.e., bystanders. In
this chapter, we use smart home owners/users to denote people who directly purchase smart home
devices. In other words, owners/users in our study context refer to people who own smart home
devices. We use smart home bystanders to refer to people who do not own or directly use these
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devices but are potentially involved in the use of smart home devices, such as other family members
who do not purchase the devices, guests, tenants, passersby, etc.
Our study attempts to fill the gap in the literature by specifically investigating smart home
bystanders’ privacy perceptions. In particular, through a focus group study with eighteen bystanders
in six groups, we aimed to understand the concerns that bystanders had towards smart homes
under a variety of social contexts. In the last part of the focus group, we adopted a co-design
approach [187, 195, 206] and collaborated with bystanders to design privacy mechanisms to
mitigate their privacy concerns in smart homes.
This chapter makes three contributions. First, we investigate smart home bystanders’ privacy
concerns and identify several factors that affected their privacy perceptions, such as trust towards the
owners. Second, the design activity results in a number of design factors that bystanders considered
when designing privacy mechanisms to protect their privacy. These perceptions and the design
factors demonstrate bystanders’ needs for privacy and some control mechanisms. We highlight
the cooperative design mechanism as a unique aspect of bystanders’ privacy designs and advocate
for addressing privacy needs for both owners/users and bystanders through potential collaboration.
Third, we make a number of concrete design suggestions to better support different stakeholders’
privacy needs in smart homes.
9.2 Related Work
In this section, we present the prior literature on privacy issues in smart homes in general and
different privacy mechanisms. We then summarize prior research on understanding the bystanders’
perspective in introduce the bystanders’ perspective in prior research and explain why our results
fill a significant gap in the literature.
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9.2.1 Smart Home Privacy Risks and Concerns
Given improvements in smart home technologies, researchers have started to look at the potential
privacy and security risks associated with changes in technology. These risks include but are not
limited to: the possibility of identity theft and device reconfiguration [19], the inference of user
activities at home through smart home network traffic analyses [17], as well as risks caused by human
factors (e.g., weak passwords) and system flaws (e.g., unauthorized system modifications) [109].
User studies also looked at the privacy issues of smart homes from the perspective of end-users.
From the smart home level, people were concerned about the possibility of Internet attacks and data
abuse [240]. Zeng et al.’s interview study discovered people’s concerns on video recording, data
collection, and analysis, as well as network hacking [235]. However, their participants also outweigh
cost and interoperability over privacy and security [235]. Worthy et al. found an association between
people’s trust towards the entities that collected their information and their desired control of such
information, and they argued that less trust would lead to a greater level of desired control [223].
Brush et al. further claimed that a “difficulty achieving security” was one road blocker towards
large adoption of smart home devices. On the other hand, according to Zheng et al., some people
believed that their privacy was well protected by the entities who collected the information, which
may result in new privacy risks [237]. In a slightly different direction, Apthorpe et al.’s survey study
investigated the privacy norms in smart homes using the theory of Contextual Integrity and found a
number of factors that could influence specific norms, such as their purposes of device usage (e.g.,
in an emergency situation) and device ownership (e.g., how many devices users owned) [18]. To
explore what information should be provided to the users in smart homes, Jakobi et al. conducted
a long term study and identified users’ information demands to understand smart home system
169
performance and communications [112]. They found that in the initial phase of smart home usage,
users preferred to access detailed information of the smart home environment through web-based
platforms, whereas in the later stage, users preferred to only know the exceptions where something
went wrong [112]. In a recent work, Barbosa et al. discovered that factors such as “consent not
given” and “sensitive data collection” could make users less comfortable, and factors such as ”user
control” and “user awareness” could make users more comfortable regarding the data collection in
a smart home [26].
Concerning especially about smart home devices, users have shown their uncertainty of data
practices in smart TVs, including data collection, usage, re-purposing, and sharing with third-
parties [143]. For smart toys, parents were concerned about data collection and sharing abilities
while children were uncertain of whether their conversations with the toys could be heard by
their parents [149]. Interestingly, smart speaker users generally expressed no concerns in their
perceptions, but the rationale behind their perceptions (e.g., they did not mention any concern
because they had strong trust towards device manufacturers) could lead to more serious privacy
risks [129]. In fact, when users did not have concerns toward smart home devices, it did not mean
that the users do not face any privacy risks. For example, users’ activities can be inferred using their
smart home network data and thus pose various privacy risks to the users [16].
9.2.2 Bystanders’ Privacy Concerns
The privacy of bystanders has been studied in a few contexts. For example, Denning et al. found
that bystanders assumed augmented reality wearable devices were used for recording [66]. In their
study, they reported cases in which bystanders had negative reactions to these devices and expected
to be asked for consent before they were captured by them [66]. Bystanders’ privacy was a concern
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of people who recorded audio or video for lifelogging [108]. As such, the recorder chose to discard,
modify, or not share the audios or videos to respect the privacy of bystanders [107]. Wang et al.
studied bystanders’ privacy perceptions of drones in a variety of usage scenarios and discovered
several privacy concerns held by bystanders, such as peeking and stalking, as well as surveillance in
public places [228]. Interestingly, when comparing drone bystanders’ privacy perceptions with the
drone controllers’, Yao et al. identified several mismatches. For example, bystanders were heavily
concerned about their faces being recognized in drone footage while controllers believed that drone
cameras were satisfactory for such purposes [232]. Motivated by this line of research, in this chapter,
we investigate the privacy perceptions of bystanders in the context of smart homes. Besides, we aim
to identify, if any, mismatches in the perceptions between users/owners and bystanders to further
inform future privacy designs.
9.2.3 Smart Home Privacy Mechanisms
Many technical solutions have been proposed to mitigate smart home privacy risks and concerns. To
reduce the potential of inferences, Yoshigoe et al. designed a software-based system to automatically
inject synthetic network packets to obscure legitimate network data flow [234]. Apthorpe et al.
demonstrated the effectiveness of introducing noise data to shape smart home network traffic [17] to
obscure the real traffic and prevent data loss. A more recent work by Datta et al. introduced a Python
library so that developers could easily implement traffic shaping for IoT devices [64]. To achieve
better access control to users’ data, Moncrieff et al. designed a tool to manage access privileges
dynamically and automatically according to some contextual factors in home surveillance, such
as users’ activity and location in the home [156]. Through capturing user-defined privacy zones
and generating corresponding policies dynamically, Arbo et al.’s framework aimed to ensure data
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security for smart home devices [19]. Chakravorty et al.’s system only granted users access to their
data if these users were successfully re-identified by the system [47]. To increase data transparency
and user awareness as well as to facilitate user control, Das et al. envisioned an infrastructure to
personalize users’ privacy notices based on their privacy preferences in IoT devices [63]. Wang et
al. built a tool which could blur faces captured by cameras based on users’ self-defined rules [208].
McReynolds et al. suggested that smart toys should communicate their recording capabilities to the
parents and children [149]. Lastly, Lin et al. suggested a mechanism in which supporting systems
should auto-configure new devices added to the smart home network based on the most secure
setting to ensure a safe home environment [137].
Arguing that the above privacy mechanisms were proposed or implemented either by researchers
or experts without users’ input, Yao et al. took a user-centered approach in which they involved
smart home users and co-designed privacy-enhancing mechanisms to alleviate users’ privacy
concerns [229]. Their study suggested several factors and features that users considered in their
designs, such as network intrusion detection and data localization [229].
9.2.4 Gap in the Literature
We aim to explore how bystanders perceive privacy issues in smart homes. This is an important
question for two reasons. First, bystanders’ privacy issues are usually omitted. This is because
bystanders are not the owners nor users of smart homes, however, they are subject to usage of smart
home devices without their knowledge for most of the time. Understanding bystanders’ privacy
perceptions can broaden our knowledge of smart home privacy issues more holistically. Second, the
rapidly growing popularity of smart home devices has created many interesting yet controversial
social contexts in which users receive benefits from these devices but may put bystanders’ privacy at
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risk (e.g., using an Internet-connected security camera in an Airbnb apartment [94] and the adoption
of voice assistants in hotel rooms [49]). Understanding the factors that influence bystanders’ privacy
perceptions of smart homes can provide insights into how to better suit the needs of both users and
bystanders collaboratively.
In addition, inspired by Yao et al. [229], we deem to see what privacy mechanisms bystanders
desire to mitigate their privacy concerns if exist. The results can inform future privacy designs and
illuminate how to support the privacy needs of both bystanders and users. Next, we will describe
our methodology in detail.
9.3 Method
To explore bystanders’ privacy expectations and how they desire to protect their privacy, we
conducted six focus groups with an average of three participants in each group and a total of
eighteen participants. We chose to do focus groups instead of one-on-one interviews because we
hoped to encourage interaction between participants and spark the discussion by bringing different
experiences as bystanders. The average length of the sessions was 1.5 hours. Upon completion,
each participant was paid $15. This study is approved by our university IRB.
9.3.1 Study Settings
Participants recruitment. We recruited our participants primarily through Craiglist, word-of-
mouth, and local senior citizen centers. When prospective participants first reached out to us, we
asked them to fill a pre-screening survey to obtain their demographic information. We deliberately
selected participants from various gender identities, age groups, occupations, and with different
levels of smart home experiences. We carefully framed our study as “a focus group study to
understand your perceptions of smart homes” without mentioning anything related to “privacy” to
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Table 9.1: Summary of participants’ demographics
Group NO. Participants Gender Age Occupation Experiences Scenarios
1
P1 M 18-25 Student Owner S1, S2
P2 F 18-25 Student Owner S1, S2
P3 M 18-25 Student Owner S1, S2
2
P4 M 36-45 Hospital employee Owner S1, S2
P5 M 26-35 Government employee Owner S1, S2
P6 F 26-35 Student Experienced S1, S2
3
P7 F 18-25 Paralegal Owner S2, S3
P8 M 26-35 University staff Owner S2, S3
P9 F 36-45 Postal expeditor Experienced S2, S3
P10 M 36-45 Civil engineer Owner S2, S3
4
P11 M >65 Retired Non-user S1, S3
P12 F 26-35 Unemployed Experienced S1, S3
5
P13 F 36-45 Sales Experienced S1, S3
P14 M 56-65 Retired Non-user S1, S3
P15 F >65 Retired Non-user S1, S3
6
P16 M 26-35 Editor Owner S2, S3
P17 F 26-35 Filmmaker Owner S2, S3
P18 F 36-45 Chef Experienced S2, S3
prevent potential bias. We summarize the demographics of the participants and their groups in
Table 9.1.
Pilot study. Drawing from prior research [66, 228, 107, 233, 229, 187, 195, 206], we developed
a list of questions and activities to probe participants to think about the potential benefits and
concerns of smart homes from the perspective of bystanders. We ran two pilot study sessions with
seven participants, gained a few insights, and then made several changes to our study protocol. First,
in the initial protocol, we only asked participants to think from the bystanders’ perspective. In the
pilot study, we found that our participants tended to think from the owners’ perspective. Thus, we
added a question and asked the participants to recall the last time they visited other people’s places
where smart home devices were installed to better situate them as bystanders. Second, the original
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protocol asked participants about their general perceptions and concerns of smart home devices.
However, in the pilot study, we found that our participants focused more on the negatives of smart
homes in the scenarios. Thus, to reduce potential priming, we asked participants to discuss the
benefits first in each scenario to ensure they think thoroughly. Third, when we asked our participants
to create prototypes to illustrate their ideas, most of them expressed confusions on the definition of
“prototypes”. Thus, we added a brief introduction session to show participants a few examples of
different types of prototypes (e.g., diagram, low-fidelity paper prototypes, wireframe, etc.) to help
them know the expectations from the design activity. The final study protocol is described in detail
in the next section.
9.3.2 Study Flow
The goal of the study is to understand bystanders’ privacy expectations in smart homes and their
desired privacy controls. We divide each study session into three main parts.
Part 1: general understandings. We started each session with a round-table introduction. We
first asked each participant to talk about their understandings, experiences, and general perceptions
regarding smart home technologies. Regardless of their prior knowledge, we provided a working
definition of smart home [41, 115], “a home consists of different sensors, systems, and devices,
which can be remotely controlled, accessed, and monitored.” We showed them a few smart home
devices and explained their primary functions. These devices included voice assistants, security
cameras, smart toys, and a set of smart appliances.
Before introducing the concept of “bystanders”, we first asked participants to discuss the pros
and cons of smart homes in general. We then started to shift the perspective towards that of
bystanders by asking participants to describe their past experiences and thoughts in other people’s
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smart homes. Next, we deliberately introduced our definition of a “bystander” in the smart home
context, framing it as “people who are not the owners nor the primary users of smart home devices
but can potentially be involved in the device usage.” We then asked our participants to think about
themselves as the bystanders in the remainder of the study.
Part 2: scenario-based discussions. Similar to [213, 231], we introduced three scenarios
in our study to (1) capture participants’ contextual privacy perceptions and (2) better situate our
participants and nudge them to think as bystanders. The three scenarios were inspired either by
findings in the literature or from the news, including: (1) the temporary residency scenario (S1): you
rented an apartment for three days through Airbnb and an Internet-connected security camera was
installed in the apartment [94]; (2) the playdate scenario (S2): you took your child to a playdate and
there was a smart toy for the kids to play with [87]; and (3) the cohabitant scenario (S3): you live in
your own house and your spouse purchased an Amazon Echo [237]. These scenarios were designed
to represent a variety of factors, including different application contexts (e.g., temporary resident in
an Airbnb apartment, friend’s house, your own house), social relationships (e.g., tenants and owners,
guests and owners, husband and wife), and different devices (e.g, Internet-connected security
cameras, voice assistants, smart toys). It is worth noting that we did not limit our participants to
these devices. All participants were told that they could also discuss other devices they would like
to add in each scenario. We also did not explicitly mention or investigate the case of hidden devices
(e.g., devices that were purposefully hiding in a place by the owners or not obvious to the bystanders)
because we did not want to prime our participants to think about devices that were not obvious to
them which could adversely influence their perceptions. Due to time limitations, each group was
asked to discuss two of the three scenarios. For each scenario, we asked our participants to discuss
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the benefits of smart homes as bystanders, then we moved forward to discuss their concerns.
When finishing the discussion of the scenarios, our participants demonstrated to have grasped
the concept and the role of bystanders for the study. These prior activities resulted in participants’
understandings of a wide range of potential benefits as well as potential concerns, including their
privacy concerns and expectations. We then focused on the privacy concerns and expectations
emerged from the discussion and continued the study with a co-design activity.
Part 3: co-design of privacy mechanisms. The goal of this activity was to co-design privacy-
enhancing mechanisms with our participants based on their privacy concerns and expectations in
smart homes as bystanders. We first situated participants in a friend’s house with a number of
smart home devices (i.e., voice assistants, security cameras, and smart toys, all adopted from the
previous three scenarios) presented, then we asked them to brainstorm their desired features to
mitigate their aforementioned privacy concerns and created prototypes to illustrate their ideas. We
chose to use a different and more general scenario with the same devices for the design activity
rather than using the three scenarios from the previous part for two considerations. First, each group
of participants only discussed two of the three scenarios, thus none of the three scenarios were
shared by all three groups. Besides, involving all participants in the same scenario made it easier
to synthesize our findings. All previous scenarios were designed with different combinations of
contextual factors in mind which made it difficult to understand the rationale behind participants’
designs. We provided a set of tools (e.g., Post-It notes, color pens, paper board, color papers) for
their convenience. We encouraged participants to collaborate and discuss their ideas with others
and with researchers, break the existing technological and policy limitations, and potentially design
futuristic and speculative solutions.
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9.3.3 Data Analysis
Study recordings. All study sessions were audio-recorded after obtaining participants’ consent.
Then two co-authors transcribed all recordings and conducted a thematic analysis [32]. We read all
transcriptions a few times to familiarize ourselves with the data, then coded one transcription (i.e.,
the transcription of one complete focus group) together at the sentence level. After generating the
initial codebook, we independently coded the same subset of data. When new codes emerged from
this process, we added them to the codebook. Upon completion, we compared and discussed the
coding and merged their codebook. The inter-coder agreement was 0.81 (Cohen’s Kappa), which
is considered good [86]. Then we coded the rest of the data using the updated codebook. The
final codebook contained over 120 unique codes, such as “bystander action”, “trust in the owner”,
and “wish for data local storage”. We further grouped all codes into seven themes, including
“general perceptions”, “perceived norms”, “bystanders’ awareness”, “privacy-seeking behaviors”,
“cooperative mechanisms”, “bystander-centric mechanisms”, and “demographics”. We deliberately
checked all the codes to ensure they were assigned to the appropriate groups.
Image data. We collected participants’ prototypes of their designs. Using the same analysis
method in Poole et al.’s study [173], two co-authors coded all the elements in the prototypes. These
elements covered everything that was covered in the prototypes, including all components (e.g.,
stakeholders, devices), visual elements (e.g., buttons, colors), information flow (e.g., information
type, flow directions), and other parts (e.g., notes). We followed the same coding procedure as
described above and resulted in a codebook with over 100 codes. We further grouped all codes into
six themes. The inter-coder agreement was 0.85 (Cohen’s Kappa), which is considered good [86].
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9.4 Results
Next, based on our thematic analysis, we first focus on the themes related to our participants’ privacy
perceptions, then we present the main themes from our participants’ privacy designs.
9.4.1 Participants’ General Perceptions
Our participants discussed several benefits of adopting smart home technologies, including enabling
home automation, providing remote access, ensuring home safety, etc. They acknowledged several
benefits of using smart home devices in all scenarios. We summarize the perceived benefits in this
section. The full list of the perceived benefits and risks discussed by our participants is attached
in Table 12.1 in the Appendix. For example, in the temporary residence scenario, bystanders
mentioned that if the apartment was a shared space, having some smart home devices (e.g., an
Internet-connected security camera) could provide them a peace of mind for safety purposes.
Our participants’ concerns of smart home devices varied among individuals and across different
scenarios. In general, bystanders’ had more privacy concerns in the temporary residence scenario
and the playdate scenario than the cohabitant scenario. Bystanders also expressed more concerns
regarding the video and audio data collected by devices with microphones and cameras (e.g., voice
assistants, security cameras) but barely any concern with other devices (e.g., smart coffee makers).
Through our analysis, we identified three major aspects to shape bystanders’ privacy perceptions
of smart home devices: their perceived norms in different contexts, their awareness of smart home
devices and device behaviors, and the potential ways to control their privacy. In the following
section, we unpack the three aspects and describe how each aspect shapes bystanders’ privacy
perceptions.
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9.4.2 Three Aspects of Bystanders’ Perceptions
Perceived Norms.
Perceived norms refer to bystanders’ believed values or standards in a given context. For example,
our participants felt that as bystanders, they should not directly control the devices without the
owners’ permission. Such norms are deeply rooted into specific contexts and contain four primary
facets: (1) perceived device utility, (2) perceived social relationship, (3) perceived trust, and (4)
length of stay. Changes to any one of the facets may cause changes to bystanders’ perceived norms,
which further influence their privacy perceptions. We present the four facets below.
Perceived device utility. The first facet of the perceived norms is bystanders’ perceived device
utility. This facet was brought up by eight participants (P1-3, P5-6, P8, P14, P17). Bystanders held
different opinions on whether smart home devices were needed in this context. For instance, in
the temporary residency scenario, several bystanders believed the legitimacy of having Internet-
connected security cameras installed in the apartment for security reasons (e.g., if the shared space
was broke in or needed surveillance) as long as the cameras were not in the bedroom or living room.
However, some other bystanders were completely against the use of cameras inside an Airbnb
apartment since they preferred to have their privacy. In the playdate scenario, P6 shared her opinion
about smart toys:
“My concern would just be that the kid grows up used to having invasive devices present so I
would prefer the Alexa not in the house and the toy not in the house ... because I would imagine
the purpose of the toy is to get children used to having smart devices and other smart amenities.
Personally, I would want my child to be more concerned about their privacy.” (P6)
P6’s perceived utility of smart toys significantly affected her perceptions. She believed that this
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device was designed to immerse the children in an environment full of “smart amenities” so that
they would get used to these devices, instead of being an object that the children could simply play
with. In the long run, children would be used to the data collection and potential privacy violations
associated with such devices. Thus, she would be concerned.
Social relationship. The social relationship in the study mainly refers to bystanders’ relation-
ships with the owners of smart home devices. Such a relationship also helps to shape bystanders’
perceptions. This facet was discussed by seven participants (P1, P3, P5-7, P10, P14). For example,
P10 commented on how social relationships impacted his perception:
“Listening to children doesn’t make sense to me. I would like that kid playing with another toy.
If it is my friend’s kid and they assure me that the toy is fine, I would be ok. If I’m not close with the
other parent, I would try to politely get my kid not to play with it. ” (P10)
P10 believed that smart toys needed to listen to and record children’s conversation to provide
the “smart features.” His privacy perception of the smart toys from a bystander’s perspective largely
depended on the relationship between himself and the owners. In this case, he would allow his
children to play with the smart toy if the owner was a close friend. In the cohabitant scenario,
P16 was against the use of any smart home devices due to the potential collection of his data.
However, he also acknowledged that he would still use the voice assistant if his wife bought it and
wanted to use it, which further confirmed the role of social relationships in influencing bystanders’
perceptions.
Perceived trust. Perceived trust refers to bystanders’ perceived trust level towards different
potential stakeholders involved in smart homes, such as the owner, the device manufacturers, as
well as the potential mediators (e.g., Airbnb as the company in the temporary residency scenario).
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This was discussed by seven participants (P1, P3, P6-7, P10-12). For example, in the temporary
residency scenario, bystanders discussed their trust towards the owner of the property. P12 refused
to book an apartment even if she was told explicitly that there was a security camera in the home.
She explained:
“I like my privacy. You can say there’s ownership and it’s their building, but I guess I don’t trust
people, expect the worst of people I guess. I wouldn’t like that.” (P12)
P12’s lack of trust towards the apartment owner was the primary reason for not accepting
the usage of a security camera. Besides, bystanders also mentioned how their trust towards the
manufacturers and the mediators influenced their privacy perceptions (e.g., they tend to trust the
household company names and believe in their privacy policy), further confirming the findings from
prior research [129, 235].
Length of stay. Length of stay is a unique facet in smart home norms from bystanders’ perspec-
tives. It refers to how long a bystander stays at one particular location.This was discussed by three
participants (P2, P4, P15). Our results suggested that the length of stay also impacted bystanders’
privacy perceptions. Generally, bystanders were more concerned with smart home devices if they
were exposed for a longer time, although different participants had different interpretations towards
what a “long time” meant. For example, P2 believed that in the temporary residency scenario, “three
days” could be considered as a long time, thus using an Internet-connected security camera and
other smart home devices was not acceptable. However, P4 had a different opinion on this and
explained:
“I think this would be different if this was at a friend’s house or I was renting an apartment and
the apartment owner was like we have to have cameras on you at all times because this is a short
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amount of time. If this was a long time, like three weeks, or if it was someone I don’t trust and there
were no laws against it, then that is a red flag.” (P4)
In this response, P4 not only explained his perceived “a long time” being three weeks but also
further echoed the aforementioned trust facet. His privacy perceptions as a bystander would vary if
these two facets changed. P4’s quote also hinted that regulations would play a role in his perceptions.
However, we did not observe recurring theme around users’ legal expectations. Future research may
dive deep into this area.
The above examples further suggested that, due to the complex social dynamics in smart homes,
the social norms were not always clear, which made privacy management more difficult in smart
homes when considering both bystanders and owners. We will further unpack the implication in the
Discussion section.
Bystanders’ Awareness of the Smart Homes
The second aspect influencing bystanders’ perceptions is related to their awareness of the surround-
ing environment. Such awareness further includes their awareness of smart home devices one
owners’ property and their knowledge of smart home device behaviors.
Awareness of device existence. This was discussed by thirteen participants (P1-4, P6-8, P10,
P11-P13, P16, P17). Many bystanders acknowledged that often times, they did not pay attention
to or look for any smart home devices even though those devices were becoming more and
more ubiquitous. It is worth noting that although we did not explicitly investigate the issue of
hidden devices, the awareness issue still emerged from our study as one main factor that impacted
bystanders’ perceptions. Our participants discussed their thoughts about the consequences of not
knowing the existence of these devices. As P8 stated, controlling the devices was not as big an
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issue since he could negotiate with the owners. However, unawareness of the devices was a vastly
different story. One thing worth noting from our study was the fact that people struggled to tell that
something was, in fact, Internet-connected and essentially “smart” as these devices made their way
into people’s homes in a variety of formats. In the playdate scenario, P7 explained her concerns as a
bystander:
“The Google Home and Amazon Alexa are controlled by awake words, they look like devices.
That thing [smart toy], it goes back to the awareness factor. If I walked in, I would never know
that is a smart toy. I don’t know where it is going, I don’t know what it is recording, I don’t know
if someone knows where my children are. That is when it gets concerning. Because those things
like the Google Home and Alexa, people can track where you go. That [a smart toy] gets a child
involved. That is where I get concerned as a bystander, I want to be aware of the things.” (P7)
P7, who owned a few smart home devices, acknowledged that she did not know that the
“dinosaur-shaped toy” was a smart toy. Given her prior knowledge regarding the tracking capability
of similar voice assistant products, she would be concerned that her kids were accidentally exposed
to another tracking device without her even knowing about it.
Awareness of device behaviors. Relatedly, bystanders also lack awareness of device behaviors
and thus are not sure whether they are facing any risks or not. Nine participants (P2, P4, P6-9, P12,
P14, P18) discussed this aspect. In the family cohabitant scenario, P6 shared her own story in her
parents’ house:
“My dad has a Google Home which, he doesn’t use it to control music although sometimes it
will, he might use it to ask a question about the weather or if we are having a conversation and he
doesn’t recall something he will ask the Google Home. It is kind of annoying when he isn’t there,
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I unplug it because it is kind of weird like if we are talking just amongst ourselves and he says
something vaguely like “okay Google” which is the activation thing, it will start listening and it
is kind of weird. He works during the day so if I am there on the weekend. He has two one in his
bedroom and one in his living room. I don’t spend any time in his bedroom so I only unplug the
living room one. I don’t find the device useful and I don’t know anything about it. I don’t know if it
is always on or whatever.”
P6 was against the usage of Google Home in her parents’ house. She chose not to expose herself
in front of the Google Home by either unplugging the device or not staying in the same room
with the device as long as her father was not in the house. This was primarily due to her lack of
awareness of the device capabilities and what the device might bring to her.
9.4.3 Privacy-Seeking Behaviors
The third aspect of bystanders’ perceptions of smart homes is their privacy-seeking behaviors.
Privacy-seeking behaviors refer to different ways people adopt to mitigate their privacy concerns
and protect their privacy. Unlike the owners or users of smart home devices who directly set them
up or turn them off the devices if they chose to, bystanders generally do not have access to directly
control the devices, or simply do not believe that they should control the devices. In our study,
several bystanders (P1, P4, P6, P9, P13, P15-16) mentioned a few ways of how they seek to protect
their privacy. One common way in the temporary residency scenario was to cover the security
camera if needed. In the family cohabitant scenario, P5 chose to place the voice assistant in a place
where he only stayed to make food as a way to protect his privacy against the voice assistant.
In the playdate scenario, many bystanders mentioned that they would directly talk to the owners
to either obtain more information about the toys or simply ask the owners to turn off the toys.
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However, bystanders also mentioned the potential caveat in doing so, as P1 stated:
“I feel like I am not in the place to be like “hey can you turn it off?”, so I probably won’t, but it
still makes me feel uncomfortable.” (P1)
This quote demonstrated that simple and direct privacy-seeking behaviors might create socially
awkward situations. In this particular case, an awkward situation was caused by the perceived
imbalanced power structure in the owner’s home. As a result, bystanders ended up giving up seeking
for privacy controls.
The three aspects discussed above, on the one hand, shape bystanders’ privacy perceptions; on
the other hand, provide insights into bystanders’ privacy expectations in a variety of smart home
contexts. Building on top of the above results, we present the findings from the follow-up co-design
activity during which bystanders carried out various ideas to enact their privacy concerns and meet
their privacy expectations.
9.4.4 Privacy Designs
In our study, we include a co-design activity to help us understand bystanders’ desires in privacy
controls and mitigation strategies. The activity provides a chance for researchers and bystanders to
design together and cope with bystanders’ privacy concerns. It is worth noting that although the
designs are for a pre-defined smart home scenario, bystanders discussed the possibility of extending
these designs to other scenarios.
We synthesize all designs and extract the design factors from our analysis. We first group
all the factors based on design purposes, i.e., the privacy problems to be solved. We identify
three purposes which can be mapped to the three aspects in bystanders’ privacy perceptions, i.e.,
expressing preferences and asking for device control aiming to clarify bystanders’ perceived norms;
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Table 9.2: Summary of bystanders’ privacy design factors, organized based on design purposes and
large categories.
Categories Purposes Factors
Cooperative mechanisms Clarify norms
- Express preferences
- Ask for device control
Bystander-centric mechanisms
Increase awareness
- Detect nearby devices
- Inform device behaviors
Provide controls
- Limit data collection
- Control data processing
detecting nearby devices and informing device behaviors aiming to increase bystanders’ awareness;
as well as limiting data collection and controlling data processing aiming to empower bystanders
with more control over their privacy.
We then conceptualize all design factors and purposes into two larger categories: cooperation
mechanisms and bystander-centric mechanisms. Cooperation mechanisms refer to the designs that
require communication between bystanders and owners to collaboratively resolve bystanders’ pri-
vacy concerns, while bystander-centric mechanisms refer to the designs that require only bystanders’
effort alone to meet their privacy expectations. The summary of the results can be found in Table 9.2.
It is worth noting that these design factors are not mutually exclusive. Many design ideas carried
out by bystanders cover a few of these factors.
9.4.5 Cooperative Mechanisms
One primary reason for bystanders’ concerns is the lack of communication between bystanders and
owners. This is due to either the lack of communication channels or the potential social awkwardness
and confrontation in face-to-face communication. Thus, bystanders’ designs provide technological
alternatives to enhance communication. Through effective communications, bystanders hope to
establish or clarify contextual informational norms in the owners’ smart home with respect for their
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privacy. From this perspective, seven participants considered the cooperative aspect in their designs,
focusing on expressing their privacy preferences and asking for some device controls.
Express preferences. Seven bystanders (P1, P5-6, P9-10, P13-14) wished to express their
privacy preferences to the owners through their designs. For example, in the playdate scenario, P5
designed an app interface in which he could specify his preferences regarding smart toys and other
recording devices in the home. Once the preference was set, the owner would receive notifications
in which the owner had the choice to either honor the preference by changing the smart toy settings
or ignore the preference.
Ask for device control. Another cooperative element in bystanders’ designs centers around
asking for some controls of the devices in the owners’ home. Six participants (P1-5, P10) included
this aspect. Such designs provide a unique perspective in bystanders’ privacy expectations since
when discussing their perceptions, most bystanders acknowledged that they should not expect
controls of others’ devices. However, these privacy designs reflected that bystanders expected some
controls over owners’ devices to protect themselves. For example, P4 designed an app (Figure 9.1)
to detect smart home devices in the owner’s house. When he connected to the owner’s home Wi-Fi,
the app would provide a list of connected devices. If he was not comfortable with any of the listed
devices and preferred for it to be turned off, he would make a request to the device directly through
the app. The owner would be notified as well and would need to approve the request.
There are several insights behind this design. First, the app starts with a transparency feature
that can detect all the devices connected in the home network so that bystanders are more aware of
their environment. We will further unpack the awareness and transparency aspect in the Discussion
section. Second, as a bystander, P4 prefers direct communication with the devices in the owners’
home and the ability to turn the device on and off if needed as a way to protect his privacy. However,
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Figure 9.1: The app design by P4.
this idea can be considered as an intrusion for the owners, which further highlights the mismatch
and tension between the owners and bystanders. Third, the fact that P4 designed an app to reflect his
expectations of controlling the device rather than directly talking to the owner face-to-face suggests
the potential of using our everyday technologies to avoid social confrontations in smart homes.
9.4.6 Bystander-Centric Mechanisms
The bystander-centric mechanisms refer to designs that only require effort from bystanders. Several
bystanders’ designs include many bystander-centric features, with a primary goal of addressing
bystanders’ concerns around the transparency issues in the owners’ home as well as the lack of
control of their data. More specifically, these designs focus on detecting nearby smart home devices,
informing bystanders of device behaviors, limiting data collection, and controlling personal data
process.
Device Awareness.
Eleven of the designs (P1-8, P15-17) had a component to increase awareness of the smart devices in
multiple ways. P4’s example (Figure 9.1) from the previous section required bystanders to connect
to the owners’ home Wi-Fi to actively detect the existence of smart home devices inside the house.
P14 designed the content of a text message, which included details regarding the types, schedule,
and location of the devices. P8 designed an app that could help him realize the existence of a camera
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inside the owner’s place, and if any devices existed, its operating status:
“You go into each room and the app lets you know if there’s a security camera in their home.
And going further, maybe it lets you know the location of every camera in the house. But that’s
dumb because then any burglar can do that. And it lets you know if it’s on or off.” (P8)
It is worth noting, however, that P8 also commented on the potential negative consequences of
such an app: if he could use it, then any burglar could use it to detect the location of the cameras
for a potential break-in. This concern was discussed in three groups, indicating that: (1) if such
a design were to be implemented, more advanced security mechanisms should be included; and
(2) bystanders’ designs need to be critically examined by privacy and security experts as well as
practitioners in order avoid security loopholes should any design idea be implemented.
Device behaviors.
Bystanders also design with a desire to know the smart home devices’ behaviors to make sure that
they are informed. Eight designs (P1-2, P4, P7-8, P11, P17-18) included this feature. For example,
one feature in P1’s app design focused on improving the transparency of smart home devices, as he
explained:
“I talked about an app, so it would be like an app that has access to all IoT devices in your
home, so when you talked about the scenario if you walked in your friend’s house and there was a
camera and you weren’t sure. If you walked up with an app, it would tell you all the devices they
detected and the hours they are running, if it is on right now, who is using the device right now, the
purpose of it so you are aware. This is for everyone around the device to know what it is used for.”
(P1)
P1 was concerned that even if he noticed a smart home device, he would not be aware of the
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specific device’s details. He would like the app to inform him about different aspects of these
devices to increase his awareness, including the device status, purposes, schedule, etc. P7 designed
a similar app to monitor device behaviors and inform him of any data collection. Besides, her
design also had a piece for providing recommendations regarding how to avoid unwanted data
collection. For example, in a case of security camera detection, the app would recommend, “move
to the kitchen if you don’t want to be recorded, and don’t say secrets.”
Limit data collection.
Four designs (P3, P6, P7 P14) embedded a piece to limit data collection by smart home devices,
particularly bystanders’ data. For example, P6 designed an incognito mode for bystanders to
alleviate concerns of being tracked:
“I know for a fact that some tech companies track your device’s location so by default they
track your location. And I think a feature in your smartphone that allowed you to go smart home
incognito so if you go to your friends house, and they have a security camera that they don’t turn off
then I guess you have to get over that privacy concern but the max amount of privacy would be if
you have this feature turned on in your phone, your whereabouts won’t be in their system. That
data doesn’t mix with theirs.” (P6)
P6 acknowledged the fact that she was tracked by technology companies, thus she designed an
app for her smartphone in which she could set a “smart home incognito mode”. Once activated, this
mode could ensure that smart home devices would not track her.
Control data processing. Another feature is to control the processing of bystanders’ data,
including data sharing, access, storage, and deletion. Four designs (P3, P10, P13, P16) included this
component. For example, P10 created a futuristic design which trapped the collected data inside the
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Figure 9.2: The signal blocker designed by P10.
house (Figure 9.2):
“This is a signal blocker that stops information from leaving the house, kind of like bubbles
around the house basically. Information can still get in. Signal blocker app will go along with it. I
could get a notification that says ‘Allow’ or ‘Deny’ information to go out. Potentially it could add
other people’s devices to your signal blocker or they could share their system with me, kind of like
Google Docs ‘view’, ‘view and edit’ link share.” (P10)
P10s’ design represented an entire smart home system as a signal block shield. In this design,
the “bubble” referred to an invisible shield that stopped the information from going out. Bystanders
could not control whether to use smart home devices or stop the data collection, but through the
app, they could potentially limit the collected data inside their friend’s house. That would make P10
more comfortable.
P13’s design of an app reflected the ideas of data deletion and storage. She explained:
“I would be happy if audio and video were deleted after a couple of days if the person went on
and said I want to save this clip for this specific reason. Or if the data is only stored locally on
their network or in the mesh network where it is connected between the devices itself or phone or
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computer. So it is not actually going outside of your home network and not being sent out anywhere
so I know this data is not being shared or used maliciously.” (P13)
P13’s design reflected that her data would be properly handled by either smart home devices or
the owners. By deleting the collected data after a certain amount of time and keeping the collected
data stored in the owners’ house, this app offered her peace of mind as a bystander since she would
know that her data was secure.
It is worth noting that while our participants have different levels of experiences with smart
homes, we do not observe notable differences between the designs of those who had more ex-
periences and those with fewer experiences. We suspect this is due to 1) our small number of
participants, 2) the qualitative nature of the study, and 3) our scenario-based discussions which
reduces the potential influences of participants’ prior experiences with smart home devices. We
encourage future work to further dive into this issue using different methodologies (e.g., survey)
with a larger sample size.
9.5 Discussion
Few prior research has hinted the needs to study the privacy issues from other stakeholders in smart
homes, such as visitors and other family members [129, 229, 235]. Our study attempted to respond
to such needs. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first of its kind that specifically focuses
on the understudied bystanders’ privacy in the context of smart homes, aiming to understand their
privacy perceptions and desired ways of addressing their privacy concerns. Our results highlight
the different aspects of shaping bystanders’ privacy perceptions in smart homes. Besides, our
co-design activity results in several design factors that the bystanders desire when designing privacy
mechanisms to meet their privacy expectations in smart homes.
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This study primarily focuses on smart home bystanders, while prior work primarily focuses
on smart home users. Both groups are necessary and important stakeholders in smart homes and
their perceptions and desirable design factors provide novel insights for the smart home industry,
practitioners, and researchers. In this section, we compare our results to the findings from the
literature (primarily the work of Zeng et al. [235], Zheng et al. [237], and Yao et al. [229]) to
highlight major differences between the two groups. We choose these prior work because 1) they are
among the pioneering work in understanding smart home users’ privacy perceptions in the literature,
and 2) they are similar to our work in terms of methodology. The goal of the comparison, instead
of generating an exhaustive list of similarities and differences between bystanders and users, is to
show that owners and bystanders may have different privacy needs. We also take the first attempt to
answer the question posed by Yao et al. [229], i.e., “whose privacy should be protected and who
should make the decision?”
9.5.1 Comparing Bystanders’ and Users’ Privacy Perceptions
Our results suggest that bystanders, despite their limited engagement with other people’s smart
homes, still hold their privacy concerns. We compare our findings of bystanders’ privacy percep-
tions with other results of users’ privacy perceptions and summarize three major differences: (1)
contextual variations; (2) bystander’s data access; and (3) privacy-seeking behaviors.
Contextual variations.
Prior research on smart home users was mostly situated in their own homes. As a result, users’
privacy perceptions were tied to their dwellings without too many variations. This means users
chose to adopt smart home devices to accomplish certain goals in their home, such as home
automation, surveillance, home safety, and remote access [235, 237]. As such, individual user’s
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privacy perception centered around their specific use cases and was less likely to change once
formed. In a sense, there is limited contextual variation from the users’ perspective. In comparison,
due to the nature of bystanders, they could switch their roles under different social relationships
(e.g., family members living in the same home, visitors to another friend’s home, or temporary
renters of Airbnb homes). Thus, bystanders could face strong contextual variations. Our study
showed that bystanders’ privacy concerns varied in different scenarios and that their expectations
and information needs were also significantly affected by many contextual factors, such as perceived
social relationships with the owners and length of stay.
Expectation of bystanders’ data access.
Literature has discovered that users’ mental models contained several entities that could access their
data collected by smart home devices [235, 237]. These entities included device manufacturers,
third-party advertisers, government, Internet service providers, etc. No evidence in the literature
suggested that smart home users expected bystanders to obtain access to the collected data. However,
bystanders from our study expected a certain level of control of either the users’ devices or their
data collected by these devices. Such expectation was perceived as reasonable by the bystanders as
they were captured by the devices, and their privacy could be at risk.
Privacy-seeking behaviors.
Literature has suggested that the majority of users did not seek privacy protection [235]. This was
primarily due to users’ overwhelming trust towards the device manufacturers. They believed that
the manufacturers would provide satisfactory protection to their data and privacy. Even though users
realized these privacy issues, many of them were not concerned about these issues and thus did not
seek privacy protection [235]. Bystanders in our study, however, were somewhat different. On one
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hand, many bystanders claimed that they have taken some actions in their past experiences or in
hypothetical scenarios, such as covering the security cameras, talking to the owners, etc. This was
because bystanders’ trust towards the owners as well as the mediators in some cases could cause
privacy concerns, thus they would actively seek their privacy. On the other hand, we also noticed
that some bystanders had concerns and would also like to seek protection, however, they did not
do so due to the social pressure or awkwardness (e.g., not being in a place to directly talk to the
owners), and they felt that there were no other options for privacy protections.
This comparison indicated several mismatches for privacy perceptions between the bystanders
and the users/owners in smart homes. These mismatches highlight the fact that bystanders also
have privacy needs and desire some controls, as well as the tension between bystanders and users in
smart homes. The mismatches also point to potential opportunities for privacy designs to balance
the privacy needs of both stakeholders. To answer the first part of the open question posed by Yao
et al. [229] (i.e.,“whose privacy should be protected”), we argue that the privacy of both smart
home users and smart home bystanders need to be well protected, since ignoring bystanders’ privacy
can heighten tensions between bystanders and owners, which would potentially change the social
dynamics at the home. In the long run, there can also be various push backs for the adoption and
use of these devices across a variety of contexts.
9.5.2 Unpacking Bystanders’ Privacy Designs
The co-design activity in our study results in several design factors that bystanders desire to mitiga
te their privacy concerns. In this section, we would like to take a deeper look at these design factors
to illuminate future privacy designs for smart homes.
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Cooperative mechanisms.
Rationale. In our study, bystanders’ privacy perceptions changed across different scenarios. How-
ever, as we noted before, the norms were not always clear in different contexts, especially when
considering various social factors embedded in those contexts. Thus, bystanders often desired to
cooperate and even negotiate with the owners/users regarding their privacy in a given context. For
example, when bystanders did not give consent for their voice to be recorded, they hoped to send a
request to the owners and ask for approval to limit the audio recording. As Nissenbaum argues in
the theory of Contextual Integrity, it is important to understand the contextual information norm
to decide whether one’s privacy is breached within a given context [164, 165]. This contextual
information norm includes three independent parameters: (1) actors, including the subject, sender,
recipient, embody the context; (2) information types, i.e., the types of information that are collected;
and (3) transmission principles, i.e., the principle that is either socially acknowledged or required
by law [164, 165]. From the bystanders’ perspectives, once the actors are determined, they would
like to explicitly express their privacy preferences to specify information types. Considering the
transmission principle in the smart home, bystanders further sought users’ approval for device
controls instead of directly controlling the devices at their command. Thus, through communication
and potential negotiation between bystanders and users, the cooperative mechanisms were designed
to clarify the contextual information norm in smart homes which were not always clear, so that
bystanders’ privacy expectations could be better achieved.
Comparison among cooperative mechanisms. In the literature, the attempt to cooperatively
negotiate privacy management has been made in several contexts to enact the privacy needs of
different stakeholders. For example, in the context of photo tagging on Facebook, to protect the
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privacy of users who were tagged in photos and, at the same time, still make the photo-sharing
and tagging possible for the photo owners, Besmer and Lipford proposed a design which allowed
the tagged users to send the photo owner a request and ask that if they were tagged in the photo,
the photo should be hidden from certain people [29]. Xu et al. proposed the design principle
for privacy-enhancing tools, which stated that users should act as a member of a group and have
collective control of their information [227]. In the context of drones, Yao et al. proposed two
mechanisms with a cooperative nature: Deletion Request (i.e., drone bystanders could send request
to the controllers to delete their footage) and Controller-Bystander App (i.e., drone bystanders could
obtain more information of and, if needed, communicate with the drone controllers) [233]. Both
these two mechanisms were designed to enact the privacy issues of drone bystanders but at the same
time, balance the privacy needs of drone bystanders and the functional needs of drone controllers.
In our research, the cooperative mechanisms were mostly similar to those mechanisms mentioned
above. For example, P4’s design asking for device control was similar to the Controller-Bystander
App in the context of drone privacy designs [233], and P5’s design to express his privacy preferences
was similar to the photo tagging tools [29]. It is worth noting that, despite being largely embraced
by the researchers as well as targeted users [233, 29], most of these cooperative mechanisms have
not been implemented in the real world. This is in part due to the feasibility of these mechanisms,
which have either technological barriers or policy obstacles, as well as many other potential design
issues, e.g., different preferences of drone controllers and bystanders, the amount of user effort
required in cooperation, etc. In our study, we also anticipate similar feasibility issues and design
questions, such as whether bystanders have different privacy needs than the owners/users and if
the bystanders’ privacy needs to defeat the purposes of owners’ smart home devices. However, the
recent large adoption of Amazon Echo in hotel rooms [49] indicates the urgency of effective privacy
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mechanisms for bystanders. We advocate that future research should look deep into these issues,
examine user-generated ideas more comprehensively in terms of feasibility, usability, and other
potential issues (e.g., required user efforts), then propose new cooperative mechanisms to better suit
the needs of both smart home users/owners and bystanders.
Bystander-Centric mechanisms.
Designing for awareness. The other set of design factors focused on bystanders only, with a
primary focus on increasing awareness and transparency as well as providing some controls to
bystanders. On one hand, as notice and choice are well-recognized privacy principles, increasing
bystanders’ awareness of nearby devices and device behaviors reduce their uncertainty and alleviate
their privacy concerns to a certain degree. On the other hand, what level of awareness should be
provided to bystanders and how to do so remain open questions and require further investigation,
especially when considering if such awareness tools fall into the wrong hands and cause unpleasant
safety incidents. For example, P8’s design provided awareness to the bystanders by showing them
the location of every security camera in the house, but at the same time, if this app was accessed by
burglars, then the safety of the house might be compromised. Future research is needed to provide
better and more comprehensive solutions.
Designing for control. In terms of controls, we found it intriguing that bystanders designed for
having active controls on other people’s property, even though the controls were towards bystanders’
data rather than the users’ devices. This was an indicator to us that bystanders also expected to have
agency in other people’s homes. However, it is worth noting that, while providing some agency to
bystanders could potentially help them to be able to better control their data from being collected
and shared, this could conflict with the owners/users’ purpose of using the devices or even invade
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the users’ privacy. For example, P10’s design of the signal blocker limited the data being shared
with entities outside of the house but also potentially interfere with the owner’s data as all data was
collected by the same devices.
Comparisons bystanders’ and users’ privacy designs.
In the end, we also make a comparison between bystanders’ design factors in our research and the
owners/users’ design factors in Yao et al.’s study [229]. We found that although the design features
(e.g., information device behaviors, local data storage) under the bystander-centric mechanisms
category in our study were similar to the ones in their study, the design features under the cooperative
mechanisms category were unique. As discussed before, the cooperative mechanisms aimed to
enhance the communication between bystanders and owners/users so that they could negotiate and
hopefully fulfill their individual privacy needs. To answer the second part of the question posed by
Yao et al. [229] (i.e., “who should make the decision”), we argue that such decisions should be
made cooperatively between end-users and bystanders with a consideration of the specific context
they are in.
9.5.3 Design Implications
Privacy in smart homes is an important topic in the CSCW community. Many studies have
looked at the privacy concerns and perceptions of the owners/users regarding smart homes as a
whole [235, 237] and individual smart home devices [129, 149], as well as users’ desired ways
of mitigating their privacy concerns [229]. Nevertheless, all of these studies hinted at potentially
different privacy perceptions from the bystanders’ perspective, yet none of these studies have
explored the differences. Our study provides rich and novel empirical evidence demonstrating that
1) bystanders in smart homes have various privacy concerns which are further influenced by several
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contextual factors, and 2) bystanders desire some forms of privacy controls. Our discussion also
dives into the mismatches between the perceptions of bystanders and owners/users, highlighting the
tension between these two stakeholders and the needs for enact privacy issues cooperatively.
Based on our study results, we make the following concrete design suggestions for future
privacy-enhancing mechanisms in smart homes.
Transparency. In various smart home application contexts, the existence of smart home devices,
as well as their behaviors, should be more transparent to bystanders. For example, in the temporary
residency scenario, one concrete example is that the owners should proactively provide information
about smart home devices, such as their location, purposes, whether data is collected and stored,
etc. In the case that the owners do not know some of this information themselves, the device
manufacturers should provide this information along with the device, e.g., in a poster with a QR
code. The owners can potentially place physical signs alongside the smart home devices in the
apartment so that the tenants are more aware of such devices, and provide the tenants with options
to opt-out from these devices being used. In the case where mediators exist (e.g., Airbnb in the
temporary residency scenario), the mediators can also assure by notifying bystanders if the owners
delete their recordings.
Expressing preferences. When designing privacy mechanisms in smart homes, it is critical to
consider the needs of both owners/users and bystanders collaboratively to design for both groups.
For example, smart home device platforms (e.g., Samsung SmartThings) can potentially create apps
for both owners/users and bystanders so that the latter can express their preferences and potentially
communicate with owners/users.
Different modes. Smart home devices owner/users and the devices themselves should also be
proactive in considering and protecting bystanders’ privacy in various ways. One concrete solution
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is for smart home devices to have different modes. The devices will be fully functional in user mode,
but in bystander mode, the devices’ functions can be selectively disabled. For example, the voice
assistants will stop recording if a different voice is detected, indicating the possibility of friends
visiting; the security camera will only record footage of a designated area in an Airbnb apartment
(e.g., the hallway), ensuring the safety of the apartment while protecting tenants’ privacy.
It is worth noting that the design suggestions above focus primarily on bystanders. However,
one open question to ask for future research is, how will these mechanisms benefit the owners/users
and other stakeholders (e.g., mediators) and whether they will accept these mechanisms? Grudin’s
prior work on groupware argued that people who used groupware would not benefit the most, and in
some cases, technology that was designed to support one group of people might negatively impact
another [101]. Thus, ensuring these privacy mechanisms also benefits owners and other stakeholders
are crucial for their adoption.
9.5.4 Limitations and Future Work
Our study is the first to explicitly focus on understanding how bystanders perceive their privacy in
smart homes and their desired ways of mitigating their concerns. As such, our exploratory approach
has a few limitations.
First, our three scenarios in the study were by no means exhaustive in terms of different
application contexts of smart homes and the types of bystanders. Other example scenarios and
bystanders could include, for example, a UPS delivery man being caught by a smart doorbell every
day, or children being caught by security cameras in their neighbors’ house. Future research can
either investigate a more diverse set of scenarios or come up with different contextual factors so that
participants can assemble their scenarios.
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Second, given the purpose and the exploratory nature of the study, our focus group and the co-
design activity only included a bystanders’ perspective. The co-design activity, although insightful,
was also limited by the duration of the study. Future research can consider running extended
participatory design workshops with owners/users, bystanders and other potential stakeholders (e.g.,
developers) to surface the tension and gain a more holistic understanding of their perceptions and
desired designs.
Third, given the scope of this study, we did not critically evaluate bystanders’ designs in terms
of their usability, feasibility, and potential consequences. Future research can focus more on critical
evaluation of the designs emerged from our study as well as prior studies [229] and come up with
new designs to better fulfill the needs of different stakeholders.
9.6 Conclusion
Prior literature in smart home privacy has focused on end-users, leaving other potential stakeholders,
such as bystanders, understudied. In this study, we focus on smart home bystanders, i.e., people who
are not the owners/users of these devices but can potentially be involved in the use of such devices.
We aim to understand bystanders’ privacy perceptions in various contexts and their desired ways to
mitigate their privacy concerns. Through six focus groups with 18 participants, our study results in a
number of contextual factors that can potentially influence bystanders’ privacy perceptions of smart
homes. In addition, we also identify a set of design factors that the bystanders consider in their
desirable privacy mechanisms to address their concerns. These factors can further be categorized
into two types, i.e., cooperative mechanisms and bystander-centric mechanisms. Our research
highlights bystanders’ needs for privacy and some means of controls, the tension between smart
homeowners/users and bystanders, as well as how cooperative mechanisms can be used to better
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support and balance the needs of both groups. We propose several concrete design suggestions
based on our results, i.e., having both owners/user-oriented apps and bystander-oriented apps in
smart home platforms.
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To summarize, this dissertation explores the privacy issues and privacy design space from a multi-
stakeholder perspective following the steps below:
I chose to start with a single user view in traditional privacy research in the OBA context.
Following a conventional privacy research paradigm, I aimed to investigate users’ understandings
of how OBA works to identify any privacy risks in their beliefs. Based on the results, I proposed
and built prototypes of an information-based web tracking blocker that challenged the status quo of
tracker-based web tracking blockers. Then adopting a speculative design approach, I explored how
a multi-stakeholder perspective changed our understandings of the privacy issues and the designs
of web tracking blockers in the OBA context. The results indicated that when considering other
stakeholders in the OBA eco-system, users’ privacy issues could have a significant impact on other
stakeholders, such as the advertisers, the technology designers, and the policymakers. Such an
impact might further influence the privacy designs since different stakeholders might choose to
implement the privacy tools in a variety of ways, which would diminish the purpose of the original
designs. This initial exploration demonstrated that a multi-stakeholder perspective could contribute
a different view of looking at privacy issues and privacy designs, which are currently understudied
in the privacy literature.
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To build better understandings around the multi-stakeholder privacy perspective, I then chose
to study an emerging domain that contained a multi-stakeholder setting, the drones. I conducted
interview studies with drone controllers and bystanders and discovered the mismatches between their
understandings of the privacy issues related to drones. The results demonstrated the mismatches
in several aspects (e.g., whether privacy was an issue, whether drone controllers have malicious
purposes of flying drones), as well as the tension between drone controllers and bystanders. Building
on the results, we proposed several novel privacy designs for drones to better balance the privacy
needs of both parties.
Finally, I moved on to smart homes. Smart homes represent a relatively complex social
environment that consists of various social relationships, power dynamics, and stakeholders. It is
essential to understand the privacy perceptions, needs, and expectations of multiple stakeholders in
smart homes. Furthermore, since existing smart home privacy designs are all proposed by either
researchers or technology designers, whether they can address the needs of the actual users remains
unknown. As such, I chose to conduct co-design focus group studies with smart home users and
bystanders to dive into their privacy perceptions, then worked with them and designed the privacy
mechanisms they desire. By synthesizing the results from the co-design sessions, I aim to understand
how a multi-stakeholder perspective can inform privacy designs in the context of smart homes.
10.1 Synthesis of Results
After examining the multi-stakeholder situations in three domains individually, I synthesize the
results across the three domains and make sense of the commonalities among all contexts. Table 10.1
presents the key findings from these studies as well as a high-level synthesis. In this section, I will
dive into the commonalities across all three domains and discuss how privacy designs can embrace
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the commonalities in various multi-stakeholder environments.
10.1.1 Commonalities among users in three domains
From the users’ perspective, they generally overlook the privacy of other stakeholders. Besides, in
most cases, users seldom consider how their use of technologies or their privacy decisions may have
impacted other stakeholders. In some contexts, users also need to provide sufficient information
regarding what data their devices collect and how they will use the data to keep other stakeholders
informed.
From other stakeholders’ perspectives, one primary observation is that stakeholders other than
the primary users also have privacy needs, which should be carefully and thoroughly examined
and considered. Besides, stakeholders other than primary users should proactively express their
privacy needs and preferences. Finally, users may be impacted by the privacy decisions of different
stakeholders, which is also generally ignored.
Table 10.1 points to several questions that need to be considered in various multi-stakeholder
contexts.
• Privacy designs should allow different stakeholders to express their preferences. How do we
enable various stakeholders to communicate their privacy needs and preferences? Which
stakeholders should be taken into consideration?
• Privacy designs should balance the needs of different stakeholders. In many cases, that
will require communication and negotiation. How to provide communication channels that
allow various stakeholders to negotiate their needs or preferences? What is the cost of
communication and negotiation? Is it always worth the effort to communicate and negotiate?
How to reduce the effort which is needed to negotiate? Should the communication be
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enforced?
• Privacy designs should also educate different stakeholders on how their behaviors and privacy












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Building on top of the results and the synthesis above, I will discuss the following design impli-
cations for future privacy designs for various socio-technical systems when considering multiple
stakeholders.
Cooperative approach is promising. Here, the cooperative approach does not only refer to the
cooperative mechanisms in the study of smart home bystanders. Instead, it also relates to designs
that consider multiple stakeholders rather than only considering the end-users. The purpose of
the cooperative approach is to provide channels and platforms so that different stakeholders can
negotiate their privacy needs, expectations, and controls cooperatively. Besides, in a cooperative
approach, default privacy settings should be built to reduce the time and effort needed for effective
negotiation.
Relationship-based privacy designs. A critical aspect of multi-stakeholder privacy manage-
ment is to understand the contextual privacy needs of different stakeholders. In this dissertation,
one common observation across all three cases is that our participants made their privacy decisions
based on their perceived relationship with the other stakeholders (e.g., in the smart home context,
bystanders’ privacy expectations rely on who are the users/owners). Then, an essential aspect of
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managing one’s privacy is relationship management. As such, privacy designs should consider how
to better support people’s needs for relationship management. One concrete example is to set up
context profiles and stakeholder profiles in privacy designs. Each profile will have different privacy
preferences and can be applied based on the contexts and the stakeholders involved. One can also
set up relationship profiles. Each profile will be associated with a specific kind of relationship and
will be activated based on the current relationship with other stakeholders. This approach is similar
to the role-based access control in computer security [188, 85].
User education. This dissertation shows that when making privacy decisions, most of the
participants did not consider how their decision may impact other stakeholders. In the future,
privacy designs should educate their users to better understand the relationship among different
stakeholders and how they can affect other stakeholders. A concrete example, following the line
of research on privacy nudges [210, 12, 8, 236], is that when a drone controller wants to publish
the drone footage online through an app, the app can pre-process the recording and notify the user,
“your video contains three bystanders whose faces are identifiable. Please make sure you have
obtained their consent to publish this video.”
Regulations to support the multi-stakeholder effort. The US NTIA has published the multi-
stakeholder process for a variety of technologies and use cases [4, 3, 2]. However, regulations are
needed to support the adoption of such multi-stakeholder processes better. A concrete example
is that the law can enforce any smart home manufacturer to develop a publicly accessible privacy
infrastructure that allows people to discover nearby devices and to enter their privacy preferences.
When a nearby device is collecting data that violates their preferences, the privacy preferences will
be sent to the owner of the device for communication and negotiation.
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11.2 Methodological Contribution
In this dissertation, I employed a variety of methodologies to uncover the privacy perceptions,
expectations, and designs of different stakeholders in various socio-technical systems. In this
section, I highlight how the methodological approach in this dissertation is different from what has
been commonly used in usable privacy literature as well as how it contributes to general privacy
research.
Throughout the dissertation, I used a combination of qualitative, quantitative, and design methods
to directly engage different stakeholders in exploring their privacy perceptions and expected privacy
designs. The outcome has been very beneficial.
In the online behavioral advertising chapter, the interview study provided insights into users’ folk
models of their privacy perceptions, concerns, and preferences. The results pointed to the potential
for a privacy-enhancing tool. Then, with the complement of a speculative design activity, I further
explored that if a privacy tool was to be implemented, what would be the potential implications
on various aspects of our society. These implications further implied how privacy-enhancing tools
should be designed today.
In the drone chapter, the interview studies uncovered the privacy perceptions and expectations
of both drone controllers and bystanders and provided insights into how privacy-enhancing tools for
drones could be designed. The following survey study further tested several design ideas with both
stakeholders. The results pointed to two mechanisms that were well received by both stakeholders.
The results also provided implications for future research and design.
In the smart home chapter, the co-design method has not been widely adopted in the privacy
research community. The smart home studies in this dissertation were among the first ones to use
213
co-design to illustrate users’ privacy expectations and desired designs. By conducting co-design
workshops with both smart home users and bystanders, I uncovered many new aspects of the privacy
expectations of both populations as well as key design factors. These design factors shed light on
the design of future privacy-enhancing technologies for smart homes.
The overall approach in this dissertation not only has its unique values and helps uncover the
perspectives of different stakeholders but also differs from other approaches in the privacy literature
that also consider multiple stakeholders. For example, multiple stakeholder consideration was also
a critical component in a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) [224]. However, PIA is a procedure of
expert reviews. When a system turns into a functional prototype or has been developed, privacy
experts, using standard questions from PIA, evaluate the potential privacy risks caused by the system
to help system designers and developers understand the privacy landscape. In this process, no
actual users are involved. As a result of using PIA, privacy experts may identify privacy risks that
real users would not care about, and omit other aspects which may not be privacy risks but real
users do care about. Future research in the privacy space, especially when user input is needed,
should consider a combination of various methods. In particular, methods such as speculative design
and co-designs are not commonly used in privacy research. However, proper execution of these
methods can yield valuable insights and complement other more common research methods such as
interviews and surveys.
11.3 Theoretical Contribution
The theory of Contextual Integrity (CI) argues five parameters to define the privacy norms in a
specific context: 1) data subject, 2) data sender, 3) data recipient, 4) information type, and 5)
transmission principle [164, 165, 166]. Through the lens of the CI theory, prior research has been
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focusing the contextual privacy perceptions, factors that influence these perceptions, and designing
and implement new privacy mechanisms to protect people’s privacy [144, 135, 111, 24, 103, 104,
78, 50].
In this dissertation, building on the CI theory, I explored the privacy issues in three different
domains through a multi-stakeholder perspective. The CI theory focuses on the contextual norms
of information flow and appropriateness. These norms not only provide a concrete way to under-
stand and define the privacy issues within the studied domains (especially when considering the
potential interactions among different stakeholders) but also point out the direction of how privacy
mechanisms should be designed in various contexts. As such, the CI theory forms the theoretical
foundation of this dissertation.
Moreover, this dissertation has also discovered some incidents that cannot be clearly defined or
explained using the CI theory. Drawing from these incidents, I discussed how the results of this
work could complement the CI theory. Thus, this dissertation also makes theoretical contributions.
To better guide the following discussion, I ask the primary question from a theoretical per-
spective, dose the theory of Contextual Integrity still hold itself when considering multiple
stakeholders?
One thing worth noting is that the majority of prior research using the CI theory has focused
on the privacy of a single user. In the scope of this dissertation, I investigated the privacy issues
of not only the users but also other stakeholders that might be affected across contexts. Building
on top of the prior research, this dissertation also explores whether the CI theory still holds in the
multi-stakeholder environment in today’s complex socio-technical systems. In the following section,
I critically examine the findings of this dissertation. I argue that while in most contexts, one can
use the CI theory to define the privacy norms, it is difficult to do so in some other contexts. I will
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provide examples to elaborate in detail.
11.3.1 When is CI theory promising?
This dissertation builds on top of the line of prior research on the CI theory. It explores to what
extent the CI theory can guide how we approach privacy issues in today’s complex socio-technical
systems when adding the multi-stakeholder perspective. Many examples in prior studies aligned
with the CI theory. Table 2 below summarizes several examples from all three contexts and explains
how they connect to the CI theory. Each example in Table 11.1 represents a specific norm in the
context. For example, drone bystanders believed that the drone controllers should not take their
photos without their consent. In that study context, since the bystanders did not give consent to the
controllers, they considered their privacy to be breached. In the smart home bystander example,
bystanders believed that Amazon Echo should obtain their consent in addition to the users’ content
to capture their voice data. In that study context, one of our participants indicated that since he was

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11.3.2 When is CI theory challenging?
The CI theory is not predictive. Instead, it uses five parameters to define a contextual norm, which
is then used to determine whether something is a privacy violation. However, through the analysis, I
found several cases in the study results in which privacy norms were unclear or could not be easily
defined based on the existing parameters in the CI theory. There are primarily two reasons. First, in
some cases, the additional stakeholders can complicate one or more of the five parameters in the CI
theory and makes it challenging to define norms. Second, in some other cases, the perceived norms
are affected by parameters other than the five parameters in the CI theory. Below, I will discuss
several examples from these two aspects, then make suggestions on how to complement the existing
CI theory. Finally, I will call out areas that need further research to elicit the privacy norms in a
multi-stakeholder environment better using the CI theory.
Multi-stakeholder perspective complicates the privacy norm identification.
To discover the informational norm in a context, it is necessary to identify the five parameters. For
example, when a patient (data subject) finds a new doctor, the prior doctor (data sender) can transfer
the patient’s complete medical record (information type) to the new doctor (data recipient) upon the
patient’s authorization (transmission principle). As such, when the five parameters are clear, the
privacy norm will then be defined.
However, the multi-stakeholder consideration adds another layer of complexity to these five
parameters and makes it more challenging to identify norms. Such complexity exists in many
contexts. For example, when an Amazon Echo collects the voice message of the users who have
consented Amazon to collect their data, it can also collect voice messages by other people in the
background, and these people are likely to have not consented their data being collected. In this
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example, the data subject is not clear, since both the users and the people in the background are
subject to the data collection. The transmission principle is not clear either, since although the users
may have consented the data collection, the people in the background may be unaware of their data
being collected. Finally, the information type, in this case, is also challenging to identify, especially
in the case in which the users and the bystanders interact and have a conversation with each other. It
is not clear what and whose data is collected and who should consent to the data collection. After
all, in this example, identifying the privacy norms will be very challenging.
In another example, when a drone is flying above a park and taking photos of the park, it will
also be likely to capture many people who are in the park now. In this case, the data subject is not
clear since it not only involves the park landscape but also all the people in the park. Identifying
individuals whose data is collected will be very challenging. The transmission principle is not clear
either since it is difficult to either notify the individuals who are captured by the drone or have
them consent to the data collection. Even if all individuals are informed, there are still variances
in deciding whether they are in a completely public space or a private area of a public place. As a
result, the privacy norms in the drone case remain unclear.
These examples indicate that, as we start to think about the multiple stakeholders other than the
end-users, identifying privacy norms becomes challenging and more complicated because of the
mix of the data subject, opaque information types, and vague transmission principles. If we think
more broadly, a related question may arise: what about situations where there is not an accepted
norm yet? What changes or addition can be made to the CI theory so that it can further advance
the understandings and identifications of privacy norms through the multi-stakeholder lens? I will
discuss this direction in a later section.
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Considering the Multi-stakeholder Perspective in the CI theory.
The results from this dissertation suggest many cases in which contextual informational norms are
challenging to identify under the CI theory. This is primarily due to the various needs, perceptions,
and expectations of different stakeholders in a given context. In the next section, I will present
three examples of such cases and discuss how the results from this dissertation can help identify the
contextual informational norms.
The first example is related to the privacy issues in drones. In this example, when drone
controllers take photos in a park using their drones, they may capture bystanders’ images. However,
our study suggests that the contextual informational norm is not clear. One of the determining
factors is whether the park is private or public places. To some bystanders, although they consider
the park as a public space, they still consider the proximity of themselves as a private or semi-private
space since people who are within the vicinity can hear their talking or see their phone screen. As
such, they expect to be notified and give consent before their data is collected. However, drone
controllers tend to define the park as a public space based on the legal definition. Thus they believe
that they have the right to fly a drone in the park and take pictures, and bystanders should not expect
privacy. Such differences, causing by controllers’ and bystanders’ conflicting perceptions of the
nature of the park, are not captured by the five parameters in the CI theory.
The second example is related to tenants staying at an Airbnb apartment. In this example, one of
the critical factors that influence our participants’ privacy perception is their length of stay. In this
case, if the tenants only stay in the Airbnb apartment for a short period (e.g., one day), they perceive
the use of a security camera acceptable as long as it is not in the living room because only limited
amount of data can be collected in one day. As such, their privacy is not compromised. However,
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when the tenants have to stay in the Airbnb apartment for a long time (e.g., seven days), it is no
longer acceptable to have a security camera in the apartment, because over a long period, additional
information about them, such as their schedule, preferences, or activities, can potentially be inferred
or directly collected. As a result, in this case, the informational norm is not clear either.
The third example is related to some guests visiting their friend’s smart home. The home
contains a security camera systems with multiple cameras across the house for security purposes.
Our study has suggested that guests’ privacy expectations were determined mainly by their perceived
relationship with the homeowners. If the guests have a close relationship with the homeowners, then
the use of a security camera system is acceptable. Otherwise, the guests expect to be notified before
they arrive. It is also worth noting that in our study, even in some cases, the guests felt somewhat
uncomfortable regarding the data collection by the security camera, they did not think it is a privacy
violation because of the perceived close relationship. In this case, the information norm is also
significantly impacted by the perceived closeness of the relationship, which is not covered by the CI
theory either.
In summary, in the above examples, the existing five parameters in the CI theory may not be
straightforward or even sufficient to determine whether privacy has been compromised, because
it did not capture the interests and preferences of the affected stakeholders (Example 1 – drone
controllers and bystanders), individual differences (Example 2 – tenants and hosts), and contextual
and societal needs and values (Example 3 – guests and owners). As such, the decision of whether
privacy is compromised in these contexts is more complicated because of these additional factors.
As such, identifying the contextual informational norms in certain contexts, especially those
that contain multiple stakeholders, warrants further research. To illustrate one example direction for
future research, consider a contextual alteration factor. To make it clear, the goal of the contextual
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alteration factor is not necessarily adding a new parameter to the CI theory. Instead, it aims to
provide an angle for researchers to capture things that might influence the contextual informational
norms but can be easily overlooked, such as the interests, needs, and preferences of any affected
stakeholders. These factors may alternate people’s privacy expectations in the context. Below, I
will elaborate on the factor of contextual alteration with the above examples and re-examine how it
helps to identify the contextual informational norms.
In the first example of drone study, when a drone is flying in a park and taking photos and
video of the surrounding environment, the contextual informational norm can be defined by five
parameters, i.e., data subject - drone bystanders, data sender - drones, data recipient - drone
controllers, information type - visual and audio information, and transmission principle - drone
controllers will not distribute the recorded data. The contextual alteration factor (Table 11.2), in
this case, is whether the park is perceived as a private place or a public. In our study [228], some
drone bystanders believed that the area in their proximity should be considered as private places
even though they were in a public park. In this case, the contextual informational form has changed.
It needs to be re-defined, particularly in terms of the transmission principle, since once the data
collection happens at a perceived private space, then the drone bystander will expect to give consent
before the controllers can record them.
In the second example of the use of security cameras in an Airbnb apartment, when the host
installs a security camera in the apartment, the contextual informational norm is defined by the
five parameters, i.e., data subject - tenants, data sender - the security camera, data recipient - hosts,
information type - visual and audio information, and transmission principle - hosts notify the tenants
about the usage of a security camera and its purpose of ensuring apartment safety. The contextual
alteration factor, in this case, is the tenants’ length of stay. In our study, our participants argued that
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Condition 1 Condition 2
Data Subject Drone bystanders
Data Sender Drones
Data Recipient Drone controllers
Information Type Visual and audio information
Transmission Princi-
ple
Drone controllers will not distribute the photos/videos
Contextual alteration Perceived as private space Perceived as public space
How does the informa-
tional norm change?
Bystanders expect to be notified Bystanders should not expect privacy
Table 11.2: An example from the drone study
Condition 1 Condition 2
Data Subject Tenants
Data Sender Security Camera
Data Recipient Hosts
Information Type Visual and audio information
Transmission Princi-
ple
Hosts notify the tenants about the usage of security camera
Contextual alteration A short period of time (e.g., 1 days) A long period of time (e.g., 7 days)
How does the informa-
tional norm change?
Unchanged Tenants expect to not to be recorded
Table 11.3: An example from the airbnb scenario
if they only stayed in the apartment for a short time (e.g., one day), they would accept the usage of
a security camera for security purposes. As a result, the contextual informational norm remains
unchanged. However, if they stayed in the apartment for a long time (e.g., seven days), then they
would consider the usage of a security camera as a privacy breach. The contextual informational
norm has changed, as our participants believed that additional information types would also be
collected, such as their schedule and activities.
In the third example of guests visiting their friend’s house, when the homeowner installs a
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Condition 1 Condition 2
Data subject Guests
Data sender A security camera system
Data recipient Homeowners
Information type Visual and audio information
Transmission
The homeowner notifies the guests that the data is only used for home safety
purpose
Contextual alteration Close relationship Not close relationship
How does the informa-
tional norm change?
Unchanged Guests expect to be notified
Table 11.4: An example from the friends visiting scenario
security camera system, the contextual informational norm is defined by the five parameters, i.e.,
data subject - guests, data sender - a security camera system, data recipient - homeowner, information
type - visual and audio information, and transmission principle - the homeowner notifies the guests
that the data is only used for home safety purpose. In this case, one contextual alteration factor is
the perceived social relationship closeness between the homeowner and the guests. Our participants
have mentioned that, if they have a close relationship with the homeowner, they would have no
objection towards the data collection by the security camera system. The contextual informational
norm remains unchanged. However, if they do not have a close relationship, then they would feel
their privacy being compromised. In this case, the contextual information norm had also changed,
as our participants expected that prior consent should be obtained before they entered the house or
the security camera systems should be turned off during their stay.
In these examples, there are contextual informational norms defined by the existing five parame-
ters in the CI theory. The notion of multiple stakeholder consideration does not necessarily change
any of the five parameters at first. However, it may introduce new variables that are currently not
captured by these parameters. The contextual alteration factor captures these new variables, which
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may change the privacy expectations of different stakeholders and, eventually, the contextual privacy
norms as well. As a result, privacy violation determination needs to be re-examined. As such, it
is worth noting that the purpose of the contextual alteration factor is not to defeat the original CI
theory. Instead, it forces us to re-examine the contextual informational norms through the additional
multi-stakeholder lens and carefully consider the potential changes of contextual informational
norms caused by the various needs and interests of different stakeholders.
11.3.3 Research Agenda
Based on the above discussion, I propose a research agenda to 1) investigate how to define contextual
informational norms in complex socio-technical systems when considering multiple stakeholders;
and 2) explore whether contextual alteration factors also exist in other contexts and if so, how they
influence the contextual informational norm.
• Capture information practices through some diagnostic tools. These tools shall be used to
identify the information flow among different entities in a computing system. One possible
way is through network traffic analysis to understand the starting and ending points of a
particular data flow.
• Communicate information practices meaningfully with different stakeholders. Research is
needed to investigate how to provide notice, choice, and consent to different stakeholders. As
different stakeholders have divergent needs for various types of information in privacy notice
and consent, it is very critical to identify what information is useful for each stakeholder.
Moreover, as each stakeholder may have their preferred way of accessing notices, one thing
that nee One thing that needs special attention is to ensure easy access for all stakeholders.
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• Learn about the privacy expectations of different stakeholders. Research is needed to under-
stand how various stakeholders perceive privacy and, thus, have different privacy expectations.
More importantly, it is critical to identify potential mismatches or conflicts in their expecta-
tions. Research is then needed to carefully and thoroughly consider the conflicting needs and
seek solutions to resolve the conflicts. One concrete example inspired by our study results is
the cooperative mechanism, in which different stakeholders can negotiate their privacy needs
cooperatively.
• Detect discrepancies between the actual information flows and the expected information flows.
From an empirical perspective, research is needed to investigate how different stakeholders
perceive the information flow in various computing systems. From a technical perspective,
tools are needed to capture the real information flow in various computing systems. If
discrepancies exist, notifications should be sent to different stakeholders in proper ways.
• Define meaningful transparency for different stakeholders. Research is needed to understand
what transparency means to different stakeholders thoroughly. This is very important as
many privacy designs, policies, and laws center around providing transparency. Research
is also needed to understand the potential consequences of offering transparency, since it is
possible that improving transparency for one stakeholder may violate the privacy of others
(e.g., the controller-bystander app in the drone study). Thus, balancing the needs for privacy
and transparency is very crucial.
• Decide whether the contextual alteration is needed in other contexts. Our prior studies have
demonstrated the potential of contextual alteration in the context of drones and smart homes
to capture the values and perceptions caused by individual differences. Research is needed to
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explore whether such a phenomenon exists in other contexts. If so, research is also needed
to discover ways to capture contextual alteration in different contexts and to investigate how
contextual alteration impact the informational norms.
11.4 Limitations
This dissertation has several limitations.
First, the dissertation primarily focuses on two types of immediate stakeholders, i.e., the users
and bystanders, in three socio-technical systems (i.e., online behavioral advertising, drones, smart
homes). Although there is one section in the dissertation that explores the implications on the
external stakeholders, those external stakeholders were not directly involved in the actual empirical
studies. This is primarily due to the scope of this dissertation. Future work can expand on the
selection of stakeholders and involve other potential stakeholders in the empirical studies.
Second, although various design implications have been drawn and key design factors have been
discovered, those are not users’ actual behaviors, because no actual systems were implemented.
Future research can expand on the scope of this work by building either functional prototypes or
real systems, then launching the systems through field study to collect users’ real-world behaviors
in order to evaluate the designs.
Third, this dissertation only focuses on three specific types of technologies. As a result, the
results might not generalize in other technological contexts. Future research should be conducted to




In this dissertation, I first identified a gap in privacy research literature. Most privacy research
has been focusing on the privacy of end-users, and few have considered the privacy of multiple
stakeholders and the privacy implications caused by the interactions and potential confrontations
among different stakeholders. As a result, how the multi-stakeholder perspective changes our
understandings of privacy and the designs of privacy mechanisms remains an understudied area.
Through three cases in different domains (i.e., online behavior advertising, drones, and smart
homes), in this dissertation, I examined how different stakeholders in each domain perceive privacy
and form their expectations differently, and how such variances inform privacy designs. For example,
in the context of online behavioral advertising, we learned that privacy designs should consider the
needs of various societal stakeholders to avoid potential resistance of adoption. In the context of
drones, we surveyed several privacy mechanisms. We found that both stakeholders better perceived
those mechanisms that considered the privacy needs of both drone controllers and drone bystanders.
In the context of smart homes, we learned that cooperative mechanisms are promising in addressing
the social confrontations and conflicting privacy needs among different stakeholders in smart homes.
Drawing from a few examples in the results, in which identifying contextual information norms
can be challenging using the theory of Contextual, I argued that the multi-stakeholder perspective
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had introduced new variances to the understandings of privacy. I advocate that when applying the
CI theory in an multi-stakeholder environment, it is important consider contextual alteration factors.
These factors may be hidden and not obvious but may change the contextual informational norms.
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Abstract: Drones are unmanned aircraft controlled remotely
or operated autonomously. While the extant literature suggests
that drones can in principle invade people’s privacy, little is
known about how people actually think about drones. Drawing
from a series of in-depth interviews conducted in the United
States, we provide a novel and rich account of people’s pri-
vacy perceptions of drones for civilian uses both in general
and under specific usage scenarios. Our informants raised both
physical and information privacy issues against government,
organization and individual use of drones. Informants’ reason-
ing about the acceptance of drone use was in part based on
whether the drone is operating in a public or private space.
However, our informants differed significantly in their defini-
tions of public and private spaces. While our informants’ pri-
vacy concerns such as surveillance, data collection and shar-
ing have been raised for other tracking technologies such as
camera phones and closed-circuit television (CCTV), our in-
terviews highlight two heightened issues of drones: (1) pow-
erful yet inconspicuous data collection, (2) hidden and inac-
cessible drone controllers. These two aspects of drones render
some of people’s existing privacy practices futile (e.g., notice
recording and ask controllers to stop or delete the recording).
Some informants demanded notifications of drones near them
and expected drone controllers asking for their explicit per-
missions before recording. We discuss implications for future
privacy-enhancing drone designs.
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1 Introduction
1984. Small flying machines rove around Airstrip One where
Winston Smith lives, and peek through the windows [49].
2015. A small flying machine crashed in the White House
where the US President Barack Obama lives [33].
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The flying machine that George Orwell imagined in his
classic novel 1984 and that crashed in the White House lawn
is known as drones. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines
a drone as “an unmanned aircraft or ship guided by remote
control or onboard computers.” Drones are sometimes known
as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
As Figure 1 illustrates, drones often carry cameras to take
pictures or record videos. Originally designed for military pur-
poses, this technology has been increasingly adopted for non-
military uses. For instance, drones are used to cover ongoing
events for journalism [51], record birthday parties [34], de-
liver packages to customers (e.g., Amazon Prime Air [4]), and
to assist police in patrolling and investigation [32].
In this paper, we focus on lightweight drones with opera-
tors for civilian uses including public (governmental, e.g. po-
lice), civil (non-governmental, e.g., commercial), and recre-
ational (a.k.a, model aircraft) purposes [20]. This type of
drones dominates the consumer market and can have broad
and emergent impact on ordinary citizens. While no official
drone sales data is available, the Consumer Electronics Asso-
ciation (CEA) estimated that 700,000 drones were sold in 2015
in the US [14]. From now on, we use the term drones to denote
this type of drones unless specified otherwise.
Because of drones’ small sizes and capabilities in fly-
ing and taking high-definition images and videos, government
agencies, policy makers, consumer advocacy groups, and le-
gal scholars have raised serious concerns about drones’ usage.
For instance, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is
tasked to devise rules for drone use by 2015. Ann Cavoukian,
the Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada, has advocated
that designers should adopt a Privacy by Design (PbD) ap-
proach from the beginning of the drone design process to pro-
tect people’s privacy [12]. Legal scholars have raised ethical
and privacy concerns regarding the use of drones (e.g., [6]).
However, the extant literature mostly from legal scholar-
ship focuses on conceptual analyses of drones and their im-
Fig. 1. A DJI Phantom 2 Vision+ drone that we used in our study
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plications. There is a lack of empirical studies that examine
people’s perceptions of this emerging technology with one ex-
ception being a recent survey study of Australian citizens’ per-
ceptions of drones [13]. However, little is known about how
people in the US feel about drones, particularly around pri-
vacy. Understanding people’s privacy perceptions is integral in
informing future privacy-friendly drone design and regulation.
Our research aims to fill this critical gap.
During June to August 2015, we conducted 16 semi-
structured interviews to examine people’s perceptions of
drones. To help our informants get familiar with this technol-
ogy, we showed them a real drone (see Figure 1) and illustrated
its capabilities in flying and taking pictures and videos before
the actual interviews. In each interview, we solicited our in-
formants’ general perceptions of drones as well as their per-
ceptions under five specific usage scenarios that we adopted
from drones’ existing real-world uses. We also asked them
to compare drones with two tracking/recording technologies
that they are already familiar with, smart phones with cameras
and closed-circuit television (CCTV), as frames of reference.
Lastly, the informants were asked about what kinds of notifica-
tions and controls they would expect from drones operated by
others as well as what aspects of drones should be regulated.
Our results suggest that our informants had mixed feelings
about drones. On one hand, they saw clear values in drones
as they identified many benefits and promising applications
of drones. On the other hand, they also raised a multitude of
safety, security and privacy issues. Our informants were not
only concerned about the drones per se, but also the drone
controllers that are often invisible. Drawing from Orlikowski’s
conceptualization of duality of technology, we highlight the
duality of drones, suggesting that drone design and regulation
should consider both drones and their controllers.
This paper makes three contributions. First, we provide
a detailed account of people’s privacy perceptions of civilian
drones. Second, we highlight the duality of drone and its value
in unpacking people’s privacy perceptions of drones. Third, we
discuss implications for privacy-enhancing drone designs.
2 Related Work
To situate our work in the literature, we review three lines
of related research: (1) people’s privacy perceptions of track-
ing/recording technologies, (2) challenging issues of drones,
and (3) privacy mechanisms for drones.
2.1 Perceptions of tracking technologies
Since drones are usually equipped with cameras, they can be
classified as tracking/recording technologies. The only user
study of drones that we are aware of is a recent survey study
of Australian public’s perceptions of drones [13]. Overall, the
respondents did not consider drones to be overly beneficial or
risky [13]. However, some respondents (less than one fifth)
did raise a general privacy concern about drone surveillance
or spying [13]. Prior studies have identified people’s privacy
concerns over other tracking and recording technologies. For
instance, based on interview and survey data, Nguyen and
Hayes suggest that people are concerned about leaking per-
sonal information about themselves with institutional and end-
user tracking and recording technologies, such as credit cards,
store loyalty cards, and store video cameras [43].
In studying Internet users’ perceptions of online tracking
and online behavioral advertising (OBA), McDonald and Cra-
nor find that while people accept that free online content needs
advertising, they reject the idea that they need to give up their
data for that exchange [42]. Ur et al. show that people have
a conflicting sets of opinions towards OBA, describing it as
smart, useful, scary, and creepy [61].
Felt et al. find that mobile phone users have varied yet
strong privacy concerns in using their phones, particularly, the
potential tracking and leakage of their text messages, e-mails,
and photos stored in the phones. Users ranked highest risks
in using their mobile phones as all contact information being
deleted and messages or calls being sent out by malware with-
out their awareness [21]. Tsai et al. show that people also have
privacy concerns in using location-sharing technologies, but
their concerns vary across different scenarios [60].
Moving on to the physical world, results from a survey
conducted shortly after 9/11 show that the majority of respon-
dents approved expanded use of camera surveillance (CCTV)
in public [64]. Angeles has found that people have varying
level of privacy concerns over the use of Radio-Frequency
Identification (RFID) tags [5]. In particular, less information-
sensitive people will favor the benefits from RFID more, and
will be more willing to buy and pay more to RFID tagged
products; whereas more information-sensitive people are more
concerned about their privacy with RFID [5].
Prior research has also explored people’s perceptions of
wearable devices (e.g., glasses or cameras). Hong suggests
that since most people have little experience with wearable
devices (e.g., Google Glass) before, their perceived value and
perceived risks of these devices may change over time [28].
In a study of Augmented Reality (AR) glasses, Denning et al.
find that people expect giving their permissions before being
recorded by AR glasses [16]. When participants compared AR
glasses with CCTV or surveillance cameras, they did not in-
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dicate any evident difference in their attitudes. They felt that
these technologies are always recording in public and that the
introduction of AR glasses did not affect their expectations of
being exposed to various recording technologies [16].
These wearable devices can also be used for “lifelogging”
where photos and/or audio/video recordings are automatically
taken by the devices as a person goes about doing his/her daily
activities (e.g., SenseCam [26]). Hoyle et al. find that peo-
ple have many privacy concerns about lifelogging [31]. For
instance, they are concerned about sensitive information ap-
pearing in the “lifelog,” such as their locations or credit card
numbers. They are also concerned about the privacy of by-
standers since their faces or behaviors may be captured in the
“lifelog” [31]. In a follow-up study, Hoyle et al. also discover
that “lifeloggers” are motivated to share their “lifelogged” in-
formation for impression management purposes [30].
Last but not least, robots when equipped with cameras
also have tracking and recording capabilities. Edward Hall
proposes proxemics to refer to people’s use of space in me-
diating their contact with others [25]. For instance, if strangers
enter into someone’s personal or intimate spaces, then the per-
son would feel uncomfortable [25]. Researchers in the field
of human-robot-interaction (HRI) have used this concept in
studying the interactions and relationships between humans
and robots. Studies have found that a robot’s form, speed, and
height have different degrees of impact on people’s percep-
tions of the robot (e.g., [10]). In a recent study, Butler et al. find
that people desire mechanisms to protect their privacy against
remotely tele-operated in-home robots [9].
This literature on tracking/recording technologies suggest
that people are likely to have privacy concerns with these tech-
nologies, but people might have different levels of concerns.
People’s privacy concerns might also vary across different sce-
narios. These findings inform us to examine both general and
scenario-based privacy perceptions of drones.
2.2 Challenging issues of drones
Besides the Australian user survey of drones [13], the ex-
tant literature on drones has largely focused on privacy and
security issues from a legal perspective. The legal scholars
posit that drones could potentially violate the Fourth Amend-
ment that protects citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures when drones are used for surveillance. Therefore, the
Fourth Amendment rights should regulate and restrict drone
usage [18]. They also criticize the FAA for not taking more
responsibility and initiative in monitoring drone use. For in-
stance, Barbee comments that the potential use and misuse of
drones are both considerable and must not be neglected, yet
neither the FAA nor the Congress has paid sufficient attention
or taken any action to address the relevant challenges, particu-
larly privacy issues [6]. Research has also suggested that drone
developers are somewhat aware of the laws but tend to ignore
ethical issues. They would default to some legal considera-
tions of privacy based on their justification of whether the sub-
jects would predict that they are being photographed or video
recorded by a drone [15]. Other scholars have heightened con-
cerns due to the fact that drones could be cheaper to obtain
than before and could be so tiny yet still with high-definition
cameras (a.k.a., “dragonfly drones”). Therefore, drones could
potentially get even more detailed pictures of the people being
monitored and it would be even harder for people to notice the
drones and be aware of them being watched [65]. These legal
analyses are informative but lack empirical data about privacy
perceptions from ordinary citizens, particularly in the US con-
text. Our study aims to provide this type of empirical data.
2.3 Privacy mechanisms for drones
An number of technical mechanisms have been proposed to
protect civilians’ privacy specifically regarding drones. For in-
stance, to help drone controllers operate drones appropriately,
the FAA has developed B4UFLY, a mobile app that helps
drone controllers “determine whether there are any restric-
tions or requirements in effect at the location where they want
to fly” [19]. Besides, ordinary citizens can sign up their ad-
dresses as part of the no-fly zones for drones which may be
incorporated into the firmware or software of drones and/or
honored by drone controllers [47]. To provide citizens more
information about drones, LightCense is a system that uses
flash lights as a drone’s ID. People can look up information
about the drone by decoding the sequence of lights via a mo-
bile app [40].
As an example of a server-side mechanism, Yoohwan et
al. propose using a combination of encryption, access con-
trol, and image/video transformation. Specifically, the system
would encrypt the images or videos taken by drones and then
deliver them to a privacy server. To access these photos or
videos, the privacy server would require a shared key. Depend-
ing on the privacy policies of the drone’s surveillance area, the
pictures and videos can be transformed from high-definition to
blurring or totally blank out [37].
While our present research does not design a specific
privacy-enhancing mechanism for drones, our study can offer
insights to inform future designs of such mechanisms.
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3 Methodology
From June to August 2015, we conducted 16 in-person in-
terviews to explore people’s privacy perceptions of drones in
Syracuse, New York (US). Each interview took about 1 hour
with a study compensation of $10. This study was approved
by our University IRB.
3.1 Participants
To recruit a diversified set of informants, we posted study fliers
and randomly invited adults in public places such as university
campus, streets, and parks, to participate in our study. Half
of our informants were male, and the other half were female.
Their ages ranged from 18 to 62 years old with an average of
29. Our informants represented various ethnic backgrounds,
such as White Americans, African Americans, Latino Amer-
icans, and Asian Americans. The majority of them were uni-
versity students, but we also had a news reporter, a student
counselor, an office administrator, and a retired worker.
3.2 Interview protocol
To help our informants get familiar with drones, we used a
DJI Phantom 2 Vision+ drone as a prop in our interviews (see
Fig 1). This drone has a HD camera and can provide live video
feed via a dedicated mobile app.
Each interview was structured as follows. First, before the
interview, we showed our informants the physical drone and
explained in details how the drone could be controlled to fly
and take pictures/videos. If the weather permitted (e.g., not too
windy or rainy), we also flied the drone in front of the infor-
mant. We also encouraged our informants to ask any questions
about drones before formally starting the interview. This kind
of in-situ investigation could give informants a more realistic
impression about the technology and would be more natural to
probe people’s perceptions, particularly when people are not
very familiar with the technology [16].
Specifically, our interview protocol consists of three parts:
(1) general questions about people’s perceptions of drones;
(2) context-based questions about people’s attitudes towards
drones under different scenarios; and (3) questions about spe-
cific aspects of drones, such as comparisons between drones
and camera phones or CCTV as well as expected notice, con-
trol, and regulation of drones. The interview questions are in-
cluded in the Appendix A. Using a semi-structured interview
approach, we also asked follow-up questions to continue any
interesting discussion.
3.2.1 General questions about drones
We began our interview with general questions to explore in-
formants’ understanding of and attitudes towards drones. For
instance, we asked questions such as, “Have you heard of
drones? What is the first thing that comes to your mind when
you hear about drones? How do you feel about drones? Do you
see any benefits or issues of drones?”
These questions were mainly adapted from two prior stud-
ies on Online Behavioral Advertising (OBA) [62] and Aug-
mented Reality (AR) Glasses [16], respectively. We chose to
build on these two studies for a few reasons. First, both studies
conducted interviews with ordinary citizens in the US. Sec-
ond, at the time of the studies, OBA and AR Glasses were
trendy and somewhat controversial technologies which ordi-
nary people might not have much knowledge or experience.
Third, drones, OBA and AR Glasses all can be used to support
or benefit people’s lives as well as to track people and poten-
tially invade people’s privacy.
We also asked informants to compare drones with two
widely used and known tracking/recording technologies, smart
phones with cameras and closed-circuit television (CCTV),
as frames of reference. This comparison between drones and
more familiar technologies was inspired by a pioneering study
of risk perception [22]. The main reason we chose camera
phones and CCTV is that since they are widely used, ordi-
nary citizens are likely to be familiar with them so they can be
used as references. We did not choose RFID, Google Glass, or
other wearable cameras (e.g., SenseCam [26]) because people
may be unfamiliar with them just as drones.
3.2.2 Scenario-based questions
There are both theoretical support and empirical evidence
that privacy is contextual. For example, Helen Nissenbaum
eloquently points out that human behaviors, e.g., a transac-
tion that occurs, is always situated in some concrete context,
e.g., certain geographical area and specific constituted norms
within a political, cultural environment [45]. As we discussed
in the related work, prior privacy studies have also shown that
people’s privacy preferences of technologies can vary signifi-
cantly under different contexts or scenarios (e.g., RFID [52],
location-sharing systems [60]). These studies motivate us to
develop different scenarios and understand people’s context-
based privacy perceptions of drones under these scenarios.
We created and presented five specific and realistic drone
usage scenarios. We asked our informants if they would ac-
cept the drone usage for each scenario and why. We adopted
news reports of real-world drone usages in creating the five
scenarios: a drone is being used in (1) recording a promotion
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event that you attend in a shopping mall by a store owner [66];
(2) delivering goods to you by Amazon [4]; (3) recording a
friend’s party that you attend [34]; (4) reporting a parade that
you attend by a news agency [51]; and (5) searching lurking
criminals around your residential area by the local police [32].
These scenarios covered a diverse set of contexts, including in-
door use (mall) vs. outdoor use (parade); private home (party)
vs. public area (parade); the drone controlled by individuals
(friend), the government (police), or a vendor (Amazon); and
the drone use benefiting self (goods delivery), other people
(friend), or other entities (mall).
3.2.3 Expected notification and control
To help inform future drone design and regulation, we also
asked informants about what kinds of notifications and con-
trols they would expect and what aspects of drones should
be regulated. Specifically, we asked questions, such as “do
you expect to be notified about the time periods during which
drones can/will be operated” and “do you expect to be notified
about the types of information that the operating drones might
collect?” These questions were inspired by the Drone Aircraft
Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013, which was proposed
but not enacted in the US. We also asked questions about ex-
pectations of consent and control, such as “do you expect to be
asked for any kind of ‘explicit consent’ to allow drones to fly
near you” and “do you expect to see detailed explanations if
a drone takes pictures or videos that can capture you?” These
questions were adapted from a study on RFID [29].
3.3 Data analysis
We audio recorded all the interviews upon informants’ permis-
sions. We also took notes during the interviews. The interviews
were then transcribed and analyzed qualitatively. In general,
qualitative research or analysis is particularly useful in explor-
ing the why and how questions of a social phenomenon. Qual-
itative research usually does not claim representative results
in the statistical sense but allows researchers to make proposi-
tions that can be further investigated by quantitative methods
such as surveys or experiments.
In our case, we conducted a thematic analysis, which
is common for qualitative research [7]. Thematic analysis is
“a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns
(themes) within data” [8]. First, we immersed ourselves in the
data by carefully reading through the interview transcripts, ac-
tively looking for and taking notes of meanings and patterns.
Second, two co-authors (coders) used ATLAS.ti, a pop-
ular qualitative analysis software, to manually and indepen-
dently generate initial codes that capture meanings of the same
subset of our interview data at a fine-grained level (usually at
the sentence level). These codes are considered as the most ba-
sic elements of the phenomenon under our study. Then, the two
coders convened, discussed, and converged their codes into a
code book of 132 unique codes ranging from individual drone
features (e.g., cameras) to usage of drones (e.g., parcel deliv-
ery) to concerns of drones (e.g., stalking). Next, the two coders
used the agreed-upon code book to code the interview data.
ATLAS.ti allows us to identify and extract all excerpts associ-
ated with a given code. For instance, one interview quote for
the code “public space” is “everyone is free to go in and out of
that place whenever they want to and they’re basically free to
do whatever they want unless it’s against the law.”
Third, we explored how different codes can be merged
into high-level themes. We grouped 132 codes into nine can-
didate themes: drone features, drone usage, attitudes towards
drones, cultural differences, private vs. public space, privacy
concerns, safety concerns, and drone control. For instance,
the theme of drone control included the following codes: no-
tification, accessible to everyone, actions to protect people,
controller flexibility, delete recordings afterwards, destination
of Information, expected control, know controller, sound of
drones, time to fly, and regulations. We wrote codes on col-
ored post-it notes and sorted them into groups/themes on a
wall, creating an affinity diagram [36].
Fourth, we reviewed the candidate themes by reading the
interview excerpts of each theme to see whether they co-
herently present the underlying theme. We then adjusted the
themes and our affinity diagram accordingly. For instance, the
code “battery life” was originally part of the theme of drone
features. After reviewing the interview quotes associated with
the code “battery life” (e.g., “they should know if it’s safe or
not to use and I don’t know if they use batteries” and “And
again it could run out of batteries”), we moved this code to
the theme of safety. Figure 2 shows the final affinity diagram.
Fig. 2. The final affinity diagram of the themes and their codes.
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4 Findings
In this section, we report the major themes emerged from our
study. We will use fictitious names for our informants.
Our informants suggested a number of perceived benefits
of drones. When asked about potential benefits or applications
of drones, our informants focused on a few characteristics of
drones, such as their relatively small size, agility, and capa-
bilities to fly and to take high-definition photos and videos in
inaccessible or even dangerous environments. They envisioned
several drone applications, such as aerial photography, goods
delivery, and emergency responses.
Our informants also raised several issues of drone usage
related to safety, security, and privacy concerns. Their safety
concerns mainly revolved around drones hitting people or in-
terfering with other aircraft. The informants attributed these
risks to two sources: the components and/or features of drones
(e.g., propellers), and drone controllers’ inappropriate or reck-
less behaviors. Closely related to the safety issues, our infor-
mants also brought up concerns about security issues, mainly
about drones trespassing on some forbidden or sensitive places
such as government or military facilities. When drones en-
croach on personal spaces which individual informants defined
for themselves, a sense of privacy violation arose.
4.1 General privacy concerns
Privacy was a salient and consistent topic across all of the
interviews, regardless of the diverse ethnic or occupational
backgrounds of our informants. Their discussions about the
privacy implications of drones centered around the following
themes: (1) the definitions and boundaries of public vs. private
spaces, (2) peeking and stalking, and (3) recording and shar-
ing of photos and videos without people’s awareness and/or
consent. These concerns were related to both their physical
privacy and information privacy. Informants’ physical privacy
concerns were primarily about the feeling that their private
spaces would be intruded by drones. This sense of physical
privacy intrusion is similar to when an individual’s personal
space is invaded by a stranger [24]. In terms of information pri-
vacy concerns, our informants were mainly concerned about
the collection, use, and sharing of their personal data, such as
their locations and pictures/videos that capture them.
4.1.1 Public vs. private spaces
Due to drones’ flexibility and mobility, they could intrude into
people’s private space, compromising people’s physical pri-
vacy. Territoriality (public vs. private spaces) is a key factor
that our informants considered in determining their expecta-
tions of privacy and the privacy violations of drones. There
was a general consensus among our informants that if a drone
takes pictures or records video or even just flies in a private
space, then the drone would be considered as invading the res-
idents’ privacy. While intuitive, this view begs an important
question - what is considered a private space? Our informants
had various definitions of private space and these definitions
centered around three factors: ownership of the space, sensi-
tivity of the space, and nature of activity in the space.
Ownership. In general, our informants agreed that their
homes (either owned or rent), or personal properties (e.g., a
car) are their private spaces. For one group of informants, own-
ership (or temporary ownership such as rental) alone deter-
mines private spaces. For instance, Scott (62, retired worker)
explained, “the boundary between public and private space is
like a fence of property an individual owns.” Similarly, Bill
(25, computer science major) claimed that “my private space
would be my private properties, my home, my rental house,
my car, etc. and public space is owned by the government or
public administrations, like school, city square, etc.” Dan (27,
public relation professional) also focused on ownership: “like
a lot of places outside your own property or where you live is
kind of a public space because you don’t own it, like a park is
a public space.” Emily (18, first year in college) extended her
private space beyond her home, explaining “the surrounding
place around my home is still my own private space.” Mary
(28, teacher) went to an extreme in saying that “I just assume
the space outside of my house is public space.” For these infor-
mants, ownership was reasonably easy to identify and so was
their private spaces.
Sensitivity. When a drone operates in a public place,
our informants generally felt that the drone is less likely to
cause privacy violations. However, some informants effec-
tively treated sensitive public places with children or other
vulnerable populations as private spaces. For instance, Han-
nah (19, biology major), who used to assist in an elementary
school, considered a school as a private space: “especially in
elementary schools a lot of people don’t want their children
to be recorded or taking photos of them unless you have the
consent of their parents.” This view is compatible with the
current US privacy legislation for children, such as the Chil-
dren’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) which requires
the consent from a parent or guardian for collecting personal
data about children under 13.
Nature of activity. For some informants, even seemingly
non-sensitive public places (e.g., mall) can be their private
spaces because of the nature of their activities. For instance,
Lily (24, information science major) not only considered the
place but also the activity she is engaging in the place at that
Flying Eyes and Hidden Controllers: A Qualitative Study of People’s Privacy Perceptions of Civilian Drones in The US 7
time. She elaborated, “I only regard it a public space when I
go to a so-called public area, like a square and in the mean-
time I am participating in some public event, like a promotion
event, or a parade. Otherwise even I am in a public area, I still
regard it, particularly my surrounding as my private space.”
Lily’s viewpoint is related to the notion of proxemics which
refers to the personal space (or distance) that people maintain
around themselves [25]. Lily desired proxemics against drones
even in public places when conducting her personal business.
4.1.2 Peeking and stalking
There were two behaviors of drones that our informants re-
garded as intrusions to their privacy: peeking and stalking. In
terms of peeking, almost all the informants generally loathed
being watched or recorded by a drone, peeking through the
windows of their private spaces. For instance, Cindy (21, fi-
nance major) explained her concern, “because a drone could
fly so high, even if I am living on the top floor of a building, I
would still worry that a drone may peek me through the win-
dow when I am doing some private things, like taking a bath.”
Emily shared the same attitude. She said “If I’m in my own
private home I won’t like a drone peeking into my house.” Dan
drew an analogy between a drone’s peeking and a neighbor’s
peeking, “it’s the same thing in houses, people don’t want the
neighbors to peek in. In a society where everything is docu-
mented all the time, you know, you don’t need another thing
adding to that.” By peeking, drones can invade into people’s
private spaces and lives.
Stalking means that a drone could follow and record an
individual’s activities. Bill painted a dreadful picture against a
backdrop of the current social and cultural landscape in India
where he was originally from: “One concern would be stalk-
ing. In India, parents care about their daughter very much, and
if they see a drone stalking their daughter, they will be very an-
gry and use every means to find the controller of the drone and
punish him, even if the controller is unintentional.” Even per-
ceived or unintentional watching or stalking may lead to re-
venge and grave consequences. In the US, there were cases
where people shot down drones over their backyards [55].
However, Bill’s example brought drone controllers to the fore-
ground. They are the ones who will be held accountable for
the drones’ behaviors.
Mary also denounced stalking or watching and alluded to
the problem of the lack of control for drone ownership. She
explained, “there are some very emotionally unstable individ-
uals out there so to have everybody able to own a drone and
that I could have some crazy person watching me, yeah that’s
a problem.” Mary’s concern is not unfounded. While the FAA
requires licensing of commercial use of drones and registra-
tions of drone controllers, practically anyone can buy a drone
for personal use in the US. While the media often focuses on
drones’ potential use in government surveillance, Mary called
attention to misuses of drones by individual controllers.
4.1.3 Recording and sharing
Last but not least, our informants were concerned about drone
controllers taking and sharing of photos and videos with-
out people’s awareness and/or consent. This concern mainly
stemmed from a sense of uncertainty about how drone con-
trollers would collect and use people’s information, because a
drone can be remotely controlled and can fly out of sight while
recording. In other words, both the drone and its controller
might be invisible to the people being watched or recorded.
Furthermore, people may not be aware of the recording nor
have access to or control over the drone recording about them.
Abby (20, environmental science major) explained the in-
visibility of drones and the lack of awareness and control of
the recording, “People can’t tell it’s there and will not be
aware that they are being watched by such a tiny drone and the
footage by drone may be used for whatever purposes without
their consent or knowledge.” Abby’s concerns pointed to two
more fundamental issues: drones’ capabilities in capturing pic-
tures or videos of individuals inconspicuously, and bystanders’
lack of knowledge of and access to drone controllers.
Dan further highlighted the importance of the drone con-
troller behind the scene, “drone kind of could be a robot or
could be pre-programmed to just like stay in one area all the
time so you’d like to know who’s behind this and I think that’s
kind of an important point to raise because people fear what
they don’t know, so if they don’t know who’s steering it, that
raises some concerns.” Cindy was also concerned about the
drone controller and the potential usage of drones’ recordings.
She elaborated, “If the person who controls the drone is a per-
son that I don’t know, I will be concerned maybe he will use
this video to do some other things like put it in the advertise-
ment or yeah, or some illegal things. So I must ensure that
the person who controls the drone is someone reliable or the
person that I know.” This foregrounding of drone controllers
underscores the duality of drones. People not only deal with
drones but also the people who control the drones. Privacy is
deeply relational [59]. Cindy’s concern was aggravated or at-
tenuated by the social relationship between her and the drone
controllers (e.g., strangers or people that she knew).
In addition, the audio part of videos can be another con-
cern. For instance, one informant said “if you’re having a con-
versation with someone like on the quad and that’s still like
your own kind of private conversation...well maybe not ever
but most of the time I wouldn’t want like audio recorded.”
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Lily raised a quite different concern not due to the flights
of drones per se but due to pictures being taken by drones
and later being posted on the Internet. She explained, “I know
someone immigrated from Afghanistan, and they don’t like
their pictures being posted on the Internet because they are
still in touch with their families, and it’s a security issue for
them. If they are studying in the university and the tribes are
here, (post their pictures on the Internet) will be bad for them.”
Lily’s example reminds us the privacy and security risks are
engendered in their rich social and cultural settings. Expos-
ing people’s seemingly public activities such as studying in a
US university could potentially put people and their families at
risk. The lack of knowledge and control of data collection and
sharing by drones paralyzes people’s desires and abilities to
manage boundaries between themselves and others in achiev-
ing the right level of privacy.
4.2 Context-based privacy perceptions
After asking our informants’ general perceptions of drones,
we then provided five specific drone usage scenarios to fur-
ther probe informants’ context-based privacy perceptions of
drones. Our informants’ perceptions of drones varied across
these scenarios. The differences mainly stemmed from three
sources: (1) whether the scenario occurs in a public or private
space; (2) what is the intended purpose of the drone usage; and
(3) notification and consent of the drone usage.
4.2.1 Scenario 1: shopping mall event monitoring
We described this scenario to our informants, “Imagine you
are in a shopping mall where a promotion event is going on,
like on the Black Friday. The store owner decides to use a
drone to monitor and record this event, and you happen to be
in that event.”
12 out of 16 informants considered a shopping mall as
a public space, and they expressed little concern about being
recorded by the drone in this scenario. However, four infor-
mants considered shopping mall a private space. For instance,
Cindy explained, “Shopping mall is a relatively private space
for me if I go shopping with my intimate friends and I don’t
want to be audio or video recorded if I am having some pri-
vate conversation with my friends.” Again, Cindy’s reasoning
points to the relational aspect of space, or the social space is
characterized by the social relationship therein. The intimate
personal relationship makes the space intimate and private.
Several informants expressed that the drone’s recordings
should be restricted to the promotion event and that the drone
should not appear around sensitive areas, such as the dress-
ing room. A few informants would prefer to be notified about
drone recording, as Emily put it, “I guess you could like put
out some sort of notification to the people...or making people
aware that you will be recorded.”
4.2.2 Scenario 2: recording a friend’s party
In this scenario, we told our informants, “Imagine you are at
your friend’s party, and your friend decides to use a drone
to record the party.” Five informants perceived their friend’s
party as a public space. For example, Sue held that, “it is a
public setting so I don’t really see that would bother me too
much.” However, the other 11 informants felt it is something in
between. For instance, Cindy said “I think it’s kind of between
the private and the public. There are many friends I know so it
can be taken as private, but there are lots of people, so I also
think of it as public.” This perspective suggests that it is not
always a clear cut whether a space is public or private.
Another important factor they considered was the pur-
pose of the recording. Sue commented, “I could see some con-
cern about that but if you’re concerned about your image, you
should not consent to go to that party and get drunk in public
and anyone can record it.” Grace could accept this scenario
if it is for personal use. She explained, “I think if it’s for his
personal use I think it’s okay because you’ve shown consent in
being in that space and being with other people.”
4.2.3 Scenario 3: delivering goods
We told the informants “Imagine that Amazon decides to use
drones to deliver goods that you have bought in its online
store to your house.” All informants felt that a drone delivering
goods would fly close to their home, which was unanimously
regarded as their private space. However, most of them felt this
drone usage is cool. Dan shared his excitement, “that’s like an
efficiency thing, that’s making life more convenient and better,
and it serves a good purpose and I guess yeah, I think that
would be pretty cool, that’s a cool way of using technology.”
The informants did mention the potential safety risks such as
drone crashes. In addition, some informants felt it is not neces-
sary for the drone to carry a camera. For instance, Abby noted
that “I think the drone should have the whole map in its GPS
system, you know, you don’t have to use the camera.”
Among the five scenarios, our informants expressed the
least demand for notification and consent in this scenario per-
haps due to its “useful” nature. However, Grace still wanted
notifications: “there should be some sort of disclosure on how
it’s going to be sent because normally when you purchase
something on Amazon you choose your shipping method.”
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4.2.4 Scenario 4: reporting a parade
For this scenario, we told the informants “Imagine you are in
a parade. Some news agency decides to use a drone to record
the parade.” In general, our informants were least concerned
about this scenario. They all agreed that this scenario occurs in
a public space. In addition, all informants except two felt that
the drone’s recording in this case is acceptable because the pur-
pose is for journalism and if they have already decided to par-
ticipate this parade, they would rather the parade be recorded
and publicized.
However, Mary and Cindy had some reservation. Mary
was concerned about her vanity. She explained, “That’s just
like vanity...just like wish that I would have done my hair that
day so that my appearing on news would be great.” Mary cared
about the presentation of herself, a form of impression man-
agement practice that Goffman observes [23].
Cindy was more concerned about whether the parade is
controversial or not. She elaborated, “Say I am in a feminist
parade. If my face is recorded by the drone and it is put on-
line or in the newspaper, or in other media. The people from
the other side, the anti-feminist side, if they meet me later in
street, they may revenge me.” This example alludes to the lack
of prior notice of and control over drone recordings as well as
the potential ramifications. If she had prior notice, she might
have reconsidered her participation in the parade.
Our informants mainly requested for prior notice of using
their images in news, especially when the images reveal their
identities. For instance, Sue (21, biology major) suggested, “I
guess you would need people’s permission before you use their
face and you know you post their image on website or social
network whatever.”
4.2.5 Scenario 5: searching for criminals
We told informants “Imagine that there are some suspects or
criminals lurking in your residential area. The police depart-
ment decides to use drones to search for these people in your
residential area.” Most informants felt this is acceptable, and
some of them even applauded this practice. For instance, Joe
(59, newspaper reporter) explained, “That could be better be-
cause a drone could get there immediately even before police
car gets to the scene. So I think it will be very useful. If waiting
for the police, by the time the police comes, maybe the subjects
have already fled away.”
However, three informants considered the surrounding
area of their residence as their private space and felt uncom-
fortable having a drone patrolling around their house, invading
their physical privacy. For example, Emily said, “I would be
uncomfortable but I understand why they have it, like if it was
in my neighborhood for example, and there was a drone flying
around I would be thinking like what’s going on.”
Given the recent Snowden revelation of the extensive gov-
ernment surveillance, it is perhaps not surprising to see that
most of the informants requested explicit notification and con-
sent for this practice. Bill, articulated his expectation, “I would
like to have explicit information from the police department.
Because the home is my private space, having a drone flying
above me and recording is like having a policeman watch-
ing me around my living place all the time...I don’t like to be
watched or surveilled by a drone, especially without my per-
mission and prior knowledge.” In Bill’s view, the patrolling
drone is like a pair of flying eyes watching his life at home.
Many issues that surfaced from these scenarios include
physical privacy, purpose of data collection and usage, notice
and control. These issues have long been recognized when ex-
amining privacy implications in technologies. However, this
begs the question: are drones any different from other familiar
tracking technologies that have raised similar privacy issues?
4.3 Comparing drones with other familiar
tracking technologies
We asked our informants to compare drones with two familiar
technologies that have tracking/recording capabilities: smart
phone with a camera, and closed-circuit television (CCTV).
Our informants pointed out both similarities and differences.
4.3.1 Comparing drones with camera phones
From the informants’ perspective, the main similarity is that
both drones and camera phones can take pictures and record
videos. The major differences, however, lie in the distance of
recording, and the visibility or accessibility of the owner or
controller. For instance, Dan explained eloquently, “It would
be a lot further away with a drone and they’re hidden away
but still get a really good shot. So I feel like there’s that kind
of not knowing that this is happening as opposed to a cell
phone where you get a much larger chance of seeing that per-
son taking that photo of you.” Dan’s reasoning again speaks
to the flying (drone) cameras at a distance that can take pic-
tures or videos of individuals inconspicuously (i.e., without
their awareness).
Emily focused on the controller of the device. She said,
“When you see some people taking picture of you using their
phone, you can go to them and ask them to delete the pic-
tures or videos. But when a drone is taking picture or record-
ing video of you, you cannot control it, and it can easily fly
away, or the pictures and videos have already been trans-
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ferred to the controller’s mobile phone and you may not even
know where the controller is.” She emphasized the hidden con-
trollers that are behind the scene, inaccessible to the people
being recorded. As such, the invisibility and inaccessibility of
drone controllers make people’s usual privacy practices (e.g.,
ask camera controllers not taking or deleting the photos) futile.
4.3.2 Comparing drones with CCTV
While both drones and CCTV can take videos, the informants
suggested a few notable differences, including their flexibility,
visibility, intended purposes, and trust in the controllers. For
instance, Mike focused on the flexibility. He said, “Drones can
fly anywhere so it can dynamically record everything. As far as
I know, CCTV can only record as long as you’re in that area.”
Emily explained the difference in purpose, “Well there’s
obviously a reason why they have the (CCTV) cameras in
there, it’s like for security and safety and like I know why
they’re there and I think it’s kind of like the norm. People
are already like kind of used to having security cameras.”
Emily highlighted that CCTV is a familiar technology now and
people have established norms or expectations of it, whereas
drones are too new to have agreed-upon norms.
In terms of visibility, Grace articulated the difference, “A
security camera is put in a place where it’s very visible, usually
places will post some sort of sign that says there’s a security
camera. So there’s that disclosure and you understand if you
step into that space you are going to be recorded. But I think a
drone has the ability to enter someone’s space rather than the
person going into a space and then not having that disclosure
that it’s being recorded.” What Grace illustrated is a metaphor
that CCTV passively waits for people to be recorded whereas
drones actively enter into people’s space to record them. In a
way, this nature of drones shifts the initiative from the people
to drones, weakening the people’s control of the situation.
Our informants also pointed out differences in their trust
of the controllers. “I wouldn’t mind what you would be doing
indoors, that’s for security, but outside then it’s beyond your
control because inside you know who is having that, who is
handling that...definitely we know who is handling the drone.
Maybe the security person or something like that, right. So you
trust them, you would not fear unless you are the one who’s
going to be the trouble inside.” This informant highlighted the
importance of trust or the lack of it for drone controllers.
Because drones and their controllers can be more difficult
to recognize and approach, we next discuss what people would
expect in terms of controlling and regulating drones.
4.4 Expected notification and control
Our informants proposed a few controls of drones and their
controllers. They also suggested regulating drones in terms of
their size as well as their flying altitude, area, speed, and time.
4.4.1 Tracking drone controllers
Because of the potential for safety issues and malicious use,
several informants suggested the need for drone controllers to
register so that they can be tracked and held accountable. In
addition, training and certification were recommended for op-
erating drones. Interestingly, our informants used driver’s li-
cense or gun license as an analogy to drone controller license.
For example, Cindy treated a drone license like a driver’s
license: “just like drivers need driving lessons, I think the
drone controller also needs a license because if you didn’t
control it very well and it can make some damage to the envi-
ronment and may also intrude other people’s privacy.”
Those who compared a drone’s license with a gun license
felt both technologies can be used for bad purposes. For in-
stance, Hannah proposed a drone license to keep track of the
controller, “You can’t just buy drones whenever and wherever,
you have to have like a license or it would be registered un-
der your name with that serial number so people can identify
whose was that, so people can’t use it and like if they used it
for something bad it would be under your name.”
4.4.2 Tracking and controlling drones
Our informants also proposed ideas to track drones such as
using a unique ID, and detecting and monitoring drones via a
mobile app. Mary was one of the informants that proposed a
unique ID for each drone. She explained, “For example, let’s
say some people use a drone to do bad things, and you can
track the drone by the serial number. It would be an evidence
that you have used your drone to do bad things, such as you
used your drone’s camera to see the forbidden spot.”
Grace hoped for something more convenient. She imag-
ined, “I would hope to see in an app or something to show what
the drone could see or record from flying above my home.”
What she requested is a technology that could essentially dis-
cover nearby drones and monitor what the drone camera can
see, but more fundamentally, she asked for more awareness of
drones and their operations.
While our informants provided suggestions for tracking
drones, they felt that they cannot stop drones from flying or
taking pictures. For instance, Lily said “I can’t stop them
[drones] from taking pictures. I will just stay away.” Abby also
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expressed her inability to stop drones but suggested that drone
manufacturers may do something to prevent misbehaviours of
drone controllers. She speculated, “Let’s say they [drone man-
ufacturers] have a backup chip to capture the images from the
phone, so if a controller is doing any illegal activity that would
be stored in this purposeful part of this chip, which a controller
has no access to but the manufacturer can get into that. That
would be the only way to curb the bad activity.”
Given the powerful nature of drones, regulation is war-
ranted. While the FAA has been finalizing their drone regula-
tion, what do people expect from the regulatory front?
4.4.3 Regulations on drone features and operations
When asked what aspects of drones should be regulated, our
informants’ responses focused on two aspects: drones’ physi-
cal properties such as size, speed, and color; and drones’ oper-
ational properties such as flying height, area, and time.
Some informants held that the size of a drone should not
be too small or too big. Abby explained, “If a drone’s size is
too small then that would be weird because you cannot see it
and that’s definitely used for spying. I don’t want a drone like
a Boeing though, that would be pretty bad if it flies low and
it would be scary. It should not be bigger than this table [one
yard long, and 16 inches wide].” Besides, Hannah felt the need
to regulate drone speed. She said, “I would want to regulate
the speed of drone, about how fast it goes...may be not too
fast.” Several informants mentioned about noise control. Mike
explained, “Personally you may not want to hear any noise. I
may be sleeping so if somebody is outside flying a drone, I feel
like so it’s just getting annoying.”
Finally, a few informants proposed to color specialized
drones, e.g. drones used by the police, so that they can be more
identifiable by the public. Hannah explained, “Using color
that is specifically for police, just dye your drone would help
people. So when I see that drone flying I know that this is for
the police and I’d be kind of okay with that.” The colors sig-
nify purposes or ownership which could produce trust: “I fly
somebody’s drone then how can you be sure that that drone
does not carry a gun. How can you trust those things...that’s
why I say if you use different colors you trust them that it’s
some government or some legalization purpose so you trust”
In terms of drone operations, our informants proposed to
regulate its flying height, area, and time. For instance, a few
informants emphasized that a drone should not be allowed
to fly at night for privacy and noise considerations. For ex-
ample, Sue said, “It would be weird if the drone is flying at
night...particularly if it is flying around my private space.”
Drone regulations should consider these dimensions.
5 Discussion
While all of our informants had heard of drones before, it is
still a relatively new technology to them. Overall, they had
mixed feelings about drones. On one hand, they saw clear val-
ues in drones as they identified many benefits and promising
applications of drones, such as aerial photography, goods de-
livery, and emergency responses. On the other hand, their pos-
itive perceptions were overshadowed by a multitude of safety,
security and privacy issues that they raised. Drones can be
something our informants love or loathe. They used a wide
range of adjectives to describe drones: from cute, cool, fun,
useful and beneficial to weird, risky, suspicious, invasive, dis-
turbing, chaotic, and dangerous. None of our informants com-
pletely ruled out drones as they always saw some drone usage
under certain conditions as beneficial, but some participants
expressed the sense of inability to have control over or stop
drone usage.
5.1 Unpacking privacy concerns
While the news stories and government regulations tend to
emphasize the safety and security concerns, the privacy is-
sues have received less attention. Our findings suggest that
the informants had various privacy concerns regarding drones.
There are several characteristics of these concerns.
First, we highlight the duality of drones. Our informants’
perceptions of or concerns about drones were not only about
drones per se, but also about the perceived relationships with
the drone controller. Wanda Orlikowski posits the duality of
technology, a recursive relationship that exists between tech-
nology and human action. On the one hand, technology medi-
ates human action, however, it is also changed by human ac-
tion [48]. Similarly, we suggest the duality of drones. Drones
mediate drone controllers’ interactions with citizens, and they
are also changed by drone controllers’ actions. One aspect of
this duality represents the physical form and properties of the
device (drone) as designed and manufactured by people and/or
organizations, whereas the other aspect of this duality empha-
sizes the social construction of drones by the adopters and con-
trollers through the different meanings they attach to the tech-
nology. In other words, drones manifest and extend the con-
trollers’ agency and intention. As such, our informants often
negotiated their privacy with the imagined and often hidden
drone controller, mediated by the drone. It is also worth not-
ing that drones can be used or controlled by different kinds of
entities such as individuals, organizations, and governments.
Related to the social construction of drone, people’s pri-
vacy perceptions are deeply relational [50, 59]. In the friend’s
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party scenario, the social relationships between the friend and
the guests parochialize the private party/space and eased some
informants’ concerns. In the police scenario, the perceived re-
lationships between citizens and the government (where gov-
ernment being a “Big Brother” or a safety guard) affected in-
formants’ perceptions.
Second, drones could violate both people’s physical pri-
vacy [3] and information privacy [56]. Physical privacy often
refers to the concepts of solitude and bodily privacy [3]. In-
formation privacy relates to the collection, use, and sharing
of one’s personal data [56]. In their seminal paper on pri-
vacy, Warren and Brandeis advocate for “the right to be let
alone” [63]. The fact that drones can fly close to people or en-
ter into their spaces can be viewed as intruding people’s soli-
tude. Jerry Kang discusses privacy in physical space as “the
extent to which an individual’s territorial solitude is shielded
from invasion by unwanted objects or signals” [35]. Drones
can be the unwanted objects.
One of the factors that our informants considered when
judging the acceptance of a drone usage is whether the drone
is operating in a public space or a private space. In general,
our informants detested drones flying close to their homes be-
cause the drone cameras could peek through the windows to
see or record them doing private things, such as bathing as
one informant exemplified. This would invade people’s bod-
ily privacy. The pictures and video taken by drones about peo-
ple would obviously affect their information privacy especially
when people do not know that they were recorded and how the
recordings will be used.
We also note that our informants differed in their de-
lineations of public and private space. Daniel Solove points
out that the boundary between individuals’ private and pub-
lic spaces was permeable and pivotal in their privacy con-
cerns [57]. Research has also shown that technologies have
been blurring the boundary [27]. A few informants believed
that they own their private space within a larger public space,
such as parks or shopping malls. Lofland notes that technolo-
gies have transformed urban space into a “privatism,” because
phones, vehicles etc. have “made the withdrawal from partici-
pation in the public realm a genuine option” [41]. This is also
related to the personal space that people want to maintain [25].
One informant talked about not wanting to be watched by
drones if she goes to shopping with an intimate friend. She re-
jected the drone invading the intimate space between her and
her friend while shopping in public places.
This idea of personal space also relates to Lofland’s
conceptualizations of urban spaces. Lofland differentiates
three types of urban spaces: public, private, and parochial
spaces [41]. These spaces are characterized by the social re-
lationships therein: strangers (public space), close friends and
family members (private space), and people who share com-
monalities, such as neighbours even if they do not know each
other (parochial space) [41]. Accordingly, when a person is
doing something personal (e.g., shopping with a close friend)
in a public place (e.g., a mall), for that person, however, it is
still a private space because of the social relationship (close
friendship) that defines the space.
The importance of these different kinds of spaces is also
related to the social norms within them. In Erving Goffman’s
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, he describes how
we present ourselves according to the norms in the different
spaces [23]. We argue that the presence of a drone can alter
how people perceive the norms in which they are embedded.
For instance, a drone can bring a sense of “publicness” into a
private space. As a result, the drone creates tensions between
expected norms of public and private spaces.
Privacy is also highly contextual. Our informants’ percep-
tions of drones varied across different scenarios. They con-
strued and negotiated their private and public spaces differ-
ently across the five scenarios. Helen Nissenbaum’s theory of
Contextual Integrity underlines the contextual nature of pri-
vacy [46]. She identifies two types of contextual norms for pri-
vacy: “norms of appropriateness, i.e., what information would
be appropriate to be revealed in a context; and norms of flow
or distribution, i.e., the flow of personal information in cer-
tain context needs to be reasonably justified. If either of these
norms has been violated, then users’ privacy is considered to
be infringed” [46]. The informants paid particular attention to
the purposes of the drone uses. For instance, in the friend’s
party scenario, some informants would accept drone record-
ing only if it is for personal use.
5.2 What makes drones interesting?
Drone is certainly not the first tracking/recording technology
that raises privacy concerns. What makes drones particularly
interesting or unique compared with other technologies, such
as camera phones and CCTV? Our informants identified a
combination of factors. First, drones are powerfully mobile.
Drones with cameras can be viewed as flying eyes that could
flexibly and even un-noticeably fly into public and private
spaces, watch, record and even share what people are doing.
However, it is not the drone that is flying, but rather the con-
troller is flying the drone. Even when a drone is flying au-
tonomously, it is executing a plan programmed by the con-
troller. As such, the flying eyes not only represent the drone
camera but also the eyes of the drone controllers.
This leads to the second factor - the duality of drone. Cit-
izens are not interacting with the drones in that they are essen-
tially interacting with the (hidden) controller. Moreover, both
the drones and their controllers can be invisible and/or inacces-
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sible to the people being watched. Compared with other track-
ing/recording technologies, the invisibility and inaccessibility
of drone/controller is exacerbated. People may not be able to
detect drones from afar or approach the drone controller to find
out what the drone is doing. This lack of awareness and ap-
proachability paralyze people’s abilities to negotiate and enact
their privacy. Acquisti et al. point out that people have con-
siderable uncertainty about their privacy [1]. Such uncertainty
is in part due to information asymmetry where technologies
have made personal data collection and usage invisible [1]. In-
formation asymmetry is not new but drones aggravate it.
Ryan Calo argues that drones may actually help to waken
and restore individuals’ privacy awareness because previous
privacy violations are hard to visualize, thus giving consent
or notification to individuals may not generate a concrete
sense [11]. Our informants worried about the invisibility and
inaccessiblity of drones/controllers and as a result, the diffi-
culties in getting notification and providing consent. There is
currently no standard or a reliable way to enable notice and
consent for drones. This makes our informants’ suggestions
on the design and regulation of drones particularly valuable.
5.3 Implications for design
High-level principles. Based on our findings, we first propose
the following high-level privacy principles for drones:
– making both the drones and their controllers more discov-
erable, approachable, and accountable;
– enabling communication between drone controllers and
ordinary citizens/bystanders;
– making drone designs sensitive to local social and cultural
norms.
First, given the duality of drones, designs should make drones
and controllers more discoverable, approachable, and account-
able. Information about drones and controllers should also be
made available. Adopting the notion of “accountabilities of
presence,” we suggest that the presence of the drone and its
controller signifies a participation to a social relationship with
the citizens [59]. As a result, the citizens can hold the con-
troller accountable and ease their concerns.
Second, since the invisibility and inaccessibility of drones
and drone controllers paralyze some of people’s existing pri-
vacy practices (e.g., ask the camera controllers not to take or
delete photos), we advocate creating channels or platforms to
enable direct communication between drone controllers and
ordinary citizens/bystanders. This will help build trust and
form appropriate social norms over time around drone use that
respects citizens.
Third, our results also hinted that the different perceptions
and expectations of drone usage are embedded in larger social,
cultural, and political contexts. For instance, some of our in-
formants talked about the perceptions of drone usage in the
Indian culture. Drone designs should consider the cultures or
norms of the country/environment that they operate in. Dif-
ferent pre-defined privacy settings or modes may be used as
defaults in certain countries to respect their social norms.
Next, we discuss more specific ideas for designing
privacy-friendly drones. Fig. 3 shows example ideas includ-
ing features from existing privacy-enhancing technologies for
drones and other devices as well as suggestions from our infor-
mants and ourselves. None of them is a silver bullet to solve
all the privacy issues, but collectively they will raise the bar
for protecting ordinary citizens’ privacy regarding drones. The
ideas for drones/controllers may be built by the drone manu-
facturers and used by drones/controllers.
Designs for drones/controllers. From the standpoint of
the drone or controllers, a number of privacy-enhancing tech-
niques can be applied. When a camera is recording, it usually
signals the recording with a red light which could be detected
by bystanders if the camera is relatively close. However, since
drones can fly and record at a distance, people might not de-
tect this signal. Recently, a group of researchers have proposed
a system called LightCense that uses flash lights as a drone’s
ID and people can use their phones to look up the drone by
decoding the sequence of lights via a mobile app [40]. While
innovative, it does not show what the drone camera sees, which
some informants requested. Some of our informants suggested
using particular colors to manifest the purpose of a drone (e.g.,
a police drone). Using standardized color schemes can help or-
dinary citizens quickly determine, for example, a police drone
or a recreational drone.
Besides, there are a large number of citizens with vi-
sual impairments who would have difficulties leveraging vi-
sual cues. Instead, designers could explore designs that al-
low people to discover drones on their devices such as smart
phones rather than manually searching drones in the sky. For
instance, if a drone includes a GPS unit and flies in someone’s
area, that person can be notified about the drone via an app.
If the controller registers with the app, he or she could also
provide information about the drone (even including pictures
or videos it has taken) and about himself or herself. The app
users can approach and interact with the controllers via the app
to negotiate their goals and privacy. Drones may also broadcast
ultra-frequency sounds (human cannot hear) which encode in-
formation about the drones and people’s phones or devices can
detect these sounds, decode and present these drone informa-
tion to the citizens/bystanders.
Drone privacy designs should also protect both people’s
physical privacy and information privacy. The FAA has de-
























Fig. 3. Concrete ideas of privacy-enhancing drones for drone controllers and ordinary citizens/bystanders, including both proactive and
reactive measures. + denotes suggestions from our informants. * denotes the new suggestions that we propose.
veloped B4UFLY, a mobile app that helps drone controllers
“determine whether there are any restrictions or requirements
in effect at the location where they want to fly” [19]. Besides,
the no-fly zones can help keep drones away from sensitive ar-
eas. These mechanisms could help prevent safety and security
issues as well as protect people’s physical privacy.
In terms of information privacy, the standard best prac-
tices, such as encrypting the content, setting up appropriate
access control, redacting sensitive content, logging and au-
diting would be useful. For instance, drone designs can ex-
plore existing access control mechanisms for continuous sens-
ing [54]. We advocate that the drone designers and manufac-
turers consider incorporating these privacy-enhancing designs
in their drone products. While incorporating these privacy fea-
tures might seem as an increase to the cost, the benefits of
making drones more privacy-friendly are also competitive ad-
vantages in the drone marketplace.
Since privacy concerns were raised by all of our in-
formants, we suggest that techniques such as facial recog-
nition and sensitive information detection may be incorpo-
rated into drones for data obfuscation/filtering purposes. Sim-
ilar techniques have been introduced by previous studies in
the wearable camera context for both bystanders and con-
trollers/owners. For bystanders, Korayem et al. introduced
ScreenAvoider, a framework that can help users to manage
their privacy by protecting users’ sensitive images and infor-
mation on computer screen from wearable cameras [38]. Using
deep learning techniques, ScreenAvoider can detect and clas-
sify sensitive information on computer monitor, then provide
users that ability to control the disclosure of these information
[38]. For controllers, prior literature shows that controllers are
concerned about the bystanders’ privacy [31]. Raval et al. pro-
pose PrivacyEye and WaveOff, as their privacy marker system
[53]. In this system, sensitive information will be automati-
cally covered by a virtual bounding box from the operators’
device, thus protect the bystanders’ privacy [53]. However, to
our knowledge, these techniques have not been adopted by
drones. Future work can explore adapting these existing tech-
niques to drones and developing new techniques to address the
specific privacy concerns that people have with drones.
We also value Dourish’s perspective that context is not a
static representation but is dynamically produced and repro-
duced in the course of activity [17]. Via our scenario-based
questions, we did find that our respondents’ sense of private
and public spaces, concerns on privacy, as well as opinions
about notification were context-dependent. Taking this per-
spective, we suggest that automatic location or context detec-
tion techniques may be explored for drones. One similar sys-
tem has been introduced in wearable cameras. Templeman et
al. proposed PlaceAvoider, a technique for the wearable cam-
eras to identify the current location [58]. If the current location
is considered as sensitive (bedroom, bathroom), the images
captured by the cameras will be flagged for further review be-
fore made available to other applications. [58] We did not find
similar techniques developed for drones.
Considering the extreme mobility of drones, we propose
that future work can explore and leverage location and con-
text detection for privacy protections in drones. For instance,
drones can implement smart privacy-friendly default settings
or privacy-friendly camera modes, such as blurring people’s
faces, or abstain from taking pictures / videos in obviously pri-
vate/personal locations or spaces such as people’s residences.
These settings or modes can be applied in recording but also
viewing without recording (i.e., controllers can have a live feed
of the camera view even when it is not recording).
Since drone technologies are relatively new to the general
public, social norms around appropriate use of this technol-
ogy do not exist. Designers should explore ways to nurture
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the formation of these norms. For instance, designs could help
strengthen the relationship between citizens and drone con-
trollers so that they can develop trust and expectations for each
other. A social platform (e.g., an app) for citizens and drone
controllers to meet and mingle could be valuable. For instance,
many drone manufacturers already have online forums for
drone users/controllers (e.g., forum.dji.com). The manufactur-
ers could extend these platforms into a community that allows
drone controllers to provide information about their drones
(e.g., where they fly and the purpose of flying/recording), wel-
come ordinary citizens/bystanders to voice their concerns and
support direct communication between controllers and cit-
izens. Similarly, location-based drone picture/video sharing
sites can also be extended to help support this type of com-
munication. When best practices and social norms of drones
emerge, controllers can be informed or trained about these best
practices using educational materials and tools (e.g., games).
Designs for citizens/bystanders. Since it is difficult for
citizens to always be able to detect nearby drones and their
recording behavior, they should be enabled to pull informa-
tion about nearby drones. One way to achieve this is to build
a database that drone controllers can voluntarily provide in-
formation about their drones that citizens can retrieve. If con-
trollers do not provide such information, researchers could
also look into ways to help citizens actively detect nearby
drones. For instance, the aforementioned mechanism of drones
broadcasting information about themselves via sound can be
used to allow automatic detection of drones.
In addition, citizens should be able to express their opt out
of being recorded by drones. For instance, if users can perform
certain pre-defined gesture or the users’ devices can broadcast
opt-out signals (e.g., color or sound), the drone/camera can
potentially capture, interpret and honor the request.
Lastly, citizens should be able to communicate with the
drone controllers. For instance, the automatic detection of
drones could provide information about the drone controllers
(e.g., their email address). The communication platform (e.g.,
a website or an app) we discussed earlier may also support this
communication as well as allowing citizens to request access
to the recorded data and request data filtering or deletion. In
summary, the key idea is to allow drone controllers and citi-
zens to communicate and negotiate about citizens’ privacy.
5.4 Implications for policy
In terms of public policy, both federal regulation and indus-
try self-regulation of drones should take privacy protection
as a priority. The FAA drone policy and the code of conduct
of drone associations (e.g., Association for Unmanned Vehi-
cle Systems International) barely touch on privacy protection.
However, all informants raised privacy questions without any
priming. This finding provides the timely empirical evidence
that privacy concerns of drones are real and they need to be
addressed.
The FAA launched a required drone controller registra-
tion in December 2015 [39]. The registration requires infor-
mation about a drone controller’s name, address, and a credit
card, but not any information about the drones that this person
owns. But, any registered drone controller should post his or
her registration sticker on any drone he or she wants to fly out-
door. By early January 2016 over, 180,000 drone controllers
had registered [44]. However, if a citizen is concerned about a
drone taking pictures at distance, the citizen is unlikely to see
the drone controller information on the sticker/drone and know
who the controller is. As such, it is unclear how much this reg-
istration enables to protect people’s privacy against drones in
practice. In February 2016, the FAA announced that they will
set up a committee to propose rules to govern how close drones
can get to bystanders, mostly for safety reasons [2].
Based on our preliminary review of state-level legisla-
tion, 24 states in the US have passed drone-related legislation.
We have three important observations. First, there is no con-
sensus on the definition of “drone” among these state drone
laws. Some states equate drone with Unmanned Aircraft Ve-
hicle (UAV) such as Oregon, whereas other states separate the
two, such as Idaho. Moving forward, a standardized defini-
tion is desirable. Second, only some states regulate the drone
controllers in addition to the drones. For instance, North Car-
olina requires drone controllers to pass a knowledge test and
get a permit issued by the The Division of Aviation of the De-
partment of Transportation. Given the duality of drone, we ad-
vocate for regulations that cover both drones and their con-
trollers. Third, few states have detailed rules on privacy. One
exception is Iowa, which has rules on three aspects of privacy:
(1) trespassing, (2) invasion of privacy (intrusion upon seclu-
sion, public disclosure of private facts, and sexually motivated
privacy invasion), and (3) harassment and stalking. We urge
drone laws to include detailed privacy rules.
Some of our informants expected prior consent, however,
practically consent would be difficult to implement. Imagine
you plan to fly a drone in a park where there are one hun-
dred people. It would be difficult, costly, or even unrealistic to
get everybody’s permission or consent before flying the drone
and/or recording videos in that park. Instead of relying on get-
ting people’s prior consent, we suggest considering the ideas
of accountability and audit. Drone controllers would be held
accountable and receive audits for their drone operations.
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5.5 Study limitations
Our study is a first step towards a deep understanding of peo-
ple’s perceptions of drones, and it has many limitations.
First, our study scope focused on civilian uses of light-
weight drones operated by human controllers. As such, we
did not explore military uses of drones.We separated mili-
tary and civilian uses because they serve distinct purposes,
have different implications on society, and thus require sep-
arate treatments (e.g., the FAA in th US only regulates civilian
use of drones). We also did not study fully autonomous drones
(FADs). To our knowledge, FADs are mostly used for mili-
tary purposes. FADs and military uses may lead to perceptions
of drones that are different from what we reported on civilian
uses. Since military uses were excluded, our study also did not
explore the entanglements between military and civilian uses
of drones (e.g., some drone manufacturers have both military
and civilian drones).
Second, the list of our scenarios is by no means compre-
hensive. We chose realistic scenarios that are already happen-
ing in the real world because they would be easier for people
to understand. All of our scenarios might be perceived as hav-
ing a “positive” purpose (e.g., searching criminals). We did not
have a scenario that have a clearly controversial or “negative”
intention (e.g., surveillance or mission creep). Having futuris-
tic and/or “negative” scenarios may solicit different (and pre-
sumably more negative) perceptions of drones. In addition, we
did not design the scenarios for highlighting the different affor-
dances between drones and other tracking technologies (e.g.,
camera phones and CCTV). This limitation means that our
study may miss some perceived differences between drones
and other tracking technologies. Furthermore, each scenario
presented a one-off drone use and thus did not highlight the
possibility of continuous, repeated or multiple drone uses over
an extended period of time. These long-term uses of drones
and down-stream data analyses can evoke perceptions that we
did not uncover. While some of our scenarios represented or-
ganizational uses of drones (e.g., Amazon package delivery, or
the police uses drones for searching criminals), our informants
seemed more cognizant of individual controllers than what or-
ganizations can do with drones and what data they can collect
and use over time.
Third, our results are based on a limited sample size and
the majority of our informants were university students in the
US. This means that our findings might not be generalizable
to the general population. University students can be more ac-
cepting of new technologies. Therefore, the general population
may have even more privacy concerns over drone use than
what we reported. In addition, we did not explicitly recruit
for informants with varying social-economic status (e.g., mi-
norities, vulnerable populations, or people with low incomes).
People with these backgrounds may have different perceptions
or concerns that we did not uncover.
Fourth, while we showed our informants an actual drone,
flied it and showed them its live video feed when the weather
permitted, it might be still difficult for them to think about this
relatively unfamiliar technology. Since most of our informants
were not very familiar with drones, they may have been fo-
cused more on undesirable aspects (e.g., new technology can
bring privacy risks) than their actual perceptions. However, we
did ask the perceived benefits of drones at the beginning of the
interviews, so our informants were not biased to only consider
the risky aspect of drones.
Fifth, we asked our informants to compare drones with
camera phones and CCTV, two familiar tracking technologies,
as references. We could have included other tracking technolo-
gies such as wearable cameras, which may elicit additional in-
sights. However, people are generally less familiar with wear-
able cameras, making them less ideal as references.
Lastly, we used a specific drone in our study. This might
limit our results as other examples of drones may elicit differ-
ent perceptions.
6 Conclusion
Once a military technology, civilian drones are rapidly mov-
ing into the daily lives of people in the US and other coun-
tries. Our interview study is a first step towards understand-
ing people’s nuanced perceptions of drones. Our informants
identified both potential benefits and promising applications of
drones, but also safety, security and privacy issues. Our results
also suggest that drone is more than just another tracking and
recording technology. Its potential for surveillance and impact
on people’s physical and information privacy is almost unpar-
alleled. The duality of drone implies that, metaphorically, the
flying eyes (drones and their controllers) can enter and peek
into people’s private spaces and lives together. As a result,
drone controllers should be held accountable for what they and
drones do. Lastly, while the FAA has proposed drone rules to
focus primarily on safety and security issues, our study pro-
vides timely empirical evidence that people’s privacy concerns
of drones are real, nuanced, and must be addressed.
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A.1 General questions about drones
1. Have you heard of drones? What is the first thing that
comes to your mind when you hear about drones?
2. What have you heard about drones?
3. How do you feel about drones?
4. Do you see any benefits or issues of drones?
5. What information do you think drones can collect about
you?
6. Did you know that you can record video with drones?
7. Why do you think someone would want to have a drone?
8. How would you compare recording by a drone with
recording by a cell phone with a camera? Why?
9. How would you compare recording by a drone with
recording by a CCTV camera? Why?
10. How do you feel about being around with a flying drone?
Why?
11. Would you want someone who plans to fly a drone near
you to ask for your permission before recording a video?
A.2 Context-based questions
12. Are there situations in which you would be more willing
to let drone flying round you and recording?
13. For each of the following scenarios, please indicate if you
would accept this drone usage. Please explain the reason-
ing behind your decisions.
(a) Imagine you are in a shopping mall where a promo-
tion event is going on, like on the Black Friday. The
store owner decides to use a drone to monitor and
record this event, and you happen to be in that event.
(b) Imagine you are at your friend’s party, and your
friend decides to use a drone to record the party.
(c) Imagine that Amazon decides to use drones to deliver
goods that you have bought in its online store to your
house.
(d) Imagine you are in a parade. Some news agency de-
cides to use a drone to record the parade.
(e) Imagine that there are some suspects or criminals
lurking in your residential area. The police depart-
ment decides to use drones to search for these people
in your residential area.
Do you have any other thought about drones’ possible ap-
plications?
14. Have any of your expectations changed on drones?
15. Are there any circumstances in which you would NOT
like drones to collect data about you?
16. Are you aware of any laws dealing with drones?
17. Do you have any additional comments?
A.3 Expected notification and control
The following questions were inspired by: Drone Aircraft
Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013 (proposed but not
enacted in the US).
18. Do you expect to have the list of individuals who have the
authority to operate or who are operating drones?
19. Do you expect to be notified about the exact locations of
the operating drones?
20. Do you expect to be notified about the time periods during
which drones can/will be operated?
21. Do you expect to be notified about the types of informa-
tion that the operating drones might collect?
The following questions were adapted from a RFID user
study [29].
22. Do you expect to be asked for any kind of “explicit con-
sent” to allow drones to fly near you? Why?
23. Do you expect to see detailed explanations if a drone takes
pictures or videos that can capture you? Why?
24. Do you expect to have any control over your privacy re-
garding drones operated or owned by others? Why? If you
do have such expectations of control, could you give me
an example?
Appendix B
Table 12.1: Full list of participants’ perceived benefits of smart homes
Group Participants Perceived pros/benefits Perceived cons/risks
1 P1 Convenient (e.g., playing
music); cool
Device could go off some-
times (e.g., Amazon Echo
started to play music by it-
self); lack of data control
P2 Quick access to easy tasks
(e.g., turning off living
room lights)
Device not functioning
properly due to the lack
of power (e.g., smart locks
would be tough to deal with
if the power went off)
250
P3 Convenient (e.g., checking
local weather quickly)
Security camera caused sig-
nificant privacy concerns;
no concern if consent was
granted, but would have
privacy concerns if no con-
sent was provided
2 P4 Providing proof for law en-
forcement (e.g., Amazon
Echo recorded the process
of a murder case)
The more you put on tech-
nology, the more vulnera-
ble you become; lack of
regulations on smart home
devices usage
P5 Ensuring home safety (e.g.,
remote access through
security camera and record
break-ins); convenient;
cool
Smart home could take
over the house and do
crazy things (e.g., let bur-
glar come in)
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P6 Cool (e.g., interacting with
Google Home was very fu-
turistic)
Potential data sharing
among multiple users of
the same devices (e.g.,
roommate); long term
impact on people’s accep-
tance of data collection
3 P7 Convenient (e.g., playing
music on Spotify through
Amazon Echo)
Users’ habits were not
formed (e.g., she only used
Amazon Echo to play mu-
sic)
P8 Made home more accessi-
ble (e.g., proving conve-
nience for people with dis-
ability)
Could be privacy intrusive
for people with disabilities
(e.g., blind users could not
know the running status of
the security camera); lack
of awareness in general
P9 Home automation made
some tasks easier (e.g.,
smart coffee maker could
be controlled by the phone
to make coffee)
Security camera could be
very intrusive and record
every single move; security
camera could be hidden
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P10 Convenient (e.g., voice
communication with Ama-
zon Echo to check the pack-
age status)
Had a long learning curve
(e.g., he had to learn how
to use the devices through
YouTube videos)




P12 Easy connection with other
family members (e.g., us-
ing Amazon Show)
Expensive; manufacturers
could collect and abuse
data
5 P13 Convenient (e.g., making
calls through voice assis-
tant); ensuring home safety
(e.g., outdoor security cam-






P14 Easy connection with other
family members and ensur-
ing in-home safety (e.g.,
sharing live videos through
security camera app so
that other family members
could see him if he fell)
Privacy concerns (e.g.,
sharing the videos all the
time); Internet connection
could be difficult for
people who stayed at the
senior citizen centers
P15 Convenient (e.g., let people
come into the house using
smartphone)
Security risks (e.g., hack-
ing the phone and getting
access to the house)




P17 Convenient (e.g., making
calls, remotely monitoring
kids and pets at home)




the audios after 45s)
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P18 Safer than the Internet; con-
venient
Expensive; lack of trust to-
wards manufacturers (e.g.,
smart home devices made
by small manufacturers
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Computer-Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing (CSCW 
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Smart Home Environment. Networked Privacy Workshop of the ACM 
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI 2018), 
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Experience of a Hybrid Location Sensing System. In Extended Abstracts of 
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Civilian Drones in the US. The 12th Symposium on Usable Privacy and 
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34-39. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/3358904  
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T12 “Privacy Perceptions and Designs of Bystanders in Smart Homes.” 
ACM CSCW, Austin, TX, November 2019 
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T11. INVITED: “‘What if?’ Predicting Individual Users’ Smart Home 
Privacy Preferences and Their Changes.”  
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) PrivacyCon, Washington D.C., June 
2019 
T10. “Defending My Castle: A Co-Design Study of Privacy Mechanisms for 
Smart Homes.”  
ACM CHI, Glasgow, UK, May 2019 
T9. “Explore Privacy in Smart Homes from a Multi-Stakeholder 
Perspective.” 
iConference, Baltimore, MD, March 2019 
T8. INVITED: “Defending My Castle: A Co-Design Study of Privacy 
Mechanisms for Smart Homes.”  
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T7. “Exploring a Speculative Design Approach for Inclusive Privacy and 
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HICSS, Big Island, HI, January 2014 
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D2. ACM Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work and Social 
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• IST 800 Privacy Policy, Law, and Technology, Doctoral-level, Spring 2018 
Facilitated in-class discussion 
• IST 649 Human Interaction w/Computers, Master-level, Fall 201 
Gave guest lecture on prototyping; led in-class paper discussion  
• IST 719 Information Visualization, Master-level, Spring 2016 
Gave guest lecture on creating interactive plots using R and D3.js; led in-
class discussion and exercise 
• IST 687 Applied Data Science, Master-level, Fall 2015   
Gave guest lecture on data cleaning using R; led in-class exercises; hold 
weekly office hours               
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